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ABSTRACT 
 
Reasonable disagreement about rights is commonly thought to challenge the legitimacy 
of political liberalism and judicial review. If citizens persistently and reasonably disagree about 
basic rights, how can any state adopt laws that all citizens can reasonably accept? Why can a 
handful of judges impose their beliefs about rights on other citizens? I develop a Kantian theory 
of legitimacy and public reason that responds to these common challenges.  
Conscientious people will inevitably disagree about their basic rights, because those 
rights involve vague or contested concepts. In the face of such disagreement, individuals can 
interact rightfully only if they accept a third-party authority to specify the positive content of 
rights through general laws. Accordingly, individuals are morally obligated to adopt and support 
some authority capable of adopting and enforcing general laws that specify their rights.  
However, citizens may accept the choices of a purported authority only if it remains 
accountable to citizens in the right way. A legitimate state need not let citizens define rights or 
adopt definitions that they endorse, even indirectly. Rather, a legitimate state adopts institutions 
that empowers citizens to challenge its definitions of rights and responds to those challenges in 
reasons citizens “appreciate,” even if they do not and will never endorse those reasons. Using 
possible worlds semantics, I disambiguate the idea of “reasons that all can accept” and defend 
“appreciation” as the foundation of public reason.  
On this theory, a moderate form of judicial review can enhance a state’s political 
legitimacy. Unlike other forms of political accountability such as elections, judicial review gives 
individual citizens the right to demand the state justify its decisions and enables the state as a 
collective entity to articulate a justification.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Justice is not politically neutral. We can agree about the abstract limits of justice, but 
those agreements disintegrate when we discuss the basic rights that frame our everyday lives. 
The public debates in the United States about sexuality, reproduction and drug use manifest our 
underlying disagreements about the right to autonomy and bodily integrity. Disputes about taxes, 
the environment and labor unions reflect disagreements about the scope of property rights and 
the right to association. As was evident in the recent 2012 election, we even disagree about core 
political rights, such as freedom of expression and the right to vote.  
Such disagreements are inevitable and often reasonable. In a free society, citizens will not 
converge on shared beliefs about basic rights, because the definition and application of basic 
rights involve complex normative judgments about values that are vague and perhaps 
incommensurable. What John Rawls called the “fact of reasonable pluralism” and the “burdens 
of judgment” apply not only to moral or religious theories but also to theories of justice.1  
Many political and legal philosophers believe that persistent, reasonable disagreement 
about justice undermines liberal theories of legitimacy. The liberal principle of legitimacy says 
that a state is legitimate only if it justifies coercion in terms that all citizens can accept. When 
citizens reasonably disagree about their basic rights, it seems impossible to find reasons that they 
all could accept to justify state coercion. Faced with similar worries about disagreement, political 
and legal philosophers often retreat to forms of proceduralism. If it is possible to justify a 
political procedure without favoring one theory of justice, then all citizens have some reasons to 
accept political decisions made through that procedure, even citizens who believe the position is 
unjust. Typically, these theorists appeal to forms of majoritarianism.  
In legal theory, this argument from disagreement arises most often in the debate about 
judicial review. If citizens inevitably and reasonably disagree about the precise scope of their 
constitutional rights, then a handful of judges should not have the authority to define those rights 
using their own controversial judgments, much less entrench those decisions against future 
 
1 John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (“PL”) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993): 35-40 
(I.6), 54-58 (II.2).  
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revision by the people, legislatures or future courts. In the United States, this argument is made 
from all sides of the political spectrum. Decisions about abortion, sexual privacy, marriage, 
affirmative action, gun ownership and campaign financing have all been criticized for taking 
decisions about controversial rights away from the people and their elected representatives.  
In this dissertation, I argue that despite their initial plausibility, these arguments from 
disagreement are fundamentally mistaken. Once we reveal the sources of persistent disagreement 
about rights, the scope of that disagreement is not sufficient to undermine liberal legitimacy. On 
the contrary, the fact of reasonable disagreement grounds the obligation to accept fair terms for 
cooperation, the core of a Kantian theory of legitimacy. A state is legitimate so long as it adopts 
institutions that permit citizens to challenge its decisions and responds with public justifications 
using reasons those citizens appreciate. The fact of reasonable disagreement does not undermine 
this type of appreciation. Theorists of disagreement demand too little from citizens. The state can 
offer reasons that all citizens appreciate, even those who believe its decisions violate basic rights, 
because people appreciate reasons they do not or will not endorse. Using this liberal theory of 
legitimacy, I show that the legitimacy of a constitutional democracy can be enhanced by a 
moderate form of judicial review.  
* * * 
Chapter 2 introduces the problem that disagreement about basic rights poses for liberal 
legitimacy. I use Jeremy Waldron as my exemplar, because he offers the most sophisticated 
argument that disagreement about rights provides a reason not to entrench rights or permit 
judicial review. According to Waldron, citizens in contemporary western societies are broadly 
committed to protecting rights, but they persistently and sincerely disagree about what rights 
exist and about their definition, for reasons similar to those that divide philosophers about rights. 
Such reasonable disagreement gives us a reason to be humble and resist imposing our preferred 
definition of rights on others. We should prefer greater participation in the settlement of our 
rights disputes, because majoritarian decisions offer the benefits of coordination, while giving 
each citizen the most influence she can have consistent with equal influence for all. Judicial 
review, in contrast, gives a handful of judges the power to enact their vision of basic rights.  
In Chapter 3, I use Waldron as a foil to evaluate the moral implications of persistent 
disagreement about rights. I argue that the fact of disagreement presumes sufficient agreement to 
undermine Waldron’s strong conclusions. Disagreement theorists tend to lump all disagreements 
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together, but the source of disagreement is significant. Four sources of persistent disagreement 
are consistent with arguments from disagreement: (1) ambiguity, (2) vagueness, (3) contested 
concepts and (4) mistakes caused by difficult normative judgments. Disputes grounded in 
ambiguity are not disagreements at all. Vague or contested rights, however, have a realm of 
indeterminacy that supports persistent and reasonable disagreement. Finally, epistemic mistakes 
may support persistent disagreement, but do not expand the scope of reasonable disagreement 
beyond the vague or contested contours of basic rights.  
Epistemic humility, I argue, does not require states to accommodate positions outside a 
right’s vague or contested contours, unless the proponents of such outlier positions can offer a 
justification using reasons that recognizably bear on the vague or contested rights (which brings 
their position back inside those contours). This negatively defined condition is the first limit on 
the scope of reasonable disagreement. A position is unreasonable if it can be supported only by 
reasons no one can accept as an equal, such as racial superiority, or by ignoring central 
components of the ordinary content of rights, such as religious establishment. This is little 
comfort, however. Many basics rights are vague or contested, but the state must choose some 
specification. Whatever choice it makes, many will reasonably consider its decision illegitimate.  
In the remainder of the dissertation, beginning from the ground up, I propose a Kantian 
theory of liberal legitimacy that explains how it is possible to have legitimate political authority 
despite reasonable disagreement about vague or contested rights. Citizens who accept an 
obligation to respect rights are obligated to support a public authority if it (1) selects a reasonable 
specification of their vague and contested basic rights and (2) consistently responds to dissenting 
citizens with public justifications in terms they appreciate. I will call this specific theory an 
institutional conception of liberal legitimacy (I need a catchier name).  
Chapter 4 introduces the distinction between legitimacy and justification and presents the 
Kantian justification for the state. I follow John Simmons’ distinction between political 
legitimacy and justification.2 Political justification is an impersonal demonstration that people 
should accept states in general. Political legitimacy shows why specific individuals are 
normatively bound to obey a particular state, independent of prudential concerns to avoid 
sanctions. In the Kantian theory I defend, these two political norms are intertwined. States are 
 
2 John Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” in Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations 
(New York: Cambridge, 2001): 133-157. 
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justified because rightful relations between individuals are possible only if a third party settles 
disputes about vague or contested basic rights. A state is legitimate insofar as it demonstrates to 
dissenting citizens, in terms they appreciate, that it protects a reasonable specification of their 
rights. If a state succeeds in this latter task, it grounds their obligation to accept its authority by 
demonstrating that it fulfills its general function.  
More precisely, we are obligated to adopt some political authority, because without a 
shared authority to specify the positive content of basic rights, I will either violate others rights 
by imposing my specification on them or violate my duty of self-respect by acquiescing when 
they impose their specification on me. Individuals can escape this problem by accepting a third-
party authority to supply a specification to bind them reciprocally. Unfortunately, they must 
abdicate their judgment to this third party, which leads to a regression. Individuals face a 
dilemma: they are obliged to maintain a practical authority but abdicating their judgment to this 
third party violates their duty of self-respect.  
The Kantian theory of legitimacy resolves the dilemma by avoiding the regression. 
According to my institutional conception of liberal legitimacy,  
A particular state is legitimate insofar as (a) its laws and actions respect a reasonable 
specification of vague or contested basic rights and (b) it follows procedures that 
publicly demonstrate to citizens that its laws and actions respect reasonable 
specifications using reasons that citizens appreciate.  
The final part of Chapter 4 explains this substantive component of legitimacy (a). A state that is 
not minimally just is not legitimate. Even if citizens accept its authority, they have not accepted 
its authority because it fulfills its function of enabling rightful relations. They have no obligation 
to accept its coercion. On the other hand, once citizens recognize their state is minimally just, it 
is substantively legitimate and they are obligated not to resist its laws with force, even if they 
believe its specifications violate basic rights. By resisting laws on those grounds, they insist that 
rights should be defined according to their judgment and thus undermine the basis of rightful 
relations. Chapter 4 ends by defusing the common objection that this obligation to accept state 
authority is a form of political absolutism.  
Chapter 5 explains how the procedural component of liberal legitimacy (b) supplies the 
solution to this apparent regression. When the state is required to publicly justify its decisions to 
citizens, citizens do not abdicate their judgment but use it to judge whether the states’ decisions 
  
5 
are reasonable. I also begin to sketch a theory of public reason. Citizens are able to recognize 
public justification as reasonable, despite disagreeing with the outcome and the reasons relied 
upon, because citizens appreciate reasons they do not endorse. 
The procedural component of legitimacy says that a state is legitimate only if citizens can 
demand that officials explain why their actions are consistent with basic rights and officials 
successfully respond with justifications using reasons that the citizens appreciate. When citizens 
recognize that the state satisfies this principle, they do not abrogate their judgment by accepting 
its conclusions – indeed, they exercise their judgment to identify its decisions as reasonable. 
Now, they are both obligated and permitted to accept the public authority.  
But, in a situation of reasonable disagreement about rights, how can the state offer public 
justifications in reasons that can all citizens accept? My first task is ground-clearing. Rawls’ idea 
of overlapping consensus encourages the mistaken idea that legitimacy requires citizens to 
endorse the constitutional essentials. Theorists typically assume a theory of public reason must 
identify shared reasons for this endorsement. However, attempts to specify a list of public 
reasons vacillate between two unappealing alternatives: (1) it includes any reasons that citizens 
actually accept, in which case reasonable disagreement makes liberal legitimacy impossible; or 
(2) it includes reasons that it is reasonable to accept, in which case legitimacy reduces to justice. 
These alternatives, represented by Waldron and Rawls, make the same mistakes. They assume all 
citizens must directly or indirectly endorse a state’s conception of basic rights, and they try to 
identify the reasons that citizens can use for endorsement in advance of institutional deliberation. 
My account of “appreciation” explains how citizens can accept a state’s actions without 
direct or indirect endorsement. The set of reasons citizens can accept is not limited to the reasons 
they endorse, will or would endorse after being presented with them, or even that all reasonable 
persons would endorse. Citizens can “appreciate” reasons that they do not or will never endorse. 
Intuitively, these are the reasons that are “in the ballpark.” More formally, citizens appreciate 
reasons insofar as accepting those reasons would require revision of their actual beliefs. This 
ability to appreciate reasons enables citizens to recognize when a state offers a reasonable 
justification for its specification of vague or contested rights, even if that justification appeals to 
reasons they reject. A reasonable citizen is one who can judge when her state’s justifications rest 
on reasons she appreciates but does not endorse. However, analysis of this concept of 
reasonableness will not identify a determinate set of public reasons. The reasons that citizens 
  
6 
appreciate develop through their ongoing relationship with particular public authorities. Public 
reasons can be separated from nonpublic reasons only by following procedures that empower 
citizens to challenge state actions and forcing officials to articulate public justifications.  
Chapter 6 provides a formal definition of “appreciation” by presenting a modal analysis 
of the idea of “reasons all can accept.” Although the idea of possible acceptance is crucially 
ambiguous, I have found no rigorous analysis of this counterfactual idea. As I survey the 
conceptual space, I argue that my notion of appreciation offers the best philosophical 
reconstruction of the idea that there are “reasons all can accept.”  
Possible acceptance is typically articulated as a counterfactual moral idealization (e.g. she 
would accept the reason, if she were reasonable); historically accessible counterfactuals (e.g. she 
would have accepted the reason, if she had been exposed to it; will accept it, after she is exposed 
to it; or will accept it, if the state presents it in a public justification); or as an idealized historical 
counterfactuals (e.g. she would accept the reason, after rational or reasonable reflection or after 
engaging in reasonable dialogue). I argue that these interpretations of possible acceptance fail to 
take seriously the individual as she is, particularly when one universalizes these interpretations to 
ask where it is possible for all citizens to accept the reason. In addition, most of them offer no 
real limits, unless one evaluates the similarity between the individual and her counterpart.  
Instead, I propose that possible acceptance should be understood as a counterfactual 
based on bare similarity. The intuitive idea is that we can ask how different a person's beliefs and 
the world would have to be for her to accept a reason; the more different, the less she will 
appreciate the reason. Stated formally, a person can accept a reason if there is a possible world in 
which she has a counterpart who accepts the reason and this world is sufficiently similar to the 
actual world. The important task is to specify criteria to identify “sufficiently similar worlds,” 
which I suggest include (1) how different are the facts about the world; (2) how different are her 
beliefs, (3) and how long and broad are the reasoning chains needed for her counterpart to accept 
the proposed reason. This is an objective judgment about which individuals can be mistaken. 
However, each individual judgment is highly nuanced and may even depend on judgments that 
she has never made before. The universal judgment that all citizens can accept a certain reason is 
beyond the analytical abilities of any state actor. As a result, public officials have no choice but 
to develop procedures likely to facilitate appreciation and let legitimacy be determined by 
citizens’ actual judgments.  
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Finally, Chapter 7 brings this institutional conception of liberal legitimacy to bear on the 
practical construction of legal institutions and the use of public reason. In particular, returning to 
the topic that began the dissertation, I focus on the relationship between the power of judicial 
review and legitimacy. I argue that judicial review for basic rights supports liberal legitimacy by 
empowering individual citizens to demand the state as a collective articulate a reasonable 
justification for actions that impact basic rights. A careful combination of doctrinal and 
institutional restraints can help ensure the state is required to articulate public justifications while 
reconciling judicial power with reciprocity. Finally, the classical doctrine of stare decisis 
supplements judicial review, enabling the judiciary over time to develop a specification of rights 
and public reasons that is, in a real sense, not reducible to the will of a particular individual or 
identifiable group.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
PERSISTENT DISAGREEMENT AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
 
Most discussions of judicial review begin with a rhetorically charged question: If basic 
rights depend on moral issues that permit conscientious disagreement, why should the beliefs of 
five unelected justices prevail over the views of democratic citizens? On abortion, marriage, 
affirmative action or campaign financing, American public opinion varies regionally and 
nationally, academics quarrel and Supreme Court decisions consistently fall five to four. Critics 
of judicial review argue that, in the face of such disagreement, judges should defer to the laws 
enacted by legislators or the people. When judges define rights using their own controversial 
moral judgments, they usurp the right of democratic citizens to participate in the recognition and 
interpretation of their rights. Disagreement justifies a theory of democratic deference.  
Arguments from disagreement appear in the most influential constitutional theories of the 
twentieth century, often as a motivation for the infamous “majoritarian premise.” In Democracy 
and Distrust, for example, John Hart Ely argues that judicial review for substantive rights is 
illegitimate, because the moral principles needed to define and apply rights are either too 
indeterminate to exclude legislative interpretations or too controversial for legitimate use in a 
democracy.1 Similar arguments appear in political philosophy. So-called “pure procedural 
theories of justice” often argue that pluralism about justice undermines agreement on substantive 
principles of justice, but not on principles of fair democratic procedure.2 The most sustained and 
sophisticated defense of this argument appears in the work of Jeremy Waldron.  
Waldron argues that democratic citizens agree on the need to protect basic rights but 
persistently and reasonably disagree about them because individuals have limited evidence and 
imperfect reasoning abilities. When an individual faces the persistent possibility of error, the 
rational response is to remain modest and avoid entrenching her positions. Yet, protecting rights 
requires a shared legal scheme to coordinate our efforts. We need an authoritative procedure to 
select a scheme of rights and a way to justify that procedure. The procedure and its justification, 
 
1 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1980): 44-59.  
2 See Joshua Cohen, "Pluralism and Proceduralism," Chicago Kent Law Review 69 (1994): 589-618. 
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however, can settle our rights dispute only if they are appropriately neutral. We cannot justify the 
procedure for selecting rights by claiming it is the procedure most likely to define rights 
correctly; instead, we must rely on second-order concerns of respect and fairness. These second 
order reasons favor participatory majoritarianism, because we respect citizens’ equal dignity by 
giving her a right to participate in the definition of rights.  
In this chapter, I reconstruct Waldron’s argument in detail, identifying and clarifying 
various critically obscure premises. In Chapter 3, I will argue that this type of argument fails to 
appreciate the implications of the sources of disagreement.  
2.1 REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT PREVENTS APPEAL TO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 
I should emphasize several explicit assumptions of Waldron’s argument from the outset. 
First, he eschews consequentialist and relativist arguments for or against judicial review. For 
example, Adrian Vermeule argues judges have limited information and are imperfectly rational, 
and would reach better outcomes by deferring to legislative resolutions of vague or aspirational 
constitutional clauses.3 Waldron believes such outcome-related concerns are inconclusive (see 
infra 2.2.1), but also rejects such arguments for illicitly assuming a set of social goals despite 
purporting to respect disagreement (see infra 2.1.4.3). Other critics of judicial review like Robert 
Bork believe that disagreement supports non-cognitivism or skepticism and, thus, that judges 
should not second-guess democratic decisions.4 In contrast, Waldron argues that disagreement 
would create legitimacy problems even in a world of moral realists (see infra 2.1.2).5 
Second, Waldron’s argument is ideal in two senses. First, he compares democratic and 
judicial institutions in “good working order.” By this he means that (1) democratic processes 
include universal suffrage, structural safeguards and legislatures able to review and remedy 
problems of equality and (2) judicial processes have typical structural features like precedent, 
adversarial proceedings and selection processes to ensure independence and judicial training. 
Second, society takes rights seriously. Although committed to majority rule and the common 
good, citizens care about and consider rights in their decisions. They accept that rights protect 
 
3 Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 2006): 231-88. 
4 Robert Bork, Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free Press, 1990): 255-260. 
5 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (“LD”) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): Ch. 8. While 
sympathetic to moral non-cognitivism, Waldron devotes an entire chapter to “The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity.” 
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interests that should not to be denied for mere efficiency and minorities are entitled to greater 
insulation from political processes than guaranteed by their numbers.6 With these preliminaries 
out of the way, on to the main event.  
2.1.1 Reasonable Disagreement Exists about Basic Rights 
Waldron’s first premise is that democracies cannot avoid reasonable disagreement about 
rights, because philosophical uncertainty infects political decisions. Philosophically, we disagree 
about rights-bearers (animals, fetuses, etc.), the interests rights protect (dignity, equality, etc.), 
their balance against social interests (defense, stability, etc.), and the duties and priorities they 
justify (lexical or weighted priorities, prima facie or absolute duties, etc.).7 This philosophical 
uncertainty reemerges when citizens debate rights, legislators draft statutes to protect rights and 
judges apply rights in hard cases. One might hope to reach consensus on core rights and relegate 
dissent to the peripheries, but our disagreements about religion, speech, abortion, property and 
drugs are “watershed issues.” These disputes are not about the margins of vague rights but about 
the core applications of our basic conceptions of justice.8 
Moreover, these disagreements about rights persist because what Rawls calls “the 
burdens of judgment” apply to judgments about the right as well as the good. Given the hazards 
of applying imperfect human reason to delicate and complex balances of interests, even sincere 
and conscientious individuals inevitably and reasonably reach different conclusions about what 
basic rights exist and how they apply to particular situations.9  
Waldron distinguishes this explanation for the persistence of disagreement from 
alternative explanations. First, he argues is “unrealistic” to explain all such disagreements as the 
result of ignorance, self-interest or power politics. We should hesitate before positing such 
cynical explanations. It is easy to infer bad faith on simple issues, where only ignorance or bad 
faith can support dissent. We need not resort to cynicism to explain disagreement about rights, 
which invoke difficult issues that divide professionals who are not subject to time-constraints.10  
Second, the argument does not assume relativism or skepticism about rights. Irresolvable 
 
6 Jeremy Waldron, "The Core of the Case against Judicial Review," Yale Law Journal 115 (2006): 1359-63.  
7 Jeremy Waldron, "A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13.1 (1993): 
18-51. 
8 Waldron, “Core,” 1367.  
9 Ibid. 1366-69; Waldron, LD, 112, 151-52, 225-30. 
10 Waldron, LD, 111-12, 224, 230. 
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disagreement is consistent with moral truth, as long as the “truth of the matter discloses itself in 
ways that are not reasonably undeniable.”11 The problem concerns the limits of moral 
epistemology and political discourse. We lack a moral epistemology not “associated directly 
with a particular set of substantive moral claims: naturalism with utilitarianism, intuitionism with 
deontology … and so on.”12 This does not mean there is no truth or truth is indiscernible. Rather, 
given the limits of human reason, it is unreasonable to demand political consensus on the truth or 
an epistemological method to determine the truth. Even if I possess justified true beliefs, others 
may reasonably disagree because even true justified beliefs “never appear in politics in propria 
persona, but only – if at all – in the form of somebody’s controversial belief.”13  
Finally, Waldron’s claim that “reasonable” people can disagree in “good faith” should be 
distinguished from Rawls’ conception of “reasonableness.” For Rawls, reasonableness is a moral 
ideal.14 Reasonable pluralism exists when comprehensive moral doctrines can justify the core 
principles of a political conception of justice. Religious truth is off the political agenda, not 
because it is controversial, but because liberty of conscience makes it a morally inappropriate 
subject for political decision. Waldron, in contrast, cannot define the scope of “reasonable” 
disagreement by appeal to rights, which are the very subject of the disagreement.15 Waldron 
never offers a precise definition of “reasonable disagreement.” However, he relies almost 
exclusively on epistemic limits, so I think a fair interpretation defines a disagreement as 
“reasonable” whenever people reach contrary positions after exercising their moral powers in 
good faith, but subject to the burdens of judgment.  
2.1.2 Reasonable Disagreement Provides a Reason for Modesty 
The existence of disagreement alerts us to the possibility that we are mistaken and should 
lead us to adopt a position of “modesty.” Once we acknowledge the difficulty of rights 
judgments and the extent of disagreement among sincere individuals, we should “not evince the 
same mistrust of our opponent's suggestions nor indeed the same dogmatic confidence in our 
 
11 Waldron, “Core,” 1368. 
12 Waldron, LD, 254. 
13 Waldron, LD, 111. 
14 John Rawls, PL, 62. 
15 Waldron, LD, 157. 
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own.”16 Although we cannot believe a proposition without believing it is correct, we hold our 
beliefs with various degrees of “conviction” and we can combine even strong conviction with 
“openness to counter-argument and refutation in the future.”17 Modesty does not require us to 
alter our conclusions but to reduce our confidence in those conclusions.  
This modesty provides a prima facie reason not to entrench one conception of rights 
against future revision. Once disagreement reminds us of our fallibility, we “should be less 
inclined to cast [our] conclusions in stone, and more open to the possibility that subsequent 
debate among [our] fellow citizens will from time to time produce conclusions that are better 
than [our] own.”18 Philosophical dialogue assumes a similar modesty, in hopes that disagreement 
results in better theories. We should extend similar modesty and civility to political dialogues.19 
Although Waldron never says so explicitly, this is a form of epistemic modesty resting on norms 
of rational belief.  
2.1.3 The Need for Concerted Action Justifies Authority 
Epistemic modesty, however, cannot lead us to suspend judgment or action. People 
committed to living with others while respecting rights need a common scheme to adjudicate 
rights disputes. Waldron calls the “felt need among members of a certain group for a common 
framework or decision or course of action on some matter, even in the face of disagreement 
about that framework, decision or course of action" the “circumstances of politics.” The 
circumstances of politics are (1) persistent disagreement and (2) a felt need for concerted 
action.20 I have discussed disagreement, but what is the “felt need for concerted action”?  
Waldron thinks the “felt need” is a response to pure and partial conflict coordination 
problems. If I accept the independent “moral urgency” of protecting rights and that only 
concerted action can protect them, then the adoption of a common scheme despite disagreement 
is a significant achievement that deserves respect and those underlying rights justify an 
“imperative sense of constraint” to follow the scheme.21 Waldron surmises that rights disputes 
are often partial conflict coordination problems. His central example is rape law. Rape laws are a 
 
16 Ibid. 224. 
17 Ibid. 227. 
18 Ibid. 224. 
19 Ibid. 227, 311. 
20 Ibid. 102. 
21 Ibid. 117.  
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justified means to protect the right to bodily integrity, but they require many details about 
consent, mistakes and age about which persons reasonably disagree. For instance, even if my 
theory of autonomy may leads me to support a specific theory of consent for rape cases, I should 
prefer a less than optimal law to having a law limited only to uncontroversial cases.22  
Assuming the felt need for concerted action gives us a reason to accept some resolution, 
what reasons are there to prefer a particular decision? Waldron hopes to circumvent substantive 
disagreements by moving to procedural fairness. As justice is only morally valuable in 
conditions of scarcity and limited altruism, fairness is only morally valuable in the circumstances 
of politics, when a community needs to adopt a controversial principle despite disagreements 
about justice. A theory of legitimate authority supplements a theory of rights by justifying a 
procedure despite persistent disagreement about substantive claims caused by epistemic limits.23  
2.1.4 The Need for Content-Independent Justifications of Decision-Procedures 
What type of procedures can settle disputes, and what reasons can justify choosing one in 
procedure? Waldron maintains that substantive disagreement drastically limits our options. 
When choosing a procedure to settle disputes about rights, appeal to rights will beg the question. 
The rule to identify which view we adopt and the justification for that rule must be independent 
of the merits of the issue that the rule is meant to settle.24 The procedure will reignite the dispute 
if either it or its justification is not neutral with respect to the underlying substantive dispute.25 I 
will call this the neutrality condition. It is Waldron’s key philosophical move and similar ideas 
motivate many objections to judicial review. On closer analysis, the neutrality condition includes 
three distinct constraints, constraints that Waldron never clearly distinguishes. The first two, 
derived from positivist limits on the logic of authority, limit the type of procedures that can be 
authoritative. The third, derived from concerns of political legitimacy, limits the type of reasons 
that can support an authoritative procedure.  
2.1.4.1 Positivist limit one: no reference to rights in directives or procedural rules 
Waldron writes that we need an “arbitrary criterion” to “identify” one of the proposed but 
controversial policies as “ours.” He is relying on a generic positivist conception of law. A legal 
 
22 Ibid. 105.  
23 Waldron, LD, 189; Waldron, “Core,” 1372, 1386. 
24 Waldron, LD, 96. 
25 Waldron, “Core”, 1373.  
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authority can settle disputes only if its procedure and decisions can be identified without 
reevaluating the merits of the dispute.26 The procedure must appear arbitrary with respect to the 
substance of the disputes it will settle. A rule of the form “Do whatever is right” must fail, “for it 
is precisely the disagreement about the application of [this rule] that gives rise to the decision-
problem in the first place.”27  
A procedure may fail this positivist limit in two ways. First, a practical directive cannot 
settle disputes if subjects must revisit the same substantive issues to determine how to follow the 
directives. A physician who instructs a patient to “Take the appropriate medicine for your 
disease” is not a successful practical authority. To follow the order, the patient must diagnose his 
own disease and identify its treatment. The doctor’s order is irrelevant to the patient’s judgment 
of the appropriate action. Legal directives fail similarly if citizens or officials must personally 
reevaluate the disputed issue to identify the content of the law. A rule like “Respect rights, 
whatever they are” transfers the power to define rights to citizens. Once I determine for myself 
what rights exist and how to balance them against other interests, my reason to follow the 
directive is coextensive with my personal estimate of what rights require. This directive does not 
alter citizens’ set of reasons and is not authoritative.28 
Second, a procedural rule fails if subjects must revisit the substantive issues to clarify 
which procedure is authoritative. The rule we use to identify what procedure to use for settling 
controversies about rights cannot appeal to those rights.29 Procedural rules must look “arbitrary” 
or “technical” with respect to the content of the issues they settle.30 Most rules meet this condition, 
including coin-flips, referenda, judicial panels or monarchical decrees. Only rules of the following 
form do not: “Use procedure X to settle issue Y, unless procedure X yields the wrong decision on 
issue Y.” The substantive dispute will reappear in disputes about whether to use procedure X or the 
rider. This rules out procedures like “Decide by majority vote, unless the majority decision violates 
basic rights.” The choice of which theory of rights to use for the rider reproduces the disagreement 
that the procedure was meant to settle.31 Waldron never admits this, but this limit does not rule out 
 
26 Waldron, LD, 203. 
27 Ibid. 107. 
28 Ibid. 203, 245. 
29 Ibid. 245.  
30 Ibid. 107. 
31 Waldron, LD, 107, 245.  
 15 
a procedure like “Decide by majority vote, unless the high court decides that the majority decision 
violates basic rights.” 
2.1.4.2 Positivist limit two: second-order reasons  
Waldron accepts Joseph Raz’s position that authoritative practical directives displace 
one’s personal judgment. A practical authority gives one a second-order reason to discount, if not 
entirely exclude, one’s personal judgment about the first-order reasons that the authority should 
use to deliberate. A second-order reasons is a reason about another reason, such as to ignore or 
not act on the other reason. For example, I accept my doctor as a practical authority only if her 
directive to avoid physical activity creates a reason for me not to decide whether to play 
basketball by balancing my desire against my estimate of the danger.  
Similarly, Waldron argues that the outcome of the procedure for settling rights disputes 
must displace my estimate of what those rights really require. A procedure cannot settle our 
disputes if we continue balancing the reasons to comply directly against, and on par with, our 
own estimate of what justice requires. This is the apparent “paradox of political authority.” 
Justice is the primary standard of right political action, but a political authority can bind me to 
decisions I consider unjust. The paradox dissolves if one has second-order reasons to accept the 
authority. Political authority is morally valuable because it permits concerted action to support 
justice. This provides a second-order reason to accept the “demanding concession” that “at least 
part of the time to view my own uncompromising convictions about justice as just one set of 
convictions among others.”32 The authoritative reasons do not alter, but displace, our first-order 
judgments about justice.  
Once we select a procedure to settle basic rights, I should not ask whether the authority 
reached the right outcome when I consider whether to respect its directives. We cannot balance, 
in each case, the reasons to respect legal outcomes directly against our estimate of what justice 
requires. “[T]he problem is not about weighing and balancing; the problem is that… we disagree 
about what ought to go into [the rights] side of the balance.… Since we disagree about whether 
these rights exist or not and about what they entail if they do, there is no neutral way of stating 
what exactly it is that is supposed to do the competing with … the principle of authority.”33 If I 
ask whether the procedure reached the right decision, then I am privileging my side of a 
 
32 Ibid. 160. 
33 Ibid. 248. 
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disagreement when evaluating the procedure meant to select which side is to prevail.34 
Attempting to fold considerations of justice back into considerations of fairness fails to treat the 
authority as creating second-order reasons and, thus, as authoritative.  
2.1.4.3 Legitimacy limit: limits imposed on the justification of authority 
Waldron’s final, and most important, constraint relates to the justification of authoritative 
procedures. The reason to comply with an authoritative procedure must rest on features of the 
procedure, not on the merit of its decisions. The conditions of political legitimacy in situations of 
disagreement, however, severely limit the reasons that can justify procedures.  
According to Waldron, modern political philosophy accepts that coercive political 
authority must be justified to the persons whose lives it will govern.  
The model-theoretic ideas of consent and social contract, and the 
corresponding constraints of publicity and transparency, commit us 
to producing arguments that purport to be intelligible to anyone 
whose interests they affect, and that - in spirit if not in idiom - are 
consonant with the arguments they would find persuasive in 
conversations with one another… Modern political philosophy… 
aims not merely to justify laws or political proposals, but to justify 
them to the ordinary men and women who they will affect.35 
Any directive backed by force could resolve coordination problems about rights. But if the goal 
is to convince, not simply force, citizens to accept one procedure for resolving disputes about 
rights, it begs the question to use a disputed conception of rights for the justification. “At the 
level of social decision… [e]xercises of social power must claim legitimacy in relation to the 
community as a whole.… They will be hard put to do this if their legitimacy is based solely upon 
conceptions of justice which some members of society reject.”36 A political decision is not 
illegitimate because the decision-maker uses a theory of rights that I reject, as we saw above 
regarding the paradox of authority. However, the selection and justification of the procedure 
cannot appeal to a particular conception and remain legitimate to citizens with differing 
conceptions. A justification that appeals to a particular theory of rights is unacceptable to its real 
targets, those who must accept coercive actions despite their disagreement about its merits.  
This legitimacy objection is Waldron’s favorite weapon. He turns it on Rawls, Dworkin, 
 
34 Ibid. 198. 
35 Ibid. 229. 
36 Waldron, LD¸ 205.  
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Mill and Raz. He rejects Raz’s theory of practical authority, for instance, because Raz’s “normal 
justification condition” can never be legitimately satisfied. According to Raz, a practical authority 
is legitimate only if following its directives improves our conformity to the reasons that would 
apply to us anyway.37 Waldron argues that when citizens disagree about justice, they will 
invariably disagree about whether a political authority satisfies this condition. Socialists know 
that tax laws enacted by a Tory parliament will not advance their conception of justice.38  
Waldron uses a similar objection against rights-instrumentalist justifications for political 
procedures, whether judicial review or majoritarianism. Waldron cannot argue that participation 
better protects rights, because these rights are “the primary subject matter of the very politics that 
participatory rights are supposed to constitute.”39 Waldron objects similarly to weaker rights-
instrumentalist positions that argue a particular procedure is the “most likely to get at the truth 
about rights, whatever that truth turns out to be.”40 He argues that one needs moral epistemology 
to identify the optimal conditions for moral judgment, but as we saw in Section 2.2, moral 
epistemology is as controversial as normative judgments. Any arguments that one procedure 
reaches more decisions that are correct must privilege one theory of moral truth and beg the 
question against others.  
Waldron also uses this argument against Rawls. Public reason, Waldron claims, can settle 
issues of basic rights only if citizens can argue from shared moral premises. The idea of 
overlapping consensus is tantamount to denying the possibility of reasonable disagreement about 
justice Rawls uses justice as fairness as the core of a family of liberal political conceptions of 
justice that will frame the limits of public reason. “Surely it is a mistake to identify the norms 
framing the public debate about justice with values and principles which are constitutive (even if 
only broadly constitutive, let alone constitutive in detail) of a particular position in that debate.”41 
In subsequent sections, we will see Waldron use this legitimacy objection against Dworkin, Mill 
 
37 Joseph Raz, “The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception,” Minnesota Law Review 90 (2006): 
1014. In addition, the issue must not be one on which personal choice or deliberation has intrinsic value. 
38 Waldron, LD, 101. A political authority must “make its demand ex hypothesi on someone who thinks he has good 
ground for believing that it is mistaken. The problem then is how… sources of law can have authority and command 
respect among people who disagree about whether they satisfy Raz’s normal justification thesis.” 
39 Ibid. 243. 
40 Ibid. 248, 254.  
41 Ibid. 154; also 157. 
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and Charles Beitz.42 
In summary, what I have called Waldron’s “neutrality condition” places three constraints 
on a theory of authority: (1) the authoritative outcomes must be identifiable without using rights-
based judgments, (2) the reasons for compliance must displace rather than compete on par with 
rights-based reasons and (3) the justification of the procedure’s legitimacy can appeal only to 
principles of fairness independent of rights theories. Waldron thinks these conditions, and the 
epistemic limits of disagreement, rule out substantive justifications for political authority. This 
seems to leave Waldron without a branch to stand on.43 Can he justify a procedure without 
violating this neutrality constraint? 
2.2 CONTENT-INDEPENDENT REASONS FAVOR GREATER DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
Waldron argues that the right to participation satisfies the three neutrality constraints and, 
thus, can be used to justify participatory majoritarianism. The right to participation is a liberty 
right to participate in public discussion and a power right to influence outcomes. It supplies 
content-independent reasons for majoritarianism, because it embodies the most robust notion of 
respect acceptable in the circumstances of politics (2.2.2) and because the reasons for respecting 
liberal rights also justify a right to control decisions regarding these rights (2.2.3).  
2.2.1 Respect and the Right to Participate 
Waldron argues that participatory majoritarianism accords each citizen the greatest 
amount of respect that it is consistent to demand under circumstances of disagreement. 
Majoritarian procedures respect the diversity of reasonable positions and each person in the 
process of generating our common view.  
First, it respects differences of opinion about justice, because it “does not require any 
view to be played down or hushed up for the fancied importance of consensus.”44 It does not 
pretend consensus exists because a theory of legitimacy requires it or a particular view is thought 
self-evident. It is appropriate for reasonable disagreement, because it does not "treat [an 
opposing view] as beneath notice in respectable deliberation by assuming that it is ignorant or 
 
42 Ibid. 294, 115 and 117. 
43 Habermas’ thinks not, but that depends on Waldron’s success in Sections 3.2. Jurgen Habermas, “On Law and 
Disagreement: Some Comments on ‘Interpretative Pluralism,’” Ratio Juris (2003): 187–94. 
44 Waldron, LD, 111. 
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prejudiced or self-interested or based on insufficient contemplation of moral reality.”45  
Second, its commitment to sharing power equally respects each person in the process of 
generating our shared view.46 Giving each person some decisional weight recognizes that, “in the 
case of each individual, the fact that that individual favours option X is a prima facie reason for 
the group to pursue option X.”47 When the procedure defines “my duties, … I have a right to a 
say in the decision-mechanisms which control their orchestrations.”48 To deny me this power 
insults my dignity as a citizen. I have a stake in the decision and possess a sense of justice 
capable of conscientiously deciding questions of basic rights. Denying my view any force 
denigrates my sense of justice as inadequate to the task and, thus, insults my basic dignity.49 
Dworkin belittles the value of voting in large democracies because each person’s vote is 
statistically insignificant,50 but Waldron sees the statistical nature as essential to our expression 
of equality. Voting instantiates equality of power “by giving each individual’s view the greatest 
weight possible in the process compatible with equal weight for the views of each of the 
others.”51 Voting reflects the “determination that when we, who need to settle on a single course 
of action, disagree about what to do, there is no reasonable basis for us in designing our decision-
procedures to accord greater weight to one side than to the other.”52  
Waldron admits this argument does not establish “that either fairness or equal respect for 
persons requires majority decision” or that direct democracy is the only process consistent with 
equal respect.53 However, he argues that participatory majoritarianism is a reasonable response to 
disagreements about justice and may be “expressive of perhaps the most robust conception of 
respect for persons we are entitled to work within those circumstances.”54  
According to Waldron, any stronger notion of respect will likely fail the neutrality 
condition. Mill, for instance, claims that unequal decisional weight is not disrespectful, because 
we prefer smarter people with more experience to make decisions. Waldron claims such 
 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 238. 
47 Ibid. 113. 
48 Ibid. 234. 
49 Ibid. 238-39. 
50 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996): 21. 
51 Waldron, LD, 114. 
52 Ibid. 114. 
53 Ibid. 115, see generally 115-117. 
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arguments are illegitimate, because we lack shared criteria for recognizing practical wisdom.55 
Charles Bietz argues that true respect cares about how procedural outcomes affect other’s rights. 
Such broad notions of respect, Waldron replies, are unavailable, since “it is because we disagree 
about what counts as a substantively respectful outcome that we need a decision-procedure; … 
[this] procedure will necessarily privilege one controversial view about what respect entails and 
accordingly fail to respect the others.”56 
2.2.2 Liberal Rights and the Right to Participate  
Waldron also argues that the same premises that justify liberal rights also justify a right to 
participation. Most liberal theories assume that a person is not simply a vulnerable rights-bearer 
in need of protection, but also a rights-thinker able to reason about her rights and responsibilities. 
Entrenchment and judicial review protect rights by disabling rights-thinkers from controlling 
their rights directly or through representatives.  
Many justifications for imposing this disability, such as mistrust of the public, conflict 
with the justification for the first-order rights and responsibilities. First, justifications of political 
rights often presume citizens can transcend personal or factional interests. For instance, a theory 
that justifies free speech by the value of deliberation cannot simply dismiss citizens’ 
conscientious opinions as self-serving. Second, liberal rights like family and property rights 
presume individuals make worthwhile choices even in those morally perilous situations where 
 
55 Ibid. 115. In addition, Waldron argues that judicial review cannot be supported, as Dworkin argues, by weak 
instrumentalist arguments that judges reach better decisions about basic rights than legislators. Waldron rejects such 
arguments as speculative and rebuts judges’ purported advantages. As both judges and legislators fall prey to non-
ideal conditions, he compares the advantages or limits inherent to the method of reasoning. Judges’ deliberative 
shortcomings, he argues, are not the result of partisan nominations or insincerity but of the limitations of legal 
reasoning. Sometimes judges benefit from focusing on cases that provide rich details, but this particularity has 
drawbacks. It restricts judges’ access to social facts and limits their comprehensive perspective. Moreover, these 
particular cases were often hand-selected by advocacy groups to embody characterizations and exclude affected 
parties. One might hope that judges offset this bias by focusing on abstract constitutional rights. However, historical 
lists of abstract rights offers little guidance because they were often chosen precisely to finesse disputes at the time 
of enactment. Moreover, reliance on these lists limits judges’ imagination with platitudes and replaces open 
deliberation with a rigid textualism focused on interpretive issues. For instance, why does it matter whether a type of 
expression is “speech”? Finally, others claim that judges reach better decisions because they must justify decisions. 
This ignores the majoritarian voting procedures on judicial panels. It also overlooks the limited scope of judicial 
reasons. The judiciary’s perpetual need to demonstrate its legitimacy diverts opinions into interpretive and doctrinal 
issues. In place of probative moral reasons, judges connect their positions to eighteenth century documents, make 
desperate analogies to precedent and become sidetracked in debates about the role of interpretation and precedent. 
Waldron, “Core,” 1379-85.  
56 Waldron, LD, 116. 
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their interests are intertwined with interests of others. 
To develop a theory of rights, we need some basis for 
distinguishing those interests which are characteristic of human 
dignity from those which are relatively unimportant… If our image 
of man is that of a self-seeking animal who is not to be trusted with 
a concern for the interests of others, we lack the conception of 
dignified moral autonomy on which such discriminations of 
interest might be based.57 
It is difficult to explain giving individuals wide swaths of liberty if one believes people are 
unable or unwilling to consider how their decisions affect others.  
Last, traditional political theory recognizes that citizens deserve respect as rights-thinkers 
who are “self-aware and vigorously conscious of both the extent of and the limits on what [they 
are] entitled to demand from others.”58 If the issue is how best to respect persons as autonomous 
thinking creatures, and the subject of this debate has his own opinions, “we are hardly in a 
position to say that our conversation takes his rights seriously if at the same time we ignore or 
slight anything he has to say about the matter.”59 
2.2.3 The Right to Participate as Second-Order Right 
Waldron recognizes his arguments for the right to participate are not airtight. If they rest 
on premises that one can reasonably reject (as is, I think, obvious), why can they satisfy the 
neutrality condition and escape the problem of disagreement?  
First, Waldron accepts that citizens have a right to participate in decisions about their 
participatory rights. A vote for tyranny or judicial review would be a valid exercise of 
democracy, but would not make either democratic.  
Second, Waldron again appeals to the second-order nature of participatory reasons. 
Participatory rights do not conflict directly with other rights but are the rights that “seem 
peculiarly appropriate in situations where reasonable rights-bearers disagree about what rights 
they have.”60 The right is to have a say in how we settle substantive and procedural rights. The 
justification for this method cannot balance substantive rights against the right to participate, if 
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the procedure is needed to specify the content of both.  
Third, and most important, legitimacy is comparative. The reasons of respect supporting 
participatory majoritarianism compete only with reasons supporting another decision-maker. The 
case for participatory majoritarianism must be compared with the cases for alternative 
procedures—and the arguments in support of judicial review, he argues, are inconclusive or 
obviously not neutral.  
2.3 SUMMARY 
Waldron argues that principles of fairness in situations of disagreement provide reasons 
against constitutionalism and judicial review. We reasonably disagree about rights because of the 
burdens of judgment and this gives us a reason to decrease confidence in our own position. Yet, 
we recognize the need for concerted action and for a theory of authority to specify a procedure to 
settle on a common scheme. This theory of authority must be independent of the disagreements 
in three ways: directives must be identifiable without appeal to rights, directives must create 
second-order reasons that displace rights-based reasons, and the justification of the procedure’s 
legitimacy must not appeal to rights-based concerns. The final, legitimacy limit rules out appeals 
to rights for the justification of authoritative procedures—except the right to participate, because 
it instantiates the greatest degree of respect we can use in such conditions and its justification is 
presumed by the reasons that underlie the substantive rights that needs resolution.  
Although I have belabored many details of Waldron’s theory, I recognize that many steps 
are not fully defended. In many places, most notably in the discussion of content-independence, I 
have articulated premises that were implicit and, as such, receive no explicit defense in his work. 
In other places, most notably in his defense of the right to participate as a protected second-order 
right, I think his arguments are indefensible. These specific criticisms, however, are too quick 
and easy. Instead of criticizing his theory directly, I want to use it as a springboard to focus on a 
more foundational concern: why do we have persistent disagreement about basic rights and must 
legitimate procedures in such situations of persistent disagreements be content-independent? 
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CHAPTER 3: 
MORALLY RELEVANT DISAGREEMENT 
 
Waldron’s argument has three stages: (1) identify the content, source and epistemic 
implications of disagreement, (2) derive the neutrality conditions on political authority from 
epistemic modesty and minimal premises about legitimacy, and (3) establish that the 
appropriately neutral reasons favor participatory procedures. Rather than criticizing Waldron’s 
premises, I will use his argument as a guide to probe arguments from disagreement generally. 
This chapter surveys the sources of persistent disagreement and concludes that only persistent 
disagreements supported by vague or contested rights are relevant for legitimacy. This 
conclusion supports an appropriately content-based yet not question-begging limit on reasonable 
disagreement, which I call “the sincerity condition.” Moreover, it lays the foundation for an 
argument that a purely content-independent conception of reasonableness is impossible. In 
Chapters 4 and 5, I will discuss how legitimate states respond to reasonable disagreement 
sustained by vague or contested rights. Neutrality is the precisely the wrong response.  
This chapter investigates the conditions in which disagreement has epistemic and 
political significance. Waldron appeals to Rawls’ idea of “the burdens of judgment”1 to explain 
why, despite the ideal assumption that citizens are committed to rights, reasonable disagreement 
about rights is inevitable. Following Rawls, Waldron subsumes various explanations for the 
persistence of disagreements under the burdens of judgment. This chapter argues that this is a 
mistake. The various explanations for persistent disputes warrant different inferences about the 
scope of reasonable disagreement. Once we understand the sources of reasonable disagreement, 
we realize that reasonable disagreement does not mean that “anything goes.”  
I discuss five possible explanations for the persistence of disagreements about rights: 
ambiguity, vagueness, contested concepts, distinct forms of life and the possibility of mistake. 
Only disagreements about vague or contested rights have moral relevance. Vague and contested 
rights have zones of indeterminacy in which the existence of disagreement warrants decreased 
confidence. Disputes resting on ambiguity, in contrast, are equivocations with no epistemic or 
moral relevance. Disputes arising from distinct forms of life (which is similar to ambiguity all 
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the way down) creates difficulties of a distinct order; luckily, this explanation of rights disputes 
is unavailable for disagreement theorists like Waldron. The final explanation for persistent 
disagreement, and Waldron’s favorite, is that disputes inevitably arise from mistaken inferences, 
evidence or values. I argue that this final class of disputes is morally irrelevant, because it cannot 
expand the scope of reasonable disagreement beyond vague or contested rights.  
After two quick asides, I begin analyzing the sources of disagreement with ambiguity and 
vagueness. I start with ambiguity and vagueness, not because I think moral disputes are primarily 
linguistic, but because clarifying ambiguity and vagueness is necessary for clarifying the primary 
source of persistent disputes: contested concepts. To avoid confusion, I should also note that I do 
not think conceptual disputes are issues of analytic explication or stipulation. They are not 
linguistic disputes to be settled by observations about semantic conventions. Linguistic analysis 
is often useful but, as we will see, not exhaustive. 
3.1 CONCEPTIONS OF REASONABLENESS AND LEVELS OF DISAGREEMENT 
“Reasonableness” carries a lot of freight in contemporary political philosophy. Without 
any pretense of comprehensive analysis, I would like to note two dimensions on which 
conceptions of reasonableness often differ. First, the predicate “reasonable” can modify an array 
of objects. It may qualify propositions, theories, persons, beliefs or behaviors. Theorists must 
explain the relation among them. For example, Rawls argues that reasonable people accept the 
criterion of reciprocity and the burdens of judgment and hold reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines; furthermore, a reasonable political conception of justice “can win its support by 
addressing each citizen’s reason” from within her reasonable comprehensive doctrine.2  
Second, I would like to note Samantha Besson’s distinction between person-based and 
content-based conceptions. Reasonableness may distinguish among beliefs by their content. 
Beliefs (and people who hold them derivatively) are reasonable if supported by reasons capable 
of endorsement by anyone reasoning well within epistemic limits. Alternatively, it may 
distinguish among people by the way they hold their beliefs. People (and the propositions they 
believe derivatively) are reasonable if they reach their beliefs after good-faith analysis of the 
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relevant reasons, given their actual beliefs and abilities.3 In Chapter 5, I offer a definition, of 
which I can only a promissory note here, of reasonableness that falls between these accounts: 
reasonableness is a form of practical wisdom that citizens exercise by judging that the state 
respects rights under a reasonable definition.  
Waldron’s conception of reasonableness is unclear, but he seems to presume a person-
based account. He claims that reasonable disagreement undermines any content-based accounts, 
because no specific conception of reasonableness can legitimately limit the deliberations that 
determine which beliefs are reasonable. This only makes sense if he assumes we can recognize 
disagreements as reasonable independent of the content of the dispute. A disputant, and her 
positions derivatively, are reasonable if her beliefs result from a sincere effort to exercise her 
moral powers under the burdens of judgment. A central argument of this chapter is that such 
content-independent conceptions are impossible.  
Uniform talk about disagreement, in addition to obscuring its sources, may obscure the 
levels of disagreement. Agreements occur at various levels of abstraction, and agreements at one 
level can be independent of others. We may agree about moral principles; the precise 
specification of those principles for use in particular cases; or the application of those principle 
to a case. Consider euthanasia. Two people may agree euthanasia is appropriate in general or in 
the case of a particular patient, although one reached this conclusion based on autonomy and the 
other beneficence. Even if both accept autonomy as the pertinent principle, they may disagree 
about euthanasia in general because they disagree about the conditions of autonomy. Even if they 
agree on autonomy and its conditions, they may disagree about a particular patient or class of 
them because they disagree about the relevant facts. As Rawls recognized, and Cass Sunstein has 
recently explored in great depth, the possibility of public justification may rest on shallow yet 
overlapping agreements about abstract principles, mediating rules or concrete cases.4 Now on to 
the main event.  
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3.2 AMBIGUITY 
Ordinary speakers use “vague” and “ambiguous” interchangeably to indicate types of 
indistinctness or uncertainty. The more technical senses of these words, however, reveal useful 
distinctions. An ambiguity exists when the same term has multiple references or multiple senses. 
A British person yelling “Mum!” might be demanding silence, shouting at their mother or both. 
Figurative language thrives on the suggestiveness of ambiguity, but ambiguity in conversational 
and technical language is essentially a failure of communication. Ambiguity is removed by 
“interpretation.” Speakers avoid ambiguity by relying on listeners to interpret speech with 
contextual features like tone and context. Technical writers avoid ambiguity by explicitly 
interpreting terms to specify their intended sense or reference. Ambiguity can be entirely 
removed from writing and conversation, although doing so requires a significant amount of 
resources. We typically tolerate a degree of ambiguity for the sake of efficiency. 
Disputes occasioned by ambiguous terms are not real disagreements. Ambiguity may 
create the appearance of disagreement if the parties fail to recognize that they are using the same 
terms with different references or senses. Once interpretation disambiguates the disputed terms, 
it may become clear that the conclusions are not truly inconsistent. While we have practical 
reasons to avoid ambiguity in discourse, disputes about basic rights caused by ambiguity have no 
normative moral or political relevance.  
Some prevalent terms in contemporary American discourse about rights are ambiguous, 
and some are even generally recognized as such. Judith Thomson, for instance, argues that the 
“right to privacy” groups distinct rights under a hopelessly ambiguous term and suggests we 
analyze its components separately.5 Others look for a more abstract interest or principle to unity 
each manifestation of the right. Julie Inness claims privacy protects aspects of liberty necessary 
to develop meaningful intimate relationships.6 These theorists seek to develop a conception of 
the right to unite the disparate elements in a single concept (see § 3.4).7  
3.3 VAGUENESS  
Once interpretation removes residual ambiguities, vagueness presents another conceptual 
 
5 Judith Thomson, “The Right to Privacy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1975): 295-314. 
6 Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
7 It is possible that normative terms are ambiguous “all the way down” what only appears to be a shared normative 
practice. This possibility will be treated in § E.  
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problem that may lead to disagreements that resist rational resolution. Disagreements about the 
application of the same vague concept to a borderline case may be irresolvable.  
A concept is vague if it has a borderline case for which there is no correct answer about 
whether it is as an instance of the concept. An object is vague if it there is no precise boundary 
where it begins and ends. There are three possible explanations of vagueness: semantic, 
epistemic and ontological. Vagueness may result from failures of language to specify objects; 
from failures of human cognition to identify objects; or from vague objects or properties in the 
world.  
Semantic and ontological vagueness create problems for classical logic, which insists that 
well-defined predicates have precise extensions. Various deviant logics accommodate vagueness 
by denying the bivalence of truth. Supervaluationism handles semantic vagueness by permitting 
truth gaps while preserving classical validity. A proposition with a vague concept is true if and 
only if it would be satisfied under any possible precisification of the vague term, false if satisfied 
by none, and otherwise has no truth value.8 Many-valued logics manage ontological vagueness 
by permitting degrees of truth and approximation to membership in a set. It avoids truth-gaps, 
but must reinterpret validity to accommodate degrees of truth.9 These theories may reduce 
vagueness, but they cannot eliminate all indeterminacy. At some point, analysis cannot 
differentiate between two cases, either because a proposition will fail some but not all 
precisifications or because the numeric truth-value difference will be marginal. 
The stock examples of vagueness used in sorites paradoxes can create the misleading 
impression that vagueness always concerns gradients (whether continuous or discrete) that have 
clear cases at the endpoints but no threshold. A pile of straw grows towards a heap with each 
straw but no one straw marks the division. Baldness is vague because a man becomes balder with 
each hair he loses but no one hair tips him into the class of bald men. However, most vague 
concepts are vague on several dimensions that do not admit of complete ordering of cases. 
Something like Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” concept may provide a fruitful framework 
for conceiving of most cases of vagueness, because it accommodates vagueness that is discrete, 
exists in multiple dimensions and defies a single-principled ordering. 
 
8 Achille Varsi, “Supervaluationism and Its Logics,” Mind 116 (2007): 633-676. 
9 Dorothy Edgington, “The Philosophical Problem of Vagueness,” Legal Theory 7 (2001): 371–378. 
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3.3.1 Disagreements about Vague Concepts 
Vagueness occasions disagreement when two parties disagree about borderline cases of 
the same concept. How should we alter our judgments when we realize that our disagreement 
persists because it concerns the borderlines of a vague moral concept? The disagreements can 
only be resolved if we can settle on a construction of the borderline. Yet, the criteria for applying 
the concept cannot identify a uniquely preferable construction—that is, after all, what it means to 
be vague. At some point, no reasons internal to the concept exist for preferring one boundary to 
another. Two people may apply the concept differently in borderline cases and neither person is 
correct nor mistaken. As a conceptual matter, it seems that they should remain agnostic between 
different borderlines.  
This does not mean that all choices of a borderline are equal, only that at some point the 
precise choice of a borderline is no longer be guided the concept. Construction of vague concepts 
is similar to theory construction, with both internal (conceptual) and external (pragmatic) 
considerations. We evaluate proposed borderlines according to their ability to preserve 
paradigmatic instances and to captures component criteria. A construction of baldness should 
cover clear cases like George Costanza in Seinfeld and accommodate various dimensions of 
variation (hair density, thickness, pattern, etc.). But we distrust borders that capture only 
paradigm cases, because we typically want constructions to acknowledge vagueness and explain 
borderline cases. The concern for conservation and explanation is often balanced against others 
concerns like simplicity, predictive power and overall coherence. A criterion that conserves all 
paradigm cases by ad hoc conjunction will not be promising. We may also care about how a 
proposed border relates to other concepts, rejecting borderlines that are based on principles 
inconsistent with other commitments.  
Although the concept itself may not identify a uniquely appropriate borderline or even a 
superior group of borderlines, this does not entail that the concept is fully indeterminate or that 
speakers have unbridled discretion about how to apply the term. First, vagueness is 
indeterminacy with respect to a range of cases (or underdeterminacy10), not complete 
indeterminacy. Some putative cases are “too far” from core cases to qualify even as a potential 
 
10 I will use the term “underdeterminate”, despite it awkwardness, because arguments from indeterminacy have been 
put to disreputable use in legal theory as part of the critical legal studies movement (the legal counterpart to 
postmodernism or post-structuralism).  
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vague case. Any meaningful term, concept or object has clear instances and non-instances. Even 
if it is unclear whether a donut is a pastry, strudel is and flan is not. Even if it is unclear where 
clouds begin and end, some parts of the sky are cloudy and some clear.  
Second, unlike cases of pure discretion, vagueness has epistemic significance. Although I 
know some people pronounce coyote with a long “e,” that does not challenge my choice to 
continue pronouncing it with a silent “e.” In contrast, my recognition that a concept is vague 
challenges my justification for making the borderline judgment, even if I must continue drawing 
borderlines for practical reasons. This is true by definition for linguistic or ontological 
vagueness. A term is linguistically vague when proper usage does not determine whether the 
term applies to a range of cases. We may develop a more precise predicate (wisps rather than 
clouds), but this does not create a truth value for the original predicate.11 An object is 
ontologically vague if no clear differentiation exists between it and the surrounding environment. 
We may refine our question (ask about the PPM of water molecules rather than clouds), but this 
switches to a different ontology without clarifying the first object’s boundaries.  
Epistemic vagueness creates a similar problem for justifying judgments, but the problem 
of epistemic vagueness is more complicated.12 Epistemic vagueness occurs where there is a fact 
of the matter, but we lack evidence to justify judgments in borderline cases. “Relative 
(epistemic) vagueness” results from the limits of our current answering resources, but if 
“absolute (epistemic) vagueness” exists, then even an epistemically perfect cognizer would be 
unable to make correct judgments.13 In the former case, we can only await new answering 
resources that transcend our current limits; in the latter, nothing we can do will ever distinguish 
the cases.  
In summary, when two people share the same vague concept, there are a range of cases 
for which only concerns extrinsic to the concept itself can determine whether the concept should 
be applied. Seeking greater precision may reduce the range of vagueness and permit some 
distinctions in the zone of underdeterminacy, but the underdeterminacy can never be eliminated. 
 
11 Supervaluationists deny this, as the truth of the predicate is determined by its truth in all such precisifications. 
12 Roy Sorensen, “Vagueness has no Function in Law,” Legal Theory (2001): 38-417. 
13 The latter possibility depends on a controversial version of realism. 
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3.3.2 Vague Rights 
Many, if not most, contemporary liberal rights are vague. What does this mean for our 
disagreements? If a disagreement about rights results from vagueness in the rights or concepts 
integral to right, any position in that realm of vagueness is rationally acceptable.  
Freedom of expression offers a useful illustration. Should Vegas showgirls be protected 
by freedom of expression? One approach asks if the conventional meaning of ‘expression’14 
includes showgirls. Surely the term ‘expression’ is vague and semi-nude dancing is in its realm 
of indeterminacy. This does not, of course, exhaust our semantic resources. Part of understanding 
the meaning of a term is having the ability to extend it to novel and uncertain cases. Various 
ways to make the term more precise are already part of its meaning. One might seek to a more 
precise specification by asking whether topless dancing is closer to clear instances like ballet 
than clear non-instances like prostitution. The ordinary semantic meaning identifies a class of 
paradigm cases. Speakers can make a vague predicate more precise by identifying the shared 
component features uniting the paradigm cases. Perhaps the core instances of expression are 
actions that represent or communicate ideas, emotions or objects. Such precisification, however, 
is limited. It can reduce but not eliminate vagueness, because it displaces the controversy onto a 
more precise but vague component concept. Do dancers communicate emotion by causing 
arousal? Perhaps. That depends on whether arousal is an ‘emotion’ and whether causing 
emotions is ‘communication.’  
I have assumed so far that precisification involves interpreting semantic content, but it 
might also include refining one’s concept or ontology. The former is difficult to distinguish from 
the semantic analysis, except that it will focus less on the conventional speakers and more on the 
best conceptualization of the phenomenon. The latter would occur if ‘expression’ constitutes a 
natural kind differentiated either by its causal mechanism or by the content communicated. 
Expressions may include assertive or expressive speech acts (that communicate ideas, emotions, 
objects or attitudes towards an idea or object) but not declarative or performative ones. 
The First Amendment freedom of speech jurisprudence about “expressive actions” 
illustrates the problem created by thinking that conceptual analysis is sufficient to define the 
borderlines of a vague right. The Court extends the First Amendment beyond the conventional 
 
14 Perhaps the locus of conventional meaning is the phrase rather than a function of its components. As the right to 
privacy has little to do what occurs behind closed doors, perhaps “freedom of expression” is an idiom.  
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semantic meaning of ‘speech’ to protect nonverbal expressive acts like flag burning.15 Yet the 
Court refuses to protect “obscene” speech, because it denies the value of patently offensive 
depictions of sexual conduct that appeal to a purely prurient interest in sex (and lack other 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value).16 Sometimes the Court and theorists, 
confusingly, imply obscenity is not speech at all.17 Yet, the Court struggles to specify clear 
conceptual criteria for identifying the type of speech that is not ‘speech’ because it is obscene. 
The Court is constructing the boundaries of speech by appealing to values related to, but 
independent of, the concept of speech. Even this leaves a large zone of indeterminacy. It may 
leave strip clubs unprotected, but do Vegas shows or D-grade films have redeeming social value?  
Borderline cases of vague rights may create persistent disagreement because the right has 
no determinately correct application. Yet, appellate courts must frequently resolve such 
borderline cases. Insofar as vague rights have a zone of indeterminacy in which any construction 
must rely on reasons extrinsic to the right, disputes about borderline cases inevitably rely on 
moral judgments that provide a foothold for the arguments from disagreement.  
3.4 CONTESTED CONCEPTS 
Contested concepts are the second – and most important – source of persistent disputes. 
A concept is contested when several incompatible but overlapping “theories” of the concept 
exist.18 Individuals systematically disagree about particular cases because they use different 
criteria for applying the concept. Yet, they will agree that they are talking about the same thing 
and that the conceptions cannot both be correct.19  
 
15 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
16 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
17 RAV v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (clarifying the mistake). 
18 Rawls and Dworkin are famous for invoking this idea. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979): Ch. 5; Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases,” in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1978): 127-130. However, the idea has an extensive philosophical history. Rawls cited H.L.A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961): 155-59, and Dworkin cited W.G. Gaille, 
“Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955): 167-198. A full theory of 
contested concepts will explain the relation between concepts to conceptions. See, e.g. Korsgaard, Christine M., The 
Sources of Normativity (Harvard: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 113-15. 
19 Their belief is not determinative, because purported conceptions may mask ambiguity (right to privacy) and 
purportedly distinct concepts may be conceptions of a contested concept (e.g. positive and negative freedom).  
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3.4.1 Differences between Contested, Ambiguous and Vague Concepts 
Exploring the differences between contested concepts and vagueness and ambiguity will 
help clarify this phenomenon.  
Compared to Ambiguity—If two disputants acknowledge they use different criteria for 
applying a single term, why not dissolve their disagreement by agreeing to be more careful about 
their use? Why are contested concepts not complex cases of ambiguity?  
One possibility is that contested concepts mark out a functional role in ordinary language 
and practical reasoning that can be filled by various conceptions. A contested concept emerges 
when multiple theories about the satisfaction conditions for the concept develop around stable 
disputes about concrete cases. The concept’s semantic content can still be specified independent 
of disagreements about its satisfaction conditions, because each conception plays a similar role in 
arguments. The roughly delineated functional role enables disagreement about the conception 
that best fulfills the concepts’ functional role.20 A contested concept devolves into ambiguity if, 
under various conceptions, it no longer plays the same logical role or does not do so in 
sufficiently similar manner.  
Distributive justice, for instance, might be a contested concept. Each distributive justice 
theory defines satisfaction conditions for the proposition "Distribution D is a just distribution." 
For Rawls, D must satisfy the two principles of justice.21 For Nozick, D must have emerged from 
past distributions according to his entitlement theory. The term is not ambiguous simply because 
it covers such contrary theories, because, under either conception, if the falsity of the proposition 
“D is a just distribution” provides prima facie support for the practical conclusion that the 
distribution should be shifted away from that D.22  
However, a purported conception may fail to fulfill the functional role of its concept. 
Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice may have this problem. Aristotle maintains that 
 
20 This does not mean that all contested concepts are functional kinds, in that their ontological or metaethical status 
is defined by their logical role in such arguments. Michael Moore, “Law as a Functional Kind,” in Natural Law 
Theory: Contemporary Essays, Ed. Robert George (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 188; Kenneth M. 
Ehrenberg, “Defending the Methodological Space for a Neutral Functional Theory of Law,” Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 29:1 (2009): 91-113 
21 For Rawls, the concept of justice identifies an abstractly specified problem, a need for rules to distribute rights 
without arbitrary distinctions and social benefits in proper balance, for which each conception provides the detailed 
principles for identifying pertinent differences and proper balance. Rawls, TJ, 5. This make justice a functional kind, 
but one that Nozick would reject.  
22 One might interpret Nozick’s rejection of pattern principles as a rejection of distributive justice entirely and his 
entitlement theory as merely a theory of corrective justice.  
 33 
corrective justice obliges unjust injurers to compensate victims to restore equality between them. 
On some interpretations, this principle of corrective justice applies only if the injured party starts 
with equal or less resources than merited by his relative virtue. Injuries to unjustly rich persons 
bring them closer to the correct proportional distribution. Compensation would create a less 
equal distribution. In contrast, for an unjustly poor victim, distributive justice required the 
restoration of equality anyway. It is possible to argue that this concept fails to capture a distinct 
logical feature of corrective justice: corrective justice requires compensation for injuries, even if 
doing so returns parties to an unequal ex ante distribution. The professor who runs his Kia into 
the administrator’s BMW must still pay for the damages. A conception without this, admittedly 
perplexing, consequence fails to capture the distinct functional role of distributive justice.  
Along with the functional explanation, each conception will acknowledge and seek to 
explain a shared set of paradigm cases and principles. The conceptions represent different ways 
to unite and recapture what is important about the paradigm cases under abstract principles.23 
Given the underdetermination of theory, it is impossible to fix a unique principle for deciding 
between these mini-theories, but general evaluations may be given and certain conceptions can 
be ruled out. Some paradigms themselves may be challenged, but not all of them at once. 
Imagine a theory of Impressionism. No set of necessary and sufficient conditions can capture 
Impressionism, but any conception must explain what distinguishes Degas and Monet (and 
perhaps Vuillard or Seurat) from Turner’s Romanticism and the Post-Impression of Van Gogh 
and Gauguin.  
 Compared to Vagueness—A contested concept may appear to be a vague concept, if the 
judgments under various conceptions converge so that all agree on a series of core cases and 
disagree only on marginal cases. Conversely, a vague concept may appear to be a contested 
concept, if stable theories emerge about the principles for defining the border between core and 
marginal cases.24 However, the limitation of disagreement to “the margins” is contingent for 
 
23 Dworkin, “Taking Rights Seriously.” Dworkin’s criteria of fit and justification, while nuanced, is only one theory 
of the relation between concepts and their conceptions.  
24 I would like to thank David Sussman for suggesting that perhaps contested concepts are simply concepts that are 
vague along many dimensions. The idea is tempting because both vague and contested rights invite a theory to 
provide the needed specifications. However, I think it obscures an important distinction. Some concepts are vague 
but not contested, if we agree on a theory of the concept but it identifies several boundaries that cannot be specified 
in a non-arbitrary fashion. Conversely, a concept may be contested along several dimensions, but each conceptions 
provides determinate answers. Hence, a concept might be contested and not vague.  
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contested concepts in a way it is not for vague concepts. Vagueness concerns marginal 
applications of concepts with core instances and non-instances. In contrast, for contested 
concepts, the disputes may concern core or paradigm cases.25 In fact, conceptions may converge 
only in fairly marginal cases.  
The difference is obscured if one presumes that reflective equilibrium is the default 
method of ethical justification, as opposed to a feature of the phenomenology of moral reasoning. 
Partisans of conceptions cannot accept a model of justification that emphasizes the “best fit” with 
shared cases. When disagreement erupts only in a few cases, these fractures may be indicative of 
fundamental divides – not simply a marginal feature of the concept. Testing a theory only, or 
primarily, against the shared cases will only ignore that fact.  
Consider, for example, disputes about personhood. If personhood is a vague concept, 
disputed cases like fetuses or animals are borderline cases. Analysis may precisify the concept by 
identifying the shared features of core cases, and we can argue about balancing the conservation 
of core cases with pragmatic criteria. The border cannot exclude children, severely disabled 
adults or intelligent aliens, but it must also cohere with other principles of moral respect. At 
some point, however, no further insight is possible. Those who insist on asking questions like 
“At what precise point does a fetus become a person?” are conceptually confused.  
On the other hand, if personhood is a contested concept, these isolated disputes are not 
marginal but core cases marking fissures between conceptions. For the “human being” 
conception, fetuses are a core case of a non-vague concept. Conceptions of personhood (humans, 
sentient creatures, moral agents) yield different conclusions in core cases (fetuses, the nearly 
dead, animals) because they use different criteria to identify persons. Each maintains that their 
criteria capture the concept of persons more accurately. A model of ethical justification that 
proceeds from shared cases to principles may rules out certain conceptions, precisely because the 
conception uses criteria that are not meant to unite all the shared cases.  
In summary, a contested concept holds together several distinct conceptions, because the 
conceptions fulfill similar functional role in practical reasoning and share some paradigm cases 
or principles. Any paradigm may be challenged, but a theory that rejects too many core cases at 
once or fails to fulfill the functional role may no longer qualify as a conception of the concept. 
 
25 Waldron calls these “watershed cases” (see I.A.2) 
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3.4.2 Contested Rights 
A basic task for whoever holds political authority is to develop and apply conceptions of 
our basic rights. Conceptions can operate at different levels of abstraction. A conception may 
identify the overarching justification for several rights to guide their construction, as the freedom 
of thought unites the rights to speech, religion and association.26 Or, it may identify intermediate 
principles for implementing abstract rights, as the specific rules about effective legal assistance 
protect the right to counsel in criminal cases.27 Or, it may develop factors for determining 
whether a right covers an activity, such as the list of facts and values relevant for determining if 
an individual has actual and reasonable expectations of privacy in a location or activity worthy of 
protection from unreasonable searches.28  
Virtually every right is contested in these respects, but vagueness and contested concepts 
are difficult to distinguish in contemporary jurisprudence. Consider, for instance, the distinction 
between revolutionary speech and advocacy of illegal action. Until 1957, the Supreme Court 
followed a “bad-tendency” doctrine that allowed states to punish speech about classes of ideas 
that they determined were likely to incite violence.29 The modern Brandenburg test, in contrast, 
permits punishment only if, in context, a specific act of speech is intended and likely to produce 
imminent lawless action.30 The two rules may represent a dispute about vague borders or a 
contest among conceptions. The rules were different constructions of a vague concept if, for 
instance, the Justices accepted Holmes’ marketplace theory of free speech.31 If freedom of 
speech protects ideas that contribute to society’s search for truth, then content-based restrictions 
on revolutionary beliefs draw a vague line between truth-value and public safety. Brandenburg, 
then, adopted a different evaluation of vague values or facts. The Court reconsidered either the 
balance between safety and truth or the facts about whether some ideas are so likely to incite 
violence that contextual decisions cannot protect citizens (likely both). On the other hand, 
 
26 See, e.g. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 641-42 (1943).  
27 Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984).  
28 Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967); see, e.g. City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628-30 
(2010) (attempting to determine whether a criminal defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in text 
messages).  
29 Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925) 
30 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1957). As causal predictions must rely on act-types rather than tokens, even 
contextual judgments cannot avoid partial reliance on content (a speech about heresy near a Mormon temple is more 
likely to incite violence). See also Yates v. United States, 354 US 298 (1957).  
31 Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616, 624 (1919) (J. Holmes dissenting)  . 
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Brandenburg might represent a switch from a consequentialist to a deontological conception of 
free speech. In Gitlow, the Court treated speech like any other act. If a state can punish 
conspiracy to overthrow the government, it can punish the publication of pamphlets meant to 
convince people to join such a conspiracy—the only difference is nearness to success. When it 
adopted the new test in Brandenburg, the Court recognized that freedom of speech is part of 
freedom of conscience and so has intrinsic value as part of our personal dignity, even if for false 
or dangerous speech. 
3.4.3 Disagreements about Contested Concepts 
While often a mask for persecution, the bad-tendency rule is not obviously wrong. One 
argument for regulating pornography, for example, rests on the same principle that speech may 
be regulated if its content is statistically likely to incite violence. Considering how complex this 
choice is between conceptions, citizens who sincerely desire to respect free speech will 
inevitably favor different conceptions and thus disagree about particular cases.  
Disputes occasioned by contested concepts supply the strongest basis for arguments from 
disagreement such as Waldron’s. The ‘looseness’ in identifying and describing paradigms and in 
the sources and levels of abstraction for principles precludes us from expecting or demanding 
convergence. Moreover, conceptions represent different orderings of (perhaps incommensurable) 
values and assessment of the facts. Our assessments of facts and values are subtly influenced by 
our life experiences, including the perspectives of our social roles, life projects and communal 
practices. This may be a fact about the nature of facts and values32 or about human psychology.33 
Even if some psychological influences are distortions, they are often indistinguishable from 
reasonable estimates of values or facts. Such subtle differences, exacerbated by the complexity 
of moral issues, may result in a wide variety of conceptions. Insofar as reason cannot identify a 
uniquely appropriate conception of a right that can be demonstrated to others—either because of 
the looseness of reason or looseness of values—a contested right has a realm of indeterminacy in 
which a realm of conceptions will be reasonable. Why give nine justices the final say about 
which among these rational conceptions we adopt?  
Such disagreements about contested concepts do not support the conclusion that 
 
32 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
33 Rawls, PL, 57. 
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everything goes. The ways in which a purported conception may fail as an instance of its concept 
(and dissolve into ambiguity) also show the limits of contested concepts. As we saw above, a 
purported conception might fail to satisfy the functional role of the concept; issue conclusions 
inconsistent with its functional role; or fail to accommodate sufficient paradigm cases. Even if no 
particular aspect of the concept is immune from challenge, not all can be challenged at once. 
Contested concepts open a large realm of indeterminacy for reasonable disagreement, but it is 
not complete indeterminacy. The (provisional) agreements between various conceptions supply 
the content of the concept that ensures the possibility of rational competition and the possibility 
of reasonable disagreement. 
3.5 FUNDAMENTALLY DISTINCT FORMS OF LIFE 
But what if, ultimately, our political norms turn out to be radically ambiguous? The idea 
of contested concepts is meant to explain how disagreement may persist based on deep disputes 
without lapsing into ambiguity. It is possible, however, that behind our rights lay radically 
divergent theories that do not even share enough points of contact to be competing conceptions. 
The moments of agreement about principles or cases are fortuitously overlapping judgments. 
They dissolve the moment one uses practical reason to apply principles or extend cases. Such a 
flimsy basis cannot supply enough material for a theorist to conjure up a shared concept. In this 
situation, neither our agreements nor our disagreements are real. We adopt contrary positions, 
but our arguments slide past one another, because they rest on distinct theories of practical 
rationality and substantive morality.  
Waldron – and other disagreement theorists – cannot adopt this explanation for 
disagreement about rights. To show why, I need a sample theory about how such ambiguity 
might exist despite our widespread belief that we really do argue about rights. One possibility is 
that normative terms derive their meaning from practices like what Wittgenstein called a basic 
“form of life.”34 If two distinct forms of life share the same term, a dispute using the term may 
concern a real issue and yet the parties may lack resources to resolve it. It is as if two people are 
trying to play the same game without realizing that they disagree about the rules for correct 
moves and winning.  
 
34 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing 2001): § 226. 
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Communitarians often say things like this. Alasdair MacIntyre, for instance, thinks that 
political debates about terms like ‘justice’ hide competition among incompatible moral theories 
about the organizing principles of social life. According to MacIntyre, moral theories only makes 
sense as part of the communal practices and traditions from which they draws their teleological 
values and theories of practical reasoning. Unfortunately, our fractured web of social practices is 
not sufficiently coherent to ground a shared theory of practical reason for adjudicating our 
political disputes.35 After making this diagnosis, MacIntyre wrote three books attempting to 
reconstruct a theory of rational competition among radically distinct traditions. If that project 
fails, then social relations seem to be nothing more than power relations among competing 
ideologies. The prospects of political philosophy are dire if rights terms hide this sort of dispute.  
Waldron does not accept this explanation for the persistence of disagreement, and, no 
argument from disagreement could consistently accept it. First, it would undercut their premise 
that citizens are committed to rights but disagree about their content. This explanation deprives 
citizens of any shared content for disagreement or agreement. Radically distinct theories may 
generate contrary practical prescriptions, but contrary prescriptions cannot count as disagreement 
unless similarly overlapping judgments qualify as substantive agreements. Nothing remains of 
the shared and mutually recognized commitment to rights. Second, it undermines Waldron’s 
proceduralist reconstruction. Procedural values like participation may also be subject to radical 
disputes, making a rights-based argument against constitutional rights hopeless. Third, theories 
of radical disagreement must use a substantive theory of practical rationality to rebut the ordinary 
assumption that we meaningfully disagree in our everyday practical discourse. MacIntyre, for 
instance, relies on an Aristotelian theory of the conditions of practical rationality. Such 
controversial premises about practical rationality would place a serious tension at the heart of the 
disagreement argument.  
It is possible that many of our disputes about rights devolve into the competition of 
radically divergent comprehensive ideologies.36 However, in the absence of a demonstration that 
rights systematically suffer from such a hopeless deficiency, political philosophy should continue 
muddling by on the assumption that our political norms are, at least, contested concepts.  
 
35 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) 
36 I find it difficult to portray rights as deep disputes of this sort in any level of detail. In the abstract, I can imagine 
Islamic and Kantian theories yielding distinct rights to freedom of religion, but specifying those rights in any detail 
immediately brings up similar intermediate principles that might serve as basis for agreement. 
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3.6 EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENTS: MISTAKES OF REASONING OR EVIDENCE 
The final explanation for the persistence of disagreement is Waldron’s preferred: human 
fallibility. People using similar conceptions of a non-vague right may continue to disagree if the 
issue is so difficult or human reasoning is so fallible that people inevitably rely on incorrect 
values, evidence or inferences. Such disputes can be resolved only by identifying the mistakes. 
Our rights disputes are intractable, Waldron believes, because the complexity of the evidence 
and inferences makes mistakes frequent while preventing us from identifying the mistaken party. 
How should we proceed if we suspect that persistent disputes are sustained by such mistakes?  
Waldron maintains that we must admit that any positions, however illiberal, reached by a 
good-faith exercise of reason subject to the burdens of judgment are reasonable. To claim 
otherwise implies, contrary to the hypothesis of reasonable disagreement, that one person can 
demonstrate the superiority of liberal positions in a way that no one can rationally reject. 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 argued that vague and contested concepts have such zones of indeterminacy. 
Yet, that does not mean “everything is up for grabs,” because the indeterminacy of vague or 
contested rights is circumscribed by the concept of the right. Does the potential for 
understandable mistakes, however implausible another person’s sincerely held position, expand 
the scope of reasonable disagreement so that (almost) everything up is for grabs? This section 
argues, by a detour into epistemology, that the answer is no. We can only recognize a dispute as 
an instance of disagreement about a right if we have a minimally shared subject matter. I argue 
that the shared content is found in the practice of recognizing vague or contested rights.  
3.6.1 The Epistemology of Disagreement 
The “epistemology of disagreement” has developed as a sub-field of social epistemology. 
While it focuses on the rationality of non-moral belief, I will extend it to moral disputes. One of 
its general conclusions is that the epistemic relevance of a disagreement is correlated with the 
parties’ relative epistemic positions. I should decrease confidence in my belief when I disagree 
with someone who has superior knowledge or reasoning ability. I should decrease my credence, 
for instance, when I discover that an expert in the subject area disagrees. I may be correct, but 
probably the expert has evidence I lack or better grasps the implication of evidence we share.  
The more interesting disagreements arise between parties in symmetrical epistemic 
positions, what have been labeled “epistemic peers.” According to Thomas Kelley, two 
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individuals are epistemic peers with respect to some judgment if:  
(a) They have relatively equal familiarity with the evidence and 
arguments relevant to the judgment,  
(b) They have relatively equal epistemic abilities and virtues 
relevant to the judgment, and  
No features of the particular situation exist that create new 
asymmetries in (a) or (b).  
These conditions are highly context-dependent. The relevant evidence and virtues differ for art 
critics, scientists, and sommeliers. Moreover, these criteria may depend on substantive theories 
of the domain of inquiry and are often controversial. Social epistemology nevertheless sets itself 
the task of identifying general conditions within and across domains.37  
Norms of rational belief might respond to disagreement between true epistemic peers in 
three ways. We might (1) stick to our guns,38 (2) suspend or reject belief39 or (3) split the 
difference.40 The more common position seems to be that one should not compromise the content 
of their position but should decrease one’s confidence.  
David Christensen argues that two salient features of disputes between epistemic peers 
support this position: (1) disagreement raises the likelihood of error for each peer and (2) any 
explanation of the disagreement between peers must meet an independence condition. First, the 
mere existence of disagreement between peers raises the likelihood that each made an epistemic 
mistake. As imperfectly rational creatures, humans face the standing possibility of reasoning 
mistakes. Disagreement increases the subjective probability that one party made a mistake.  
The fact that disagreement by epistemic peers is possible is a 
constant and inevitable consequence of our being nonideal 
thinkers… Actual disagreement with peers is informative because 
it provides evidence that a certain possibility—the possibility of 
our having made an epistemic error—has been actualized. It makes 
what we already know possible more probable.41 
If we are epistemic peers, the probability that I made a mistake is equal to the probability that 
 
37 Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005): 167-
196. 
38 Id. 
39 J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin 1977): 36-37. 
40 David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 112.2 (2007). 
41 Ibid. 208.  
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you did. I may be presupposed to think otherwise, because I seem to have a better ability to 
detect mistakes in my own reasoning. Such familiarity, however, does not create an epistemic 
asymmetry. Imagine that we are performing an arithmetic calculation like calculating a baseball 
batting average. Before we begin, the likelihood of mistake is symmetrical. After calculating, we 
reach different figures. I remember performing the calculation correctly, but I have no access to 
your calculation. This asymmetry, however, does not create an epistemic advantage. “I may now 
have in mind, or directly feel the force of, the reasoning supporting my answer, and not the 
reasoning supporting yours.”42 But before we began, I knew that, if a dispute arose, I would have 
this psychological preference for my reasoning. Before we started, this preference did not alter 
our respective epistemic positions. It provides no greater justification before than after.43  
The evidentiary value of disagreement diminishes, however, when there are asymmetric 
explanations for the disagreement. Christensen’s second major point is that I must “assess 
explanations for the disagreement in a way that’s independent of my reasoning on the matter 
under dispute.”44 For instance, I cannot ignore a peer’s conclusion because I think he weighed 
the evidence incorrectly when our disagreement concerns its proper weight. I cannot ignore your 
conclusion that Bonds was a better slugger than Ruth because you overestimate modern pitching 
and underestimate the steroid advantage. The evidentiary value of a disagreement does diminish, 
however, if it can be explained by contextual features that differentially affect one peer’s 
reasoning on this occasion. I may discount your conclusion if I know you are a rabid Giants fan. 
I will call this the “independence condition”: only contextual explanations of disagreement 
independent of the content of the parties’ reasoning qualify as epistemic asymmetries.  
It is time to step back and take stock. I have a reason to decrease confidence in my beliefs 
that differ from my epistemic superiors, because they may know things I do not and may be able 
to reason better than I. I also have a reason to decrease confidence in beliefs that differ from my 
epistemic equals, because our disagreement increases the subjective probability that one of us, as 
limited human reasoners, made a mistake. The disagreement is stronger evidence to the degree 
that we have equal evidence, equal ability and no contextual biases. According to the 
“independence condition,” I can justify my belief that my peer made a mistake only by appeal to 
 
42 Ibid. 197.  
43 Ibid. 197-99. 
44 Ibid. 99. 
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facts extrinsic to her conclusion or features of her reasoning.  
Waldron’s argument has unwitting parallels to these arguments from the epistemology of 
disagreement. Waldron places significant weight on the claim that the parties to disputes about 
rights are in symmetrical epistemic positions. The mere fact that another disagrees with me about 
rights does not create a reason to suspect that she made the mistake or did not reach her position 
in good faith.45 He claims that we should assume (absent evidence to the contrary) our disputes 
about rights meet these epistemic criteria, because (a) the topics are difficult and little evidence 
exists and (b) respect requires us to assume our fellow citizens are sufficiently rational and act in 
good faith. The remainder of this section disputes the epistemic component of this presumption.  
3.6.2 Content-based Circumstantial Conditions  
Christensen’s independence condition has apparent exceptions, one of which is 
surprising: implausibility. Some conclusions are just implausible. We accept only a range of 
substantive positions as instances of disagreement and potential evidence of our error. How can 
one specify such claims independent of the content of our reasoning? Christensen suggests that 
we use common-sense reasoning methods to double-check the implausible outcomes of primary 
reasoning. For instance, if I suggest that your part of our dinner bill is close to the total amount, 
you may be justly suspicious. When one party reaches a conclusion that violates such secondary 
criteria, the implausibility of the conclusion is evidence of a reasoning asymmetry on this 
occasion. You need not appeal to your specific reasoning to demonstrate the flaw in mine, and 
thus your objection is consistent with the independence condition.46 These secondary methods 
are a crucial part of practical knowledge, from tricks of elementary math to intuitive carpentry 
measurements. Although Christensen does not suggest this argument, one way to see that these 
methods are sufficiently independent is that the mistaken party could and should have used the 
double-checking methods in parallel with, and without contradicting, his own reasoning.  
I want to expand Christensen’s suggestion and claim that sometimes the implausibility of 
an answer can be evidence even without a clear secondary method of reasoning. For want of a 
better term, I will call this a sincerity condition. Parties are only epistemic peers when each 
participant is making a good faith attempt to determine the correct answer to the same question. 
 
45 Waldron, “Rights,” 50.  
46 Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement,” 200. 
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Some answers diverge so far from our intuitive understanding of the range of plausible answers 
that their very divergence creates a new reason to suspect that the party offering them made a 
mistake, answered a different question or is being insincere. The implausibility of the answer 
provides a reason, independent of the particular reasoning of either party, to suspect that some 
asymmetry exists on this occasion. This suspicion does not justify rejecting such answers, but it 
does justify insisting their proponents meet a threshold burden of support. It justifies us to 
require the proponents of such position to show us their argument. They must show that they are 
using reasons that we recognize as bearing on the disputed issue. The farther an answer falls 
from the typically accepted range of positions, the more difficult it will be for the offering party 
to claim that their position qualifies as a case of disagreement.  
This can be done consistent with the independence condition, because we can appeal to 
the conceptual criteria embedded in the relevant practice. Any rational discussion relies on a 
background of standards and paradigm cases that are independent of either party’s particular 
reasoning on this occasion. For disputes about a practical concept, its ordinary meaning can 
provide rough and intuitive criteria to identify answers that are “wide of the mark” and the type 
of reasons needed to bring them back. Like commonsense methods, these criteria are accessible 
to proponents of outlier positions, if they can view their conclusions objectively. The proponents 
may be able to offer reasons to justify the divergence, but they cannot simply ignore the 
divergence and deny its relevance. As we will see, this sincerity criterion is central to disputes 
about basic political rights.  
3.6.3 The Political Irrelevance of Epistemic Disagreements about Rights 
We purportedly disagree about the following question of liberal legitimacy: “What rights 
must we respect if coercion is to be justified to each citizen on terms that he or she can accept?” 
If citizens hold different theories of rights, a liberal political authority must justify coercion to 
citizens whose political morality condemns it. Does this mean that it must justify a schema of 
basic rights to anyone who disputes it, on whatever basis, in their terms? If liberal legitimacy 
means everything is up for grabs in this sense, then it will require compromising basic rights in 
order to justify those rights to people who reject them. 
Waldron is correct that we cannot reject a proposed theory of rights simply because we 
disagree. Legitimacy cannot demand the state justify its decisions to each person on her first-
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order reasons of justice. That does not mean, however, that we must accept any purported 
conclusions about basis rights. A dispute about basic rights is a disagreement relevant for 
legitimacy only if each party makes a good-faith effort to specify a scheme of rights to limit 
coercion in a way that could be justified to all. Some positions are so far from our common 
understanding of a right that we have reason to suspect their proponents are not offering them 
based on reasons that others can accept. Can we identify this range of positions without relying 
on the very reasoning that led us to disagree, that is, without violating the independence 
condition on epistemic disagreement?  
The remainder of this sub-section attempts to specify this range using the semantic 
content of rights. It concludes that a position about basic rights qualifies as an answer to the 
legitimacy question only if (a) it falls within the range of indeterminacy for vague or contested 
rights or (b) it falls outside that zone but can in principle be supported by reasons that 
recognizably bear on the purported right. This conclusion has two corollaries: (1) the potential 
for mistake does not expand the scope of reasonable disagreement and (2) a purely content-
neutral conception of reasonableness is impossible. 
Answers in the zone of underdeterminacy of vague or contested rights are, by definition, 
recognizable answers to the legitimacy question. Human fallibility plays no part in reaching this 
conclusion. Epistemic modesty follows from the vagueness or contestedness. Any position in the 
zone of underdeterminacy is one a reasonable person could reach. Others do not need a 
demonstration of the rationale to be sure it meets the sincerity condition. The potential for 
epistemic mistakes is morally relevant only if it expands the scope of disagreement beyond 
vague or contested rights.  
Positions outside this zone of underdeterminacy count as instances of disagreement about 
the legitimacy question only if reasons exist that could justify the outlier position as a position 
on the rights at stake. Outlier positions bear a greater burden the farther they fall from the core of 
a right. The proponents of outlier positions must be able to argue to their position from reasons 
that others recognize as relevant to the right at issue.47 Essentially, a dispute is a disagreement 
about rights only if each position can be supported by reasons that show it to be a construction of 
a vague right or a conception of a contested right. If I propose a specification of rights that 
 
47 I owe this particular formulation to David Sussman, though I do not mean to imply that he endorses it.  
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cannot meet this minimal requirement, the fact of my disagreement does not increase the 
probability they are mistaken; my position itself is evidence that I made a mistake or am not 
limiting myself by the bounds of legitimacy. Others need not distort their reasoning to 
accommodate me. I will call this the “political sincerity condition” and its justification 
requirement the “proviso.” 
We care about the reasons behind outlier positions because only those reasons can show 
that the outlier is offered as a theory to govern on terms that others can accept—that is, it is an 
answer to the problem of legitimacy. If we cannot even appreciate how the reasons proffered are 
relevant to the right under dispute, we cannot acknowledge the position as an instance of 
disagreement about the right, as opposed to a miscommunication or an attempt to impose their 
will on others. 
In later chapters, I develop this intuitive idea of appreciation into a full theory of the 
“reasons that each all can accept.” I argue that the reasons we “can accept” are not limited to 
those we currently endorse obliquely or even reasons we could endorse consistent with other 
propositions we accept. We can appreciate reasons we believe are fundamentally mistaken. It is 
difficult to specify the set of reasons that all citizens appreciate, because those reasons depends 
on our underlying shared concept of the disputed right. It is easier to specify an abstract principle 
to identify reasons that citizens cannot appreciate. Ultimately, the idea of appreciation requires 
much more explication and justification than I can give here. This chapter began its explication. 
Its justification begins in Chapter 5. For this chapter, I need only describe the conditions of 
reasonable disagreement sufficiently to reveal the flaws in Waldron’s content-neutral conception 
of reasonableness. I will do this by considering two potential objections to the sincerity 
condition: that it is too week and too strong.48 
 The condition is too weak to limit the scope of disagreement—Waldron might argue that 
 
48 Three potential misunderstandings are worth heading off. First, political sincerity does not require the proponent 
of marginal positions to demonstrate their position is fully justified, only that they show it can be supported by 
recognizably relevant reasons. Second, while moral sincerity may insist that agents sincerely believe their proffered 
reasons, political sincerity rarely peeks behind plausible reasons. Finally, the qualifying reasons will be a blend of 
rational and psychological explanation, although the relevant question is not whether a set of reasons is 
psychologically motivating, but whether it logically supports a specification of the right that all may accept. As 
explained in § 3.4, life-history may influence the ordering of values that ground a conception of a right, but 
psychological explanation is never sufficient. I can understand the personal history that causes people to support 
white supremacy movements, but any alleged reasons for they might offer cannot be endorsed as a theory of 
authority among equals (indeed, this is a premise of white supremacy).  
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this semantic condition is too weak to limit disagreement. Can appeal to the semantic content of 
rights even justify rejecting schemas that dismiss basic rights? Dworkin, for instance, argues that 
the semantic content of practical concepts is virtually open-ended. He argues that a person may 
reject all paradigmatic cases or principles of a practice, without becoming unintelligible or 
making conceptual mistakes. A person may argue, for instance, without making a conceptual 
mistake, that “courtesy” requires ignoring others, because it is always possible to understand this 
person as suggesting a radically reinterpretation of the practice.49  
Waldron could apply a similar argument to my sincerity condition for limiting reasonable 
disagreement about basic rights. A person who rejects paradigms or principles of basic rights 
may place herself outside useful discourse for the moment, but our understanding of rights may 
change over time. Although Marxism rejects most paradigmatic incidents of property ownership, 
it offers a possible reinterpretation of the right to personal property. In addition, a person might 
reject one set of paradigm cases or principles to open up a reinterpretation that supports other 
paradigms. Ethical egoism, for instance, may reject altruism in order to recapture the ethics of 
personal excellence. 
However, even Dworkin’s theory is more discriminating than this if we focus on the 
practices of justification, rather than intelligibility. As the number or centrality of rejected 
paradigms increase, the plausibility of a reinterpretation falls. At some point, a “reinterpretation” 
becomes a wholesale rejection of the practice. The new idea is intelligible, insofar as it appears 
to play the same role as the old practice, but it is not possible to justify it on grounds relevant to 
the practice. Consider the theory, call it “ethical sadism,” that our basic obligations are to 
frustrate the interests of others. This is a normative theory to guide action, but it is not a moral 
theory. We can treat a proposal to limit religious liberty to monotheistic religions similarly. We 
can understand the person who proposes it as offering a rule to specify the scope of religious 
coercion. Yet, because none of the reasons that support freedom of conscience can be used to 
justify this position, we can reject it as an instance of morally relevant disagreement about the 
right to freedom of religion.  
This condition is not appropriately independent—Alternatively, Waldron might argue 
that the sincerity position places too strong of limits on disagreement. If rights are defined by 
 
49 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986): 70-71.  
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their normative role in our practices, then any attempt to define the semantic content of a right 
must appeal to its purposes in those practices and the purposes of the practices themselves. For 
instance, Waldron might argue that any attempt to define freedom of conscience must appeal to 
the purposes of such liberty. Accordingly, even attempts to identify the minimal boundaries of a 
right must adopt controversial normative positions, in violation of the independence condition.50  
Arguments of this sort mistakenly generalize from the existence of disagreement about 
the specific definition of rights to the conclusion that our disagreements are pervasive, 
fundamental and irresolvable. Waldron and other disagreement theorists appear to think that 
either moral reasoning offers uniquely determinate answers or it is irrelevant.51 I agree that it is 
unlikely that moral reasoning will identify a uniquely correction formulation of basic rights; 
indeed, it is unlikely to identify a precise range of options. Moreover, I agree that we cannot 
reach determinate answers about how a right should apply to a specific situation without appeal 
to fully developed theories. Nevertheless, the rights embedded in our political culture are 
sufficiently determinate to delineate intuitively the realm of available positions. The role of 
specific rights may be demarcated imprecisely in our practical discourses, but an imprecise limit 
is not the same as no limit. Only detailed inquiry into our shared concepts can identify the 
reasons that are relevant for a particular right, or whether such shared reasons are absent.  
Finally, the negative and limited nature of the sincerity condition should alleviate worries 
that it is not content neutral. The sincerity condition does not exclude outlier views from political 
debates. Rather, it identifies minimally necessary conditions for our determination that a position 
is an answer to the legitimacy question under dispute. If the disputants are not at least trying to 
answer to the same question, there is no real disagreement.  
3.7 SUMMARY AND LIMITS OF THE CONCLUSION 
Disagreements creates a reason to lower one’s confidence only if one trusts that the other 
disputant (a) has roughly equal cognitive ability, (b) has roughly equal access to the relevant 
evidence and reasoning methods and (c) the context does not create new asymmetries. Under the 
 
50 Again, this is similar to an argument made by Dworkin against legal positivism. He argues that practical concepts 
cannot be defined from outside a practice. Any definition of a practical concept must adopt controversial positions 
on normative debates within the practice, and these controversies can be decided only by appeal to the purposes of 
the practice. 
51 See, e.g. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 52. 
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sincerity condition, an asymmetry exists when a purported peer adopts an outlier position, an 
asymmetry that justifies asking whether his position qualifies as disagreement. An outlier 
position on basic rights qualifies as an instance of disagreement only if its proponent can support 
it with reasons that show it is a construction or conception of the vague or contested right.  
Although limited, this concession shows that the first stage of Waldron’s argument is 
mistaken in two respects. First, without inappropriately appealing to our own theories, we can 
refuse to distort our scheme of basic rights so that citizens who hold questionable positions can 
accept it. The set of positions about rights that citizens reasonably endorse due to the burdens of 
judgment is no larger than the set of conceptions or construction of the right revealed in ordinary 
language and extended by novel positions that meet the above proviso. The possibility of factual 
or reasoning mistakes does not expand our reason to remain modest about basic rights. Second, 
the concession shows the impossibility of a content independent conception of reasonableness. 
While human fallibility may cause persistent disagreement, a dispute can be recognized as a 
disagreement only by implicitly appealing to the content of a right in political practices.  
These conclusions, however, only restrict the scope of disagreement. They limit 
Waldron’s argument but do not undermine it. Vague or contested rights permit a wide breadth of 
reasonable disagreement, and we still need an authority to make these determinations. The next 
chapters will develop a stronger positive result from these negative concessions.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
DISAGREEMENT AND KANTIAN POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
 
The principle of liberal legitimacy, in its general form, is that coercive political authority 
must be justified to each citizen in terms he or she can reasonably accept. The trick is to specify 
what terms citizens “can reasonably accept” without begging the question. Chapters 4 and 5 
define and defend what I will call an institutional conception of liberal legitimacy.  
In Chapter 3, I rejected Jeremy Waldron’s argument that the mere fact of disagreement 
about basic rights makes it impossible to find terms that all citizens can reasonably accept. Only 
reasonable disagreement is significant for political philosophy.1 Epistemic modesty does not 
require us to dilute basic rights to accommodate citizens who hold positions outside the ordinary 
semantic content of rights and who cannot (or will not) justify their position with reasons that 
recognizably bear on those rights. We need not weaken our basic rights to accommodate racists 
who think only Aryans have rights or fundamentalists who think the secular states violate 
religious freedom. These are the first limits on “reasonableness” needed to articulate the liberal 
principle of legitimacy without question-begging appeals to particular theories of justice. Our 
political practices provide substantive, albeit negative, limits on the terms citizens may 
reasonably accept.  
But this is minimal progress. Two massive problems remain. First, vague or contested 
rights remain broadly indeterminate, which can sustain persistent, reasonable disagreement that 
still threatens the possibility of liberal legitimacy. If citizens reasonably disagree about basic 
rights, how can a state select one specification and justify it to citizens in terms they can 
reasonably accept? Second, why accept a liberal principle of legitimacy and its duty to offer and 
accept a reasonable specification of basic rights? Legitimacy, a central commitment of modern 
political philosophy, requires particular states to justify their authority to their particular citizens. 
Many worry that liberal theories of legitimacy, by limiting public justifications to reasonable 
citizens, abandon legitimacy as a distinct constraint. If the “reasonable terms” are the “terms 
 
1 A disagreements about rights is reasonable if the position falls within the indeterminacy of our vague or contested 
rights or falls outside that zone but its supporters can argue to their position with reasons that recognizably bear on 
those rights (essentially, that show the right is more indeterminate than we thought).  
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citizens would accept if they were reasonable,” the liberal principle is only nominally different 
from saying that a state is legitimate if it is morally justified. Chapters 4 and 5 address these two 
issues. Their goal is to articulate a liberal theory of legitimacy that can sustain reasonable faith in 
liberal legitimacy despite persistent disagreement about basic rights.  
Chapter 4 outlines the liberal principle of legitimacy and articulates my theory of political 
justification. Section 4.1 defines the liberal principle of legitimacy by comparing it with 
alternative conceptions of legitimacy, with a particular focus on John Simmons’ distinction 
between political justification and legitimacy. Section 4.2 articulates a Kantian theory of political 
justification and argues that the fact of reasonable disagreement grounds the duty to offer and 
accept fair terms for social cooperation. Section 4.3 explains why a minimal justification is a 
condition of legitimacy.  
My theories of legitimacy and justification are broadly Kantian, but I flout some typical 
Kantian constraints. Accordingly, I should note that when I refer to Kantian or Lockean theories, 
I am not proposing textual reconstructions of Kant or Locke. Instead, I hope to articulate the 
basic features of two persistent and fundamentally opposed approaches to political philosophy. 
The ultimate task, we should not forget, is to address the moral challenge posed by persistent 
disagreement about rights in a society broadly committed to protecting rights.  
4.1 CONCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY 
The concept of legitimacy concerns the ability or right of a political entity to impose and 
enforce legal norms on its citizens. A legitimate state enacts laws that citizens regard as 
normatively binding independent of their prudential concerns to avoid sanctions. Conceptions of 
legitimacy fall into two broad camps: normative and descriptive. 
4.1.1 Descriptive or Sociological Legitimacy 
Whatever else it is, legitimacy is in some sense a function of citizen’s attitudes about 
their political institutions. Political scientists often attempt to measure institutional legitimacy by 
surveying public attitudes of loyalty.2 While many political scientists accept the Weberian theory 
 
2 See e.g., Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press, 1990); Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some 
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science 
Review 53:1 (1959): 69-105, 86. For Lipset, legitimacy is descriptive. He openly admits that oppressive societies, 
like feudal societies, are legitimate because they retain the loyalty of their subjects. Lipset, 87. Lispet, offers this 
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that legitimacy consists in the public’s willingness to accept laws and institutions as binding, 
they disagree amongst themselves about which public attitudes to measure.3 They may measure 
citizens’ willingness to accept outcomes with which they personally disagree4 or willingness to 
support institutional change when they disagree with its decision-method.5 Unlike these 
nominally descriptive conceptions of legitimacy used in legal or political theory, the liberal 
conception of legitimacy is thoroughly normative. Purely descriptive conceptions of legitimacy 
may be useful for political analysis, but are hopeless as self-standing conceptions of legitimacy.  
Political scientists who reduce legitimacy to public opinion misunderstand the beliefs 
they purport to measure. Legitimacy cannot be defined merely by citizens’ opinions about 
whether an institution or decision merits loyalty. Beliefs about legitimacy are not self-referential 
in this fashion. My opinion that the Iraq War was illegitimate rests on my beliefs about the 
proper scope of executive war powers, not on beliefs about the public attitude toward the Iraq 
War. A state’s legitimacy may be, in part, an aggregate function of citizen beliefs. These beliefs, 
however, rest on a more basic conception of legitimate authority. Descriptive conceptions based 
on public loyalty fail to isolate what is distinctive about political loyalty and thus political 
legitimacy. Green Bay Packers’ fans may be loyal to a particular manager, and their loyalty may 
correlate with the merits of management decisions (not retaining Brett Favre) and the manager’s 
decision procedures (his impatient response to Brett’s indecision), but these are not judgments of 
political legitimacy. More refined studies might isolate features that citizens regard as relevant to 
their opinions about legitimacy, but they cannot explain why citizens believe these features are 
essential. Descriptive loyalty-based conceptions of political legitimacy cannot suffice as a 
comprehensive, self-standing conception of political legitimacy.  
Consider, for instance, an interesting (but empirically limited) study of Supreme Court 
legitimacy performed by Dion Farganis.6 He attempted to study the relation between citizens’ 
                                                                                                                                                       
loyalty-based definition of legitimacy as one member of various types of normative beliefs that affect democratic 
stability (90), including access to the political system for new social groups, the perception of effectiveness, shared 
secular political culture and cross cutting political affiliations (88-90, 96-97).  
3 M. Stephen Weatherford, “Measuring Political Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review 86:1 (1992): 
149-166. 
4 James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira and Vanessa A. Baird, “On the Legitimacy of National High Courts,” The 
American Political Science Review 92:2 (1998): 343-358. 
5 Dion Farganis, "Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court Legitimacy." Political 
Research Quarterly, 65.1 (2012): 206-16. 
6 Ibid.  
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loyalty to the institution of the Supreme Court and the reasons that justices offer in their 
reasoning (as opposed to the outcomes). Farganis instructed subjects to read news articles about 
decisions using legalistic, public polling or religious reasons. He then measured their self-
reported willingness to limit the Court's power. Subjects were more inclined to curtail the 
Supreme Court’s power after reading the religiously justified decision, regardless of their 
opinion about its outcome. In contrast, they accepted both the legalistic and public-polling 
decisions. Expressing surprise at these results, Farganis concludes that such results should lead 
theorists to rethink their theories of legitimacy. This is a contradictory conclusion for a 
descriptive theorist. A descriptive theorist may be surprised when he disproves his hypothesis 
that beliefs about legitimacy rest on legal validity, but he cannot coherently ask why citizens 
accepted the public-polling decisions as legitimate—for him, legitimacy just is their acceptance 
of the procedure. The result is perplexing only if legitimacy is a normative judgment independent 
of public opinion. It is only genuinely surprising if one thinks only legally valid judicial opinions 
are legitimate and that public polls are not valid legal reasons. 
Ultimately, I will conclude that descriptive theorists are correct that the legitimacy of a 
state is a function of citizens’ attitudes toward their state and willingness to support its political 
institutions. This willingness, however, must be mediated by the right sort of reasons. In Chapter 
5, I argue that a state is legitimate if its citizens maintain their loyalty to its political institutions 
for the right reasons (because it responds to citizens’ challenges with reasons they appreciate).  
4.1.2 Normative Legitimacy: Locke and Kant 
The liberal principle of legitimacy, in contrast, is a thoroughly normative conception. A 
normative conception of legitimacy specifies the conditions in which citizens have an obligation 
to accept the acts of a political authority as binding.  
John Simmons has identified a crucial distinction for understanding the normative role 
played by legitimacy. Discussion of political justification often conflate two normative criteria: 
(1) what justifies the existence of the entities we call “states,” i.e. what makes the state morally 
and prudentially preferable to non-state alternatives; and (2) what legitimates any particular state, 
i.e. what gives a specific state the exclusive right to specify its citizens duties and to enforce 
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them using coercion.7 The justification of the state is an impersonal demonstration that states in 
general are prudentially rational and morally permissible. It is often phrased as a response to 
anarchists’ insistence that there is no good reason for states. The justification can be comparative 
or non-comparative. One may argue that state institutions are preferable to non-state institutions 
or that the state is rationally or morally necessary. Legitimacy, in contrast, is a relation between a 
particular state and its citizens. A legitimate state has two exclusive rights: a power right to 
specify its citizens’ obligations and a claim right to enforce them with coercion8 (and, on some 
conceptions, a power right to create new obligations9). Throughout the dissertation, I use 
‘legitimacy’ and ‘justification’ in these technical senses.  
4.1.2.1 Lockean theory: consent as the principle of legitimacy 
For Lockeans, justification and legitimacy are fundamentally distinct.10 The justification 
for the state is prudential: states can protect rights better than people can individually, because 
people are partial, passionate, ignorant and unequal in strength. The state’s power alleviates 
coordination problems by assuring us that someone has the power to enforce our rights and that, 
if we follow basic restraints, others are likely to reciprocate. In addition, by maintaining general 
laws and an independent judiciary, the state avoids the frequent mistakes that occur when 
individuals must define their own rights and adjudicate their own disputes. All states are justified 
by these same prudential concerns, which they fulfill to greater or lesser degrees.  
For Lockeans, a particular state is legitimate if citizens actually consent to its authority.11 
 
7 Simmons, “Justification” 123-4, 137 
8 This is not Simmons’s terminology. I am using “power right” and “claim right” in their technical Hohfeldian 
senses. This requires additional verbiage but marks an important distinction. Rights are always relations between 
persons. A power right is the ability to alter another person’s obligations. If A has the power to alter B’s duties (say 
by exercising a contractual option), then B has a correlative liability to A that A will alter his duties. A claim right is 
a true right to act in some way. If A has the right against B to act in some way, then B has a correlative duty to A not 
to interfere with A’s act.  
9 Lockeans reject this claim. The state only exercises citizens’ rights on their behalf, so its rights are in principle 
reducible to the rights of its citizens. Accordingly, a state cannot create new obligations for its citizens.  
10 Robert Nozick, for instance, argues that the minimal police state is prudentially justified and morally permissible 
as an extension of each individual’s natural executive right to defend himself from others’ mistaken or immoral uses 
of force. Individuals may rationally and permissibly band together and transfer their right to enforce their rights to a 
more powerful private agent. A particular state only has legitimate authority over any particular person, once that 
person actually consents to its authority by contract or by engaging in relations with its members (thus recognizing 
the members’ executive rights against her). A person violates no duty by refusing to cooperate. The state, however, 
may continue to protect citizens’ rights by stopping her from unilaterally enforcing her perceived rights against 
them. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974): 108-114, 139-140.  
11 As I am interpreting it, the distinctly Lockean tradition is associated with what may be called a “strong 
voluntarist” conception of political obligation. Individuals have a natural executive right (a power right) to make 
 
   
54 
A state may only specify and enforce the obligations of citizens who consent to give it those 
rights. The existence of states may generally be beneficial. A particular state may benefit me and 
others. However, neither fact gives any specific state the power to define my duties or a claim 
right to sanction me for violating my duties. Like other Lockeans, Simmons relies on the analogy 
with ordinary contracts. Even if you propose a contract that is profitable for both of us, I can 
reject your offer without violating your rights. Similarly, even if giving a state is beneficial to me 
and others, I may reject it without violating anyone’s rights. This is because no one has a right to 
my cooperation. Simmons compares the state’s monopoly on force to a utility monopoly. A 
regional electric monopoly benefits everyone by lowering prices and increasing coverage areas, 
but these benefits do obligate me to become a customer, even if my refusal to cooperate 
increases utility costs for me and others.12 More traditionally, this difference was marked by 
noting that benevolent dictators are prudentially preferable to anarchy or petty tyrants, but that is 
insufficient to demonstrate that citizens have a duty to accept the dictator’s authority. 
For Lockeans, a particular state can be legitimate but unjustified or justified but 
illegitimate. Citizens may consent to a state and make it legitimate, even if they do not know 
whether it fulfills its justification or only does so poorly. People may be more inclined to accept 
a state that is morally or prudentially beneficial, but there is no conceptual connection. It is 
irrelevant whether citizens consent out of prudence, civic self-identification, moral obligation or 
apathy, so long as their consent is free and relatively informed.13  
4.1.2.2 Kantian theory: the liberal principle of legitimacy 
Unlike Lockeans, the Kantian tradition treats legitimacy and justification as intimately 
                                                                                                                                                       
judgments about and enforce their negative claim rights (liberty rights), and thus, actual consent is a necessary to 
create obligation to a specific political authority. According to “weak voluntarism,” hypothetical consent is 
sufficient to create political obligations. Helga Varden, “Nozick’s Reply to the Anarchist,” Law and Philosophy 28 
(2009): 588-590. Varden argues it is possible to read Locke and Nozick as “weak” or “bilateral” voluntarists, for 
which consent can be attributed to citizens if a state enforces individual rights and nothing else. However, the 
Lockean position as a distinct tradition is typically associated with insistence on the natural executive right and the 
necessity of actual consent. I avoid the terminology of strong and weak voluntarism, because I believe the label 
“weak voluntarism” blurs the distinction between justification and legitimacy.  
12 Simmons, “Justification” 129. 
13 Ibid. This is clearly Simmons’ position in the text, but he complicates the Lockean story in a footnote where he 
maintains that “the limited state’s justification is intended by [Locke] to be a necessary condition for legitimation 
(by consent) of any particular state’s rule.” Ibid. n.14. As a matter of rationality and morality, we can only bind 
ourselves to a state that is prudentially justified because it meets the minimal justification of the state. This appears 
to be his reading of Lockean passages that seem like a hypothetical consent theory. This reading, relegated to a 
footnote is a significant and unexplored departure from the rest of Simmons’s text. 
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connected. While it is dangerous to let a tradition be defined by its opponents, Simmons presents 
a useful characterization of Kantian political philosophy. The Kantian camp includes 
hypothetical social contract theories (or “weak voluntarism”) that use a liberal principle of 
legitimacy. For Kantians, states are justified because positive law is morally necessary for 
respecting rights, and a state is legitimate if it justifies its laws to each citizen in terms she can 
accept as reasonable.  
Before crashing through the thicket, it would be useful to glimpse the goal. I offer here 
preliminary formulations of my specific Kantian conception of justification and legitimacy.  
States are justified because it is morally necessary to have positive law coordinate on 
specifications of vague or contested basic rights. More precisely, individuals are obliged 
to offer and accept terms for social cooperation to govern coercive public authority, 
because individuals can interact rightfully with respect to one another only after positive 
law settles on a particular shared specification of vague or contested basic rights.  
 
I am obliged to respect rights but, if I attempt to enforce my own rights or respect your rights on 
my own, one of us will impose our chosen specification of rights on the other. Thus, I am 
obligated to support a set of general laws to which we can be subject reciprocally. Any agent 
powerful enough to impose the rule of law can enable rightful relations between us; however, 
this private agent recreates the problem by imposing its conception on us. Only a legitimate 
authority may impose obligations while maintaining a rightful relation with its citizens.  
A state is legitimate insofar as it protects a reasonable specification of rights and adopts 
justificatory procedures that assure citizens of that fact.14 More precisely, a particular 
state is legitimate insofar as (a) its laws and actions respect a reasonable specification of 
vague or contested basic rights and (b) it follows procedures that publicly demonstrate to 
citizens that its laws and actions respect reasonable specifications using reasons that 
dissenting citizens appreciate. 
 
An authority is a properly public authority when it is accountable for its choices to citizens in the 
right way. A scheme of rights is only reciprocal if laws respect reasonable conceptions of basic 
rights and its officials stand ready to demonstrate this using public reason. When a state follows 
procedures designed to assure citizens that it selects reasonable specifications rather than serve 
private interests, citizens may accept its dictates without merely subjecting themselves to another 
person’s arbitrary choices. Citizens may and should accept the positive law issued by a state if 
 
14 Again, this position leaves open the possibility that a state may legitimately do more than protect rights and that 
protecting basic rights requires more than enforcing the private rights that citizens have without a state.  
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they recognize that it protects a reasonable specification of rights and empowers them to 
challenge the reasonableness of its specifications.  
The remainder of Chapter 4 articulates this theory of justification. Chapter 5 articulates 
and defends this conception of legitimacy. Despite this detour into political justification, we 
should not forget that the goal is to defend the possibility of legitimate government when citizens 
persistently and reasonably disagree about their basic rights.  
4.1.3 Simmons’ Criticisms of Kantian Legitimacy 
According to Simmons, Kantian political philosophy seeks a middle ground between the 
personal perspective of consent and the impersonal perspective of moral justification. Kantians 
admit that legitimacy requires justifying laws to citizens with varied moral beliefs but also want 
to avoid skewing outcomes to accommodate the idiosyncratic beliefs of non-ideal individuals. As 
a result, he argues, they blur the distinction between political justification and legitimacy. 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism is Simmons’ primary example. I discuss Rawls at length in 
Chapter 5; for now, I assume basic familiarity with Political Liberalism and describe only what 
is necessary to explain Simmons’ argument. Rawls initially describes justification and legitimacy 
as distinct standards, acknowledging that the fact that a state is justified is insufficient to 
demonstrate that it has the right to employ coercion. Rawls writes 
[J]ustice as fairness is not reasonable in the first place unless in a 
suitable way it can win its support by addressing each citizen’s 
reason… Only so is it an account of the legitimacy of political 
authority as opposed to an account of how those who hold power 
can satisfy themselves, and not citizens generally, that they are 
acting properly.15 
The argument for justice as fairness is equally sound regardless whether citizens believe it. 
However, Rawls recognizes that more is required. A legitimate state must also convince the 
actual people over whom it exercises coercion that its conception of justice is sound.  
According to Simmons, Rawls ends up betraying this recognition. Rawls’ final position is 
that a state is legitimate and justified if reasonable citizens reach an overlapping consensus on a 
theory of justice from within their diverse comprehensive doctrines. This position limits the 
generality of justification and the particularity of legitimacy. A state is morally justified if it 
 
15 Rawls, PL, 143-144. 
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follows a conception of justice supported by most comprehensive doctrines in that society. By 
limiting the justification to doctrines held by citizens, Rawls replaces the universal arguments of 
moral justification with arguments relativized to citizens’ actual beliefs. Second, a state is 
legitimate if it convinces reasonable citizens (those who accept pluralism and a duty to 
cooperate) that its constitutional essentials accord with a conception of justice acceptable to all 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Legitimacy, on Rawls theory, does not require convincing 
actual citizens with their actual beliefs to accept this particular state. It only requires showing 
them that the basic features of the state are consistent with principles that people with 
appropriate moral beliefs would accept. Justification loses its impersonal nature to accommodate 
the beliefs of actual citizens, while legitimacy loses its particular nature to avoid accommodating 
the unreasonable beliefs of actual citizens. Thus, Simmons concludes, Rawls is conflating 
legitimacy and justification.16  
It is a prima facie problem if Kantian philosophy conflates justification and legitimacy 
when one accepts, as I do, the intuitive position that these are distinct moral standards for 
evaluating political authority. In addition, Simmons argues that this conflation leads to further 
problems. First, by privileging a relation between the state and an ideal reasonable person, the 
Kantian perspective may discount the moral relevance of the actual relationship between a state 
and its citizens. Kant’s political absolutism reflects this tendency, as he recommended citizens 
must accept a minimally just state even if it violates their rights.17  
Second, and more important, it leads Kantians to assume what they need to prove: 
namely, that we are obliged to offer and accept fair terms of cooperation. From a Lockean 
perspective, if I respect your rights in all my actions, then I am fully justified. I have no 
additional obligation to justify my actions to you in terms you can accept. If I impinge on your 
rights, then reasonableness of my mistaken justification does not remove the violation. Our 
obligation is to respect one another’s rights. Even if we disagree, our obligation is to get it right. 
Since there is no freestanding obligation to cooperate and we can respect rights without 
collective efforts, we have no obligation to offer or accept terms for fair cooperation. Unless the 
 
16 This argument has not shown, as Simmons must, that the two are co-extensive. As I ultimately think that 
Simmons is wrong about Rawls, this reconstruction of his argument is the best that I can offer. I believe Simmons is 
ultimately right about Rawls but not the Rawlsian project. Simmons does not identify the real source of the problem 
in Rawls, which is the idea of overlapping consensus and the limited conception of reasonableness that motivates it. 
17 Simmons, “Justification” 145-150. 
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Kantian can explain why collective efforts are necessary to respect rights, then he or she fails to 
establish the moral necessity of accepting common terms for political cooperation.18  
In summary, Simmons argues that Kantians (1) conflate justification and legitimacy, 
which leads them (2) to accept a limited form of political absolutism and (3) to fail to justify the 
obligation to offer and accept fair terms of social cooperation. The remainder of Chapter 4 argues 
that Simmons is incorrect on all three counts. Section 4.1.4 explains how Kantians can connect 
legitimacy and justification without collapsing them. Section 4.2 articulates a Kantian 
justification for the state that grounds the obligation to offer and accept fair terms of social 
cooperation. Last, Section 4.3 explains why our obligation to accept minimally just states does 
not lead to a form of political absolutism.  
4.1.4 The Kantian Relation between Legitimacy and Justification  
It is more difficult to describe the relation between justification and legitimacy in Kantian 
theory than Lockean theory, for two reasons: (1) legitimacy is partially a function of justification 
and (2) legitimacy (in addition to justification) is a scalar concept with a vague lower threshold.  
Simmons was correct on one count. Kantian political philosophy identifies the shared 
ground between the two normative standards for political authority. A particular state is 
legitimate insofar as citizens accept its authority because it fulfills the general justification for 
states. Legitimacy is, in part, a function of a states’ ability to fulfill the function that makes states 
morally necessary. Accordingly, a state cannot be legitimate but not minimally justified.19 I find 
this connection intuitively plausible. The state’s right to impose obligations on its citizens should 
be connected to its reason for existence.  
A constitutional democracy, for instance, may be structured perfectly for citizens to hold 
public officials accountable and yet enact unreasonable laws that violate citizens’ rights. Citizens 
often accept state actions that violate their rights or the rights of their fellow citizens. Perhaps 
they are apathetic. Or, they may falsely yet sincerely believe the state respects a reasonable 
conception of rights. Nevertheless, democratic states remain illegitimate to the degree they fail to 
 
18 Ibid. 151-155. 
19 On this point, my conception departs from many interpretations of Kant and, arguably, from his text. See, e.g. AK 
8:297-300. This is the source of Kant’s absolutism. I revisit the absolutism objection in § C and argue that Kant 
could have consistently supported a right to revolution in unjust states. For a detailed discussion of whether Kant 
was, in fact, committed to absolutism, see Helga Varden, “Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political 
Legitimacy: How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in ‘The Doctrine of Right’,” Kant-Studien (2010): 331-51.  
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protect a minimal specification of basic rights. For instance, any state that conditions citizens’ 
rights on race is illegitimate, even if all its citizens believe race is a just political consideration. It 
is impossible for citizens to accept a racist regime for the right reasons. Citizens cannot accept 
the state’s authority because it protects a version of basic rights that each can accept as free and 
equal—it simply does not. 
Although legitimacy and justification are connected, they remain distinct. A state can be 
justified yet not legitimate. This can occur when a state fails to justify its actions to citizen. This 
is one problem with the mythical benevolent dictator. A dictator can protect a reasonable 
specification of his subjects’ rights and thus enable rightful relations among them; nevertheless, 
he violates their rights by imposing his chosen specification without permitting them to 
challenge its justification. A state can also be justified but not legitimate even if it follows 
justificatory procedures. This can happen if citizens are not equipped to understand sound 
reasons. Imagine dropping a fully just modern liberal regime in Medieval England. Though fully 
just by hypothesis, this state could never be legitimate because its medieval citizens would have 
insufficiently developed ideas to appreciate the justice of the new state. The state might become 
legitimate over time as these citizens developed these ideas (and it should strive to do so).  
Therefore, Simmons’ claim that Kantian political philosophy conflates justification and 
legitimacy is incorrect. Although Kantian theory connects these two political norms in ways 
Lockeans will reject, the two norms remain distinct.  
4.2 KANTIAN JUSTIFICATION OF THE STATE AND THE DILEMMA  
The Kantian justification for the state is that positive law is a necessary condition of 
rightful relations between citizens.20 Because reasonable disagreement about basic rights is 
inevitable, we cannot respect one another’s rights by acting unilaterally or even by acting in 
concert. We can respect our rights and the rights of others only if we have a shared specification 
of vague or contested rights, and only positive law can provide that reciprocal specification.21 
 
20 This argument was inspired by Kant’s texts, primarily the Metaphysics of Morals, and by Arthur Ripstein’s 
“Authority and Coercion” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2004): 2-35. Its final shape was influenced by 
Ripstein’s later interpretation in Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 2009): 1-30, 145-81, and Helga Varden’s “Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political 
Obligations: Why Justice is Impossible in the State of Nature,” Kantian Review 13.2 (2008): 1-45. 
21 Because this dissertation is not about justice but legitimacy, especially legitimacy in the face of disagreements 
about justice, I will remain as agnostic about the nature of those rights as possible. For instance, I take no position 
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Rightful relations are possible only in a state. And, when citizens recognize the state fulfills this 
coordinating function, that is sufficient to ground their prima facie obligation to accept its law.22 
Section 4.2.2 presents this extended argument for the obligation to adopt an authority to 
coordinate basic rights. The argument also responds to the Simmons’ challenge to justify the 
obligation to accept fair terms of social cooperation. Before offering the full argument, I need to 
first distinguish Kantian legal coordination from other similar sounding ideas.  
4.2.1 Coordination as Instrumentally, Intrinsically or Morally Necessary 
The truism that law performs a coordinating function has become so common in political 
and legal philosophy that it often conflates several distinct functions of law. Coordination may 
play three roles in attempts to justify the state: instrumental, intrinsic and constitutive.  
For Hobbes, Locke, and the contemporary law and economics movement, legal 
coordination is an instrumentally valuable tool for dealing with human imperfections and the 
limits of intrapersonal negotiation. For Hobbes, the Sovereign can prevent the conflicts that 
would otherwise be pervasive because humans are naturally selfish and insecure about their self-
worth.23 For Locke, a common set of laws and a neutral arbiter provide the coordination need to 
avoid the mistakes that arise when individuals judge and enforce their own rights. Although 
individuals should be able to discover their natural rights through reason, their partiality, limited 
knowledge and imperfect reasoning misleads them.24 Contemporary economists argue that law’s 
primary function is to adjust citizens' incentives in order to solve collective action problems (like 
prisoners’ dilemmas or the tragedy of the commons) that arise when individuals lack complete 
information or when circumstances create incentives contrary to the public good.25 For each of 
                                                                                                                                                       
on disputes about whether basic rights are positive or negative or held individually or collectively. Following Kant, 
most Kantians have no ambition to neutrality about justice; instead, they argue that we can demonstrate by a prior 
reasoning (sometimes in conjunction with a posteriori necessary facts about the nature of human agency) that it must 
be possible for us to have a right to property, contract and status relations and that the state is morally necessary 
because the state of nature is inconsistent with the possibility of those rights. See e.g., Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 
30-144; Varden, “Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception,” 6-7, 13-18 (right to property presupposes state). Unlike these 
more comprehensive Kantian conceptions, I will remain at the level of the political in the Rawlsian sense when 
arguing about the nature of basic rights. This assumption is embodied in premise 2 below.  
22 I also remain agnostic about what functions a state may perform other than enforcing rights. The argument does 
not support the weak voluntarist claim that the state may only enforce the liberty rights of individuals (that the rights 
of the state are reducible to private rights of individuals), only that the state must at least do this much.  
23 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XIII. 
24 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, sec. 124-125.  
25 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ullen, Law & Economics, 5th Ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2000): Ch. 1.  
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these theories, law would be unnecessary if humans were less partial, passionate, ignorant or 
unequal in strength. Legal coordination alleviates practical difficulties that would otherwise 
prevent us from achieving independently valuable ends of stability, security or prosperity. Such 
instrumental benefits of legal coordination cannot ground a moral obligation to follow the law, 
because they presume subjects accept these goals of stability and prosperity as valuable ends.26 
Coordination also plays a central role in the natural law theory of John Finnis. Finnis 
argues that all valuable human activities require coordination by commonly acknowledged rules. 
Political authority supplies the higher-order rules to coordinate all our lower-order activities. 
Political coordination, however, is not merely a tool for achieving these independently valuable 
ends. Political coordination is, in itself, a valuable common and individual good. When citizens 
can enable political coordination by acquiescing to a specific legal authority, then they have a 
prima facie reason to recognize an authoritative duty of obedience to its laws.27  
Legal coordination plays a third distinct function in Kantian political philosophy. Legal 
coordination is neither intrinsically valuable nor a means to an independently valuable end. 
Rather, we are morally obligated to accept legal coordination, because only within the state are 
rightful relations possible.28 The law’s settlement function makes rightful relations with other 
persons possible. Anyone who recognizes a duty to respect others rights or to protect their own 
rights is also obligated to accept a political authority capable of specifying a shared set of basic 
rights. Political authority is not merely a useful method to protect our rights. The state is a 
necessary condition of rightful relations.29  
 
26 Leslie Green argues at length that these prudential benefits of coordination cannot ground an obligation to follow 
the law. Leslie Green, “Positivism and Conventionalism,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 12 (1999): 
35-52. 
27 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980): 245-247; John Finnis, “The 
Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory,” Journal of Law, Ethics, and Social Policy 1 
(1984-1985): 115-137. 
28 The obligation to offer and accept fair terms of social cooperation is a duty of right rather than of virtue and thus, 
strictly speaking, not a moral obligation for Kant. However, that is because for Kant moral obligations (strictly 
speaking, duties of virtue) require us to act for the right reasons while “external right” concerns relations in time and 
space that may be coerced and that make no reference to the reasons for action.  
29 Historically, Kant was read as an instrumentalist who believed like Hobbes that overwhelming power was a 
prudential necessity to secure reliable conformity to law. E.g. Julius Ebbinghaus, “The Law of Humanity and the 
Limits of State Power,” Philosophical Quarterly 3:10 (1953):14-22. Howard Williams was once the prominent 
proponent of this instrumental reading. Howard Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1983): 67-68, 73, 168-170. However, contemporary authors recognize that Kant’s Metaphysic of Morals 
presents an argument that the state is constitutive of rightful relations, not simply a means to better protect rights. 
Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 1-30; Varden, “Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception”; David Sussman, “Unforgivable 
 
   
62 
4.2.2 The Moral Obligation to Establish and Accept Positive Law for Moral Coordination 
This section offers an extended argument that, in situations of reasonable disagreement, 
anyone who accepts an obligation to respect basic rights is obligated to recognize a third party to 
authoritatively settle vague and contested basic rights. Its final steps also demonstrate why this 
Kantian justification for the state does not establish that any particular state holds legitimate 
authority. The argument proceeds in nine premises, beginning with the following postulates.  
(1) Individuals have a duty to respect basic rights in themselves and others, whatever 
those rights turn out to be. (2) Whatever basic rights people have, they are held by all equally, 
such that any distinctions among the rights of particular individuals must be justified by a theory 
of those rights or result from necessary adjustments to develop a consistent system of rights.  
These first two premises are postulates. People who reject the duty to respect rights are 
simply outside the scope of our moral discourse and reasonable disagreement as defined by 
Chapter 3. Notably, democratic disagreement theorists like Waldron share this starting point. 
Their fundamental premise is that citizens accept rights but disagree about their content. The 
second premise is a fundamental feature of rights that, I take it, virtually any theory of rights 
must accommodate. One need not accept any particular theory of basic rights to get the argument 
started. 
(3) Reason can identify the contours of our basic rights, but it cannot dictate their precise 
content because many of our basic rights are vague or contested.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, one reason for persistent disagreement about rights is that 
many rights are vague or contested. When a right is vague or contested, the right has core or 
paradigm cases but also many cases (including paradigmatic cases) over which reasonable 
disagreement is inevitable.  
This premise is controversial from two opposing directions. Some profess skepticism 
about our ability to identify even vague contours of basic rights. However, it is difficult to 
imagine someone who accepts premise (1) that we should respect basic rights, while denying that 
basic rights can be roughly identified by rational and empirical judgments. Waldron’s argument 
from disagreement is the strongest version of such an argument I have encountered. Chapter 3 
                                                                                                                                                       
Sins? Revolution and Reconciliation in Kant,” in Kant's Anatomy of Evil, Sharon Anderson-Gold & Pablo Muchnik 
(eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 215-235; Katrin Flikshuh, “Reason, Right, and Revolution: 
Kant and Locke,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36:4 (2008): 375–404.  
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offers a sustained response to this position: any argument that claims we can disagree about 
basic rights also assumes sufficient agreement to avoid this objection.  
A more historically common response to premise three is to insist that the apparent 
vagueness or contestedness in rights is merely epistemic. Rights disagreements persist because 
we have imperfect knowledge of ourselves, the world or moral reality. This is a common 
Lockean position. If rights are fully determinate, then my moral duty is to figure out what our 
respective rights are and respect them. The fact of disagreement about the right specification 
does not raise a philosophically interesting difficulty. If I have judged our respective rights 
correctly, then I do not wrong you by asserting my rights despite your incorrect judgment; if I am 
wrong, then the reasonableness of my mistake does not remove the violation.  
While I have no definitive arguments against the epistemic explanation for disagreement, 
a brief survey of basic rights casts significant doubt on its plausibility as a general account of 
disagreement. The Lockean position is committed to the claim that there is, in principle, a 
uniquely correct specification of rights that determine the uniquely correct outcomes in particular 
cases. All disagreements about rights are, at least in principle, solvable with more knowledge 
about the world or about our moral principles. On the contrary, a survey of our basic rights 
reveals that many of the indeterminacies in our vague or contested rights remain even with clear 
specification of the right in the abstract, with full information about the world and a clear set of 
operational principles for applying the right. I discuss the rights to acquire property, to enter 
contracts and to expression. I chose these examples, because they are central rights for any 
constitutional theory, including a Lockean theory. 
My first example of an indeterminate right is Kant’s primary example: the right to 
property.30 Kant argues that the right to private property is morally necessary for autonomy. 
Morality, however, does not dictate a unique scheme of property rules for application to 
particular cases. This is part of what Kant means when he writes that property rights remain 
“provisional” without state authority.31  
 
30 I use Kant’s example and some of his arguments, but this section is not a scholarly reconstruction of Kant’s theory 
of private property. For textual interpretations of Kant’s argument for the necessity of private property, see Ripstein, 
Force and Freedom, 63-64, 94-96; Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism,” Harvard Law Review 109 (1996): 
1535. 
31 Kant thinks natural rights are provisional for two additional reasons. Arthur Ripstein has articulated these 
additional limits much more clearly than Kant. First, even if our rights were determinate, if I unilaterally acquire 
rights for myself, then I alter your obligations and impose on your freedom (your purposiveness) by my arbitrary 
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As Arthur Ripstein explains well in Force and Freedom, according to Kant, we can be 
free to set our own ends only if it is possible for us to have the right to exclude others from 
physical property, even when we are not physically in possession of it.32 Given the kind of 
creatures that humans are, we can pursue ends only by using physical objects. We only have 
freedom to set and pursue our projects in the world, if we have the right to exclude others from 
objects that are not currently in our physical possession.33 Say, for instance, that I want to bring 
my sandwich to work for lunch. You can interfere with my ability to pursue this end by ripping 
the sandwich from my hands.34 You can also interfere by swiping my sandwich when I lay it 
down to take a drink during lunch or when I leave it in the fridge in the morning. If I have the 
right to set the end of bringing lunch to work, then I must have the right to demand that you not 
take my sandwich, even when I am not holding it or using it. Otherwise, my ability to set this end 
is conditioned on your willingness to permit me that freedom. Therefore, the right to private 
property must extend beyond my right to control my body and objects that I am currently using – 
I must have a right to dictate how others use physical objects regardless of those object’s 
physical location. We lack freedom to set and pursue ends in the world if we lack the right to 
demand that others refrain from interfering with our physical property.  
Nevertheless, the general moral requirement for rightful private property is insufficiently 
precise to determine specific property rules or the correct judgment in particular cases. A priori 
reason, even in conjunction with empirical facts, does not identify a uniquely appropriate set of 
property rules. Any scheme of property rules will have three related forms of vagueness. First, a 
property right is a right against others persons with respect to objects in the world, so property 
                                                                                                                                                       
choices. For example, by acquiring property, I create a duties for you to refrain from trespassing, and thus restrict 
your ability to set your own ends with respect to those objects. Ripstein, Force, 148-159; Kant, Metaphysics of 
Morals, in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, translated by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996): AK 6:262-3. I invoke this problem in premise 5 below. Second, externally free persons cannot submit to 
coercively enforced limits except with adequate assurance others will reciprocally submit to these limits; otherwise, 
they violate their rightful self-respect by subjecting their choices to others potentially arbitrary choices. Accordingly, 
we can only engage in rightful relations if a powerful executive authority solves this assurance problem. Ripstein, 
Force, 159-168; Kant AK 6:256. Kant and Ripstein’s explanation of the assurance condition are perplexing. I do not 
see why this is an a priori condition rather than the standard empirical problem about reciprocal assurance. 
32 See, Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 63-64, 66-69. Kant calls these “intelligible property rights.” Although Kant 
connects “intelligible property” to his metaphysical system, for my purposes it need not be given any heavy-duty 
metaphysical reading. 
33 According to Kant, setting an end is distinct from wishing or pinning for an end. To set an end, one presumes that 
the means are within their power. Kant, Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section II. 
34 The right to bodily integrity is sufficient to capture this violation, and thus private property strictly speaking is 
only necessary for the next step. 
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rules will inherit ontological vagueness in the boundaries of objects. Real property and many 
chattels are not naturally divided into discrete parcels ready-made for setting human ends.  
Second, even when an object has determinate boundaries, we can often use a single 
object for several purposes simultaneously. When our ends overlap in non-exclusive ways, the 
same object could be the site of several property rights. There is likely no precise answer about 
the kind or degree of exclusionary rights necessary to pursue any of these particular ends.  
Third, the moral necessity for property only specifies vague spatial or temporal scales for 
the property rights. While I must have the right to exclude others from property I am not 
currently using, this general necessity does not determine either the amount of property that I 
may claim for my ends or the duration for which I can hold it without actively using it.35 
For example, what real property rights would be required for a person to set and pursue 
the end of farming? This end does not determine a precise quantity of land or the content of 
rights with respect to land. Farmers must plant a determinate amount of soil, but that land is 
connected to the surrounding land and intelligent farming requires leaving some land untilled to 
control drainage and nutrient depletion. To adopt the end of farming, a person must be permitted 
to exclude others from land that she wants left fallow. Yet, how much land? Which parcels? How 
long may she leave it fallow and still claim to be engaged in farming? It is tempting to respond 
that she is entitled to the land that the best farming practices deem reasonable. This judgment, 
unfortunately, is no more determinate.  
Second, even if there were agreement in judgment about these facts, which I doubt, we 
 
35 My concern is with reasonable disagreement about the principles that constitute the right to property. Others, 
such as Varden, argue that Kant’s concern is with unilateral choice. Varden, “Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception,” 
13-18. The right to property includes a right to acquire property by one’s choice to apply the principle of acquisition. 
Varden argues that without a public authority, no person can choose to acquire specific property without violating 
others rights. As I interpret her argument, the problem is with the exercise of a power right to create property rights. 
If I have a power to acquire property by making a choice (say, to plant corn on a certain plot), then I define others’ 
rights by my arbitrary choice (one not subject to universal laws) and thereby violate their innate right to freedom 
(not to be subject to another’s arbitrary will). The only way to escape this problem, Varden argues, is for everyone to 
be subject to an omnilateral will; that is, a postulated shared will to adopt an authority to govern appropriation.  
Although Varden notes that any principle of acquisition is subject to reasonable disagreement in application, 
disagreement is secondary to the imposition of arbitrary choice. She argues that even universal consent to a principle 
and its application is insufficient to establish rightful relations, because individuals still choose when to exercise 
their right to appropriate and whether to consent to another’s appropriation. Ibid. at 17. In contrast, my concern in 
premises 3-6 is with the choice of a principle. If there were a determinate principle that every reasonable person 
must accept or everyone actually accepted, then there would be no moral problem with unilateral decisions applying 
it. If I acquiesce to your choices under that principle, I am “subject” to nothing but my judgment about the 
respective boundaries of our rights – in this case, about your realm of legitimate choice. The problem is that our 
rights lack such determinacy and no person has the right to specify the right principles or applications unilaterally.  
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still have the problem of overlapping ends. What ends should others refrain from adopting with 
respect to her fallow land? Of course, they must be obligated not to till her fallow land, but what 
about drilling, grazing, hunting or kite-flying on it? Each of these interferes to some degree with 
the function of fallow land. This indeterminacy in the content of her exclusionary right extends 
even to the land that she is currently farming. Should she be able to fence off the entire parcel, or 
may she only insist that people walk on defined roads or between planted rows of corn? Practical 
reason alone is insufficient to answer such questions. Property rights offer an example in which 
certain forms of non-epistemic indeterminacy render it impossible, in principle, to identify a set 
of specific rules that will operationalize a basic right. It does not matter how much more 
knowledge about the world or human ends we acquire, reasonable disagreement will persist 
about the basic rules for protecting private property.  
Some people, especially philosophers with particularistic leanings or lawyers hostile to 
theory, may think that we solve such problems by careful analysis of actual cases. However, if a 
basic right inherits vagueness from the natural categories on which it supervenes or the human 
ends which it serves, then there can be no determinate application of the right to specific cases. 
Greater knowledge about the world or more detailed specifications of the background values 
cannot remove this vagueness. Consider the right to contract, another right that likely inherits 
vagueness from vague natural categories. Assume that people have a right to enter private 
contracts that no just state could entirely curtail.36 Under any plausible formulation, this right is 
limited to competent adults who can comprehend and evaluate the consequences of their actions. 
Insofar as the right to contract supervenes on facts about competency, the right to contract will 
be vague, because competency is both degree-vague and task-relative. Thirteen year olds are 
generally not competent; twenty-one year olds generally are. No precise line, however, can 
distinguish a seventeen year old from an eighteen year old, even if we knew everything possible 
about teenager’s mental abilities and the purpose of the contracts in question. This indeterminacy 
is not simply created by our desire for age-based generalizations. The problem would remain 
even if we made individual competency determinations, tailoring our competency judgments to 
the minor’s maturity, the subject matter and the context of negotiation. Intellectual ability is 
scalar. To claim that the right to contract is fully determinate, someone must maintain that a child 
 
36 Kant also provides an argument that the right to contract is morally required for rightful interaction. Kant, 
Metaphysics of Morals, AK 6:273. 
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switches from incompetent to competent at a precise level of intellectual ability for a particular 
task and we are simply ignorant of this precise dividing line.  
Our judgments about rights inherent the vagueness of the world on which they must 
supervene. Property and contract rights present some disagreements with non-epistemic origins 
that make it impossible, in principle, to identify the uniquely correct outcome in specific cases.  
Other people, with more theoretical leanings, might think that we can resolve disputes 
about specific cases or the proper operational rules by moving to a higher level of abstraction. 
Once we identify the correct theory of property, then we can settle disputes about operational 
principles and particular cases. However, when we move to a greater level of abstraction, most 
basic rights become highly contested. A right is contested when the right serves or embodies 
many values, and these support several competing conceptions of the right.  
Contemporary legal theorists are familiar with the claim that rights like the freedom of 
expression or privacy (in its classical sense) are contested concepts. The right to freedom of 
expression is bounded by a series of limits. One may publicly criticize another person but not 
defame them, spread revolutionary ideas but not incite violence, engage in artistic exhibitions but 
not obscene displays, share ideas but not infringe intellectual property, and so on.37 Legislators, 
judges and theorists must rely on specific conceptions of free expression to reach decisions about 
operational rules or judgments in specific cases.  
Consider, for instance, when the evangelical fundamentalist Jerry Falwell sued Hustler 
magazine for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress.38 Hustler published a fake 
advertisement describing a fictional interview in which Falwell ‘confesses’ that his first sexual 
experience was with his mother in an outhouse. To resolve claims like this, one must consider 
the values underlying Flynt’s right to freedom of expression and Falwell’s right to his reputation 
and to mental tranquility. One must take positions on the value of privacy for public figures and 
of hyperbolic parody as a mode of cultural criticism. We might, with Stanley Fish, throw up our 
hands, taking the fundamentally political nature of these judgments as an indication that there is 
 
37 Although many contemporary commentators assume that the right to freedom of speech is a negative and political 
right, one primarily to prevent unjustified government interference, examples like these should indicate that the right 
to freedom of speech also concerns the relation between the rights of citizens.  
38 Hustler Magazine v. Fallwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The jury found for Hustler regarding libel but in favor of 
Falwell for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but the Supreme Court reversed the IIED verdict because it 
violated Hustler’s right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth.  
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no such thing as free speech.39 Or, less pessimistically, we might simply enter the philosophical 
battle and fight for our conception of free speech – rule consequentialism,40 deliberative 
democracy,41 autonomy or freedom of conscience42 or equality.43 This proliferation of theories 
does not demonstrate that there is no single, naturally identifiable, conception of free speech. 
Nevertheless, with so many values at stake, it seems implausible to claim, as the Lockean does, 
that there is a uniquely appropriate settlement of these values and balance between one person’s 
right to mental tranquility and another’s rights to freedom of expression. 
Many of our rights are vague because they discriminate among vague natural kinds. 
Many are contested because they involve balancing or ordering many values. Such rights will 
remain indeterminate at the level of application, operational rules and abstract specification, 
regardless of how much we know about the world or how sophisticated our moral analysis 
becomes. Such examples cannot demonstrate that there is no uniquely correct construction or 
specification of our rights. Nevertheless, they cast doubt on the Lockean claim that we 
mistakenly believe our rights are vague or contested because we lack full knowledge of the 
determinate formulations and applications of our rights.  
(4) Despite the indeterminacy in our basic rights, persons must make determinate 
judgments in particular cases to assert or respect rights. Individual persons acting unilaterally 
can only assert or respect vague and contested rights by choosing a specification or submitting 
to another’s choice of that specification.  
Despite this indeterminacy, we cannot avoid adopting particular specifications. If a right 
is vague, then I must adopt a construction; if it is contested, I must adopt a conception. I will use 
the general term “specifications” to refer to both constructions and conceptions.  
The right to property, given the types of vagueness identified above, requires 
construction. We can only exercise our property rights if we adopt a particular construction of 
the vague property rules. I can respect your property by not trespassing only if I adopt a principle 
of acquisition for determining where your rightfully acquired property begins and ends. We both 
 
39 Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech…and it's a good thing too (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994). 
40 Joel Feinberg, “Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion (1975),” reprinted in Freedom and Fulfillment: 
Philosophical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 124-151.  
41 Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (New York: The Free Press, 1993). 
42 Thomas Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:2 (1972): 204-226. 
43 Dworkin, “Why Must Speech be Free,” in Freedom’s Law, 195-213. 
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have a right to use some land for farming, but the precise quantity is indeterminate. If I want to 
exercise my right while respecting your right, then I must make a determinate choice about how 
much land each of us may use and leave fallow.  
Similarly, given the contested nature of freedom of expression, we can only exercise this 
right by adopting some conception. Assume (contrary to fact) that Flynt wanted to engage in 
cultural criticism while respecting Falwell’s right to be free from unjust injury to his reputation 
and mental health. To distinguish free speech from cognizable injury to Falwell’s reputation or 
mental health, Flynt must exercise his practical reason to judge which conception of free speech 
offers the best balance of the values of privacy, defamation and cultural criticism.  
In the absence of shared authority, private persons trying to assert or respect rights can 
only make specific judgments using their personal judgment about the best specification. I can 
either chose to act on a specification of our respective rights based on my unilateral judgment or 
I can acquiesce to your unilateral judgment. Even if we agreed to some shared specification, our 
choice will remain unilateral with respect to the rights and obligations of third parties.  
(5) A person who asserts or respects rights unilaterally either (a) asserts that her choices 
give her the power to alter others obligations and sometimes the right to coercively enforce those 
obligations or (b) submits to the disability that others have the power alter her obligations by 
their choices and sometimes the right to enforce those obligation coercively.  
To assert a claim right is to assert that all others have a correlative obligation not to 
interfere with my exercise of that right.44 Thus, by acting on my unilateral determination of basic 
rights, I purport to dictate the content of other people’s obligations. For instance, by asserting my 
right to walk along a path by the river, I also assert that you have a duty not to prevent my 
evening stroll. When our property rights are indeterminate, this creates a moral problem.  
Assume that we lack a state authority, and you have tilled a parcel of land adjoining a 
creek. Following wise farming practices, you do not disturb the fragile creek bank to prevent 
erosion. I might recognize that I should not walk directly through your tilled fields, but may I 
walk along the creek even at the risk of promoting gradual erosion? If I assert my right to walk 
along the creek, then I purport to impose a duty of non-interference on you by my choice. If I 
 
44 This is the primary Hohfeldian distinction between “claim rights” and “privileges.” If A has a privilege with 
respect to B to speak in B’s presence, then B has no right that A may not speak. B has no right to demand that A 
stop speaking. That does not entail, however, that B has a duty to refrain from actions that interfere with A’s speech. 
B may, for instance, yell more loudly than B. 
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refrain from walking on the creek, then I let your choice to till define the content of my rights. 
When I unilaterally assert a vague or contested right, I assert the power to determine others 
obligations by my choice. When I unilaterally respect others’ vague or contested rights, I subject 
myself to the disability that others may determine my obligations by their choices.45 
Moreover, many rights also include a right to enforce others’ correlative duty of non-
interference. Consider, for instance, the right to bodily integrity. If I use force to defend myself 
from a wrongful physical assault, this force is not a presumptive wrong against the attacker that 
requires some excuse or justification. The use of force in self-defense simply is the exercise of 
my right to bodily integrity. The right to use force in self-defense is an inherent part of 
maintaining rightful relations. Other rights have a similar structure. Assume that by tilling along 
the creek, you did rightfully acquire an exclusionary right to the riverbank. If I continue taking 
my walks, then you do not wrong me by erecting a fence to block the path. Kant describes this 
general principle somewhat cryptically: “if external constraint checks the hindering of outer 
freedom… and is thus a hindering of the hindrances to freedom… it can coexist with ends as 
such.”46 The coercive hindrance of a wrong is not a prima facie wrongful imposition on the first 
wrongdoer’s rights. Thus, by acting unilaterally on your vague rights by tilling the field, you not 
only purport to acquire the power to alter my obligations by your choice; you also purport to 
acquire, by a unilateral choice, the right to force me to respect the obligations that you created.  
(6) Because one cannot expect or demand others agree on particular specifications of 
these rights, any attempt to assert or respect rights through individual action involves the non-
reciprocal imposition of one person’s will on another.  
I cannot reasonably expect or demand others to recognize my specification of a vague or 
contested right as correct. I cannot expect them to reach the same judgments as I do, because 
there are multiple equally correct judgments about the boundaries of vague or contested rights—
at least insofar as we can justify to one another. I also cannot demand that others recognize my 
judgments, because that would be demanding that they subject their rights to my choices. 
Therefore, if I assert or respect rights unilaterally based on my own judgments, then I necessarily 
impose my choices on others. By using my specification of the vague or contested right, I claim 
 
45 This is, I think, what Kant means when you are a standing offense to me merely by being my neighbor. Unlike 
Varden, unilateral choice in the context of underdeterminacy is the problem, not unilateral choice per se.  
46 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, AK 3:396. 
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the power to define their obligations and the right to enforce those obligations. If, on the other 
hand, I accept the specification of rights that they choose, then I permit their choice to determine 
my obligations. I submit my rights to their choices. 
As a matter of coincidence, our chosen specifications might happily align. In that case, 
our actions within those judgments could be rightful. Yet, as long as rights are vague or 
contested, then even fully informed and rational agents cannot maintain this alignment. The 
existence of convergence on one vague right, much less on several or most rights simultaneously, 
is so improbable that it almost need not be considered. Our ordinary experience with moral and 
political judgments renders this possibility so implausible as to be discountable. Even if it did 
occur, there would be no reason to expect it to be stable.  
Finally, two individuals might attempt to settle their rights by explicit agreements. They 
would have to agree about each particular boundary decision and the rules for defining the 
boundaries of their rights to govern future decisions. The two parties who reach agreement seem 
to submit only to reciprocal obligations. Unfortunately, such agreements have two problems. 
First, the reciprocity holds only between parties to the agreement. From the perspective of 
outsiders, the group is simply a collective private individual. This problem would dissolve if 
everyone who had any contact with one another could accept a single set of rules. While 
implausible, universal agreement would at least theoretically solve this problem.  
The second problem plagues even universal agreement: to maintain rightful relations over 
time, the parties must embody their rights in a set of general rules, but any general rule will have 
indeterminacy in application that recreates the problem of coercive applications. Everyone might 
agree, for example, that no one can appropriate land within the flood plain of a creek, which is an 
intuitively appealing and objective criterion for specifying property limits. However, the flood 
plain is vague. The only real option is for everyone to agree to adopt a procedure for specifying 
artificially precise boundaries.  
In summary, by acting on my judgment about our respective rights, I impose my chosen 
specification on others. By submitting to others’ judgments about our respective rights, I fail to 
respect myself as a free agent. Either situation involves the imposition of non-reciprocal limits. 
This state of affairs is inconsistent with premises one and two. Each person has an equal right to 
be free from the coercive imposition on their rights except as necessary to maintain rightful 
relations. Thus, individual persons acting unilaterally cannot engage in rightful relations. 
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 (7) Individuals can enable rightful relations with respect to one another by submitting 
themselves to a third party who can offer positive specifications of vague or contested rights; 
thus they have an obligation to propose and accept the rules and judgments of a third party 
authority, i.e. positive law.  
A group of individuals could enter rightful relations with respect to one another by 
accepting a third party’s specification of and particular judgments about their vague or contested 
rights. The third party must meet two criteria. First, it must not be personally interested in the 
specification of the rights or of this particular dispute; otherwise it is just another party. Second, 
the third party must select a specification of the party’s rights within the realm of indeterminacy 
and apply that specification impartially. The parties, by accepting the choice and judgment of a 
third party as authoritative, have adopted a basic rule of legal validity. The parties treat her 
declarations of the rules or her particular application of the rules as valid positive law. By 
accepting an obligation to abide by valid positive law, the parties create the type of reciprocal 
limits on one another’s freedom necessary to act rightfully with respect to one another. Because 
the laws are properly general,47 they impose formally reciprocal obligations on each citizen. 
Neither person’s rights are subject to the other’s choices. Positive law, thus, enables rightful 
relations by providing determinations of the citizen’s vague or contested rights.  
Consider again our dispute about ownership of the creek banks. A neutral third party 
would be a person with no stake in our dispute about creek-front property or even the common 
rules governing our property dispute. You and I may both agree to abide by this third party’s 
rules and judgments. Suppose the arbiter declares a general rule that property ownership entails a 
right to exclude others from entrance, but that individuals can only appropriate property outside 
flood plains. To resolve our particular dispute, the arbiter must also determine whether my path 
falls within that flood plain. Now when I assert my rights by walking along the river or respect 
your rights by not walking across your tilled field, I am respecting the limits that reciprocally 
bind both of us. You may till a field and exclude me, but I may also build a café on a parcel and 
exclude you. And, just as you cannot till the riverbank and exclude me, I cannot build a café on 
the other bank and exclude you.  
A group of persons can enable rightful relations among the members of the group by 
 
47 Kant would say universal but I think this can be naturally read as universal within the domain of citizens.  
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subjecting themselves to rules and determinations of a third-party arbiter, that is, by erecting a 
system of positive law. Once the arbiter has the power to issue specifications of their vague and 
contested rights and the power to judge their particular controversies, no one’s rights in the group 
will be subject to the arbitrary choices of anyone else in the group. Since they recognize, from 
premise one, an obligation to respect rights, individuals are obligated to accept a third-party 
arbiter to create a system of positive law.  
(8) Individuals cannot subject themselves to a private authority for issuing positive law 
without violating their rightful self-respect. 
Unfortunately, this resolution remains unsatisfactory. It merely reproduces the problem of 
rights conflict at a higher level of generality. The group of individuals and the third-party arbiter 
are not in a rightful condition. Positive law enables rightful relations between private individuals, 
but each individual remains in a relation of dominance to the authority that issues the positive 
law. The content of their rights is determined by the arbiter’s choices. When the rights at issue 
are vague or contested, the arbiter’s judgment is as indeterminate as anyone else’s judgment. Just 
as one cannot submit to the judgment of other private individuals, one may not rightfully submit 
to the authority of a private arbiter. Each individual shows insufficient self-respect by submitting 
to the arbitrary choices of the third party authority.48  
The ancient Greek myth of the exiled lawgiver partially addresses this problem. The 
lawgiver is an appropriately neutral authority with respect to the fundamental rules of the 
constitution, because he was not a citizen of the society and would not be governed by its laws. 
The lawgiver, thus, has no personal stake in the shape of the law. Even if the lawgiver were real, 
however, it would be insufficient. Our lawgivers must remain in our midst. Basic rights cannot 
be laid down in non-vague terms that can be applied without judgment to particular cases. 
Because judgment is necessary to provide a basic specification of rights and apply it particular 
cases, then making of law is a perpetual activity. When the third party who makes and applies 
the law must also be another citizen, it is not clear how she can ever be appropriately neutral. 
We are thus faced with an apparent paradox. Citizens who accept a duty to respect rights 
have a moral duty to create and submit to positive law and thus enable rightful relations with 
 
48 Again, note here that the problem is with the submission of one’s judgment to the arbiters’ judgment on matters of 
right, which in conditions of reasonable disagreement will either contingently align with one’s own judgment or 
violate one’s rights.  
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respect to one another; yet, they cannot rightfully submit their obligations to the arbitrary choices 
of another private person. We are morally obliged to accept positive law as the only way to act 
rightfully. Unfortunately, it is unclear how the agent who will set positive law may rightfully 
alter my obligations, whether that agent is an elitist official or a majority of my fellow citizens. 
As we will see, a legitimate state can escape this paradox.  
(9) Thus, private persons, whether acting as individuals or as a collective, may not 
rightfully assert their own rights or respect others’ rights by unilateral actions.  
In summary, moral judgment can identify vague or contested contours for provisional 
rights, but external action assumes determinate specifications. These specifications will have an 
irreducibly positive element. When people act unilaterally, they can only impose their arbitrary 
specification on others or acquiesce to others arbitrary choices. We are morally obligated to 
respect our rights and the rights of others, but we cannot do so using our own judgments. A 
group of people can enable rightful relations among themselves by giving a third party the power 
to specify their rights and adjudicate their disputes in a reciprocal fashion. Thus, people who 
must interact have a moral obligation to set up a system of positive law that enables them to act 
consistent with their own and others external rights. Unfortunately, private individuals cannot 
rightfully give another private agent the power to determine the content of their obligations by its 
choice. They violate their duty of self-respect by abdicating their judgment to a private third 
party as much as they do to the will of other private individuals. 
The Kantian justification of the state creates an apparent dilemma. We should accept 
positive law to provide a reciprocal specification of our rights, but we cannot submit to any 
authority without abdicating our judgment and violating our duty of self-respect. 
4.3 LIBERAL LEGITIMACY RESOLVES THE DILEMMA 
The liberal principle of legitimacy alleviates this apparent dilemma.49 In its generic form, 
the liberal principle of legitimacy states that coercive power is permissible only if it is minimally 
just and justified to each citizen in terms that he or she can accept. When everyone can accept the 
reasons that an authority uses to determine their rights, no one need abrogate his or her judgment. 
Instead, each exercises her judgment to identify the decision as reasonable. When the authority 
 
49 Section 4.2.2 explained why actual consent to an authority cannot alleviate this dilemma. The problem is that I fail 
to respect myself if I give away my power to be the final judge of the content of my rights. 
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justifies its actions to each person in term she can accept, each person can accept its power to 
determine their rights consistent with proper self-respect. Citizens, then, are both obligated and 
permitted to accept its authority to define, judge and enforce their obligations. Thus, a legitimate 
public authority – if such a thing is possible – resolves our apparent dilemma.  
4.3.1 The Institutional Conception of Liberal Legitimacy 
The generic Kantian principle of liberal legitimacy requires a state to protect a minimally 
just version of rights and to justify its version in terms citizens can accept. Reformulating the 
generic principle in my parlance, the principle of liberal legitimacy is  
A particular state is legitimate insofar as (a) its laws and actions respect a 
reasonable specification of vague or contested basic rights and (b) it follows 
procedures that publicly demonstrate to citizens that its laws and actions respect 
reasonable specifications using reasons that citizens appreciate.50  
This principle contains a substantive and a procedural component, which are individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient to ground a citizen’s obligation to follow the law of a particular 
state. (This language is a bit misleading. Justification and legitimacy are scalar rather than 
bivalent. The state may do better or worse on either of these two standards.)  
According to the substantive component (a), a state is legitimate only if satisfies 
impersonal standards of minimal justice. The minimal boundaries I have in mind are those set 
forth in Chapter 3. By protecting basic rights under a minimally reasonable specification, the 
state enables rightful relations among its citizens and grounds their obligation to follow the law. 
Once a state meets this minimal substantive threshold, its citizens cannot dispute the legitimacy 
of its laws because they judge them substantively unjust. Section 4.3.2 explains the substantive 
component of legitimacy and addresses the worries about totalitarianism that plague such 
obligations to accept state authority.  
The procedural component (b) links the state’s impersonal substantive justification to the 
actual citizens. By satisfying the procedural component, a state maintains its status as a public 
authority and thereby grounds its power right to alter and enforce citizens’ obligations. When 
officials meet their obligation to articulate public reasons for state actions in reasons citizens 
appreciate, the officials demonstrate that the state does not represent the will or judgment of 
 
50 Again, this leaves open the possibility that a state may legitimately do more than protect rights and that protecting 
rights may require more than simply enforcing identical private rights citizens would have without a state.  
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particular persons but represents the will of all to establish conditions of rightful interaction. 
When citizens appreciate the state's reasons for its specification of rights, they are not submitting 
to the arbitrary choice of another private person. They may rightfully abdicate their judgment to 
such a legitimate public authority.51 Chapters 5 and 6 defend this procedural component. They 
explain the connection between legitimate authority and public reason by articulating a 
conception of reasonableness that appeals to our ability to appreciate reasons we do not endorse. 
The remainder of this chapter explores the substantive component of liberal legitimacy and 
explains why we are obligated to obey laws that are minimally just.  
4.3.2 The Substantive Component of Kantian Legitimacy 
A state is legitimate only if it fulfills its morally requisite function. Section 4.2 described 
this function in detail. The state’s primary function is to enact and enforce laws that specify a 
reasonable version of citizen’s basic rights within their vague or contested boundaries.52 By 
enacting and enforcing laws that fall within the realm of reasonable differences in judgment 
about the values underlying the right, the state enables a condition of rightful relations among 
citizens. It provides a specification of rights that can bind all private citizens reciprocally. Once a 
state meets this requirement, citizens cannot complain that its particular laws are substantively 
illegitimate. They are morally obligated to follow its particular laws, even laws that they judge to 
be unjust because they fail to respect the correct specification of rights. This surprising 
conclusion follows from a very simple argument.  
If I disagree with my state’s chosen specification of rights, how might I object? I can only 
object to the state’s choice by asserting an alternative specification of the right. If I do so, I am 
recreating the predicament of the state of nature. I am asserting that I have the power right to 
impose unilaterally my specification of the right on others in a non-reciprocal fashion. If I insist 
that I may violate a valid law because I disagree with its specification of basic rights, then I 
renounce the necessary condition for rightful relations.53 If I recognize that the state’s laws are a 
 
51 A private entity’s authority (like a benevolent street gang in a crime-ridden area), becomes more legitimate insofar 
as it follows this requirement. Remember, legitimacy is scalar. See supra Chapter 4.1.2. 
52 I do not mean to imply this is the states’ only function; it is simply a necessary one.  
53 This is my version of the famous passage: “Resistance would take place in conformity with a maxim that… would 
annihilate any civil constitution and eradicate the condition in which alone people can be in possession of rights 
generally.” Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But it is of No Use in Practice,” in 
Kant’s Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): AK 8:300. 
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reasonable attempt to determine our rights and apply them equally, then I cannot claim the state’s 
laws are illegitimate because in my judgment they violate basic rights. 
To explore the substantive component of legitimacy, it is useful to see its advantages and 
its primary difficulty. One significant advantage is that it defuses a core motivation for the 
disagreement-based objections to the protection of basic rights, of the sort that I considered in 
Chapter 2. According to Waldron, private citizens and judges face a parallel problem when they 
use controversial judgments to resist democratic laws. Protestors often justify resistance by 
appealing to their own judgments about basic rights. Imagine that a state passes a referendum 
that permits elective abortions in the first trimester. An abortion protestor blockades clinic 
entrances, asserting that the statute is illegitimate because it licenses murder. From the 
perspective of disagreement theorists, the protestor’s mistake is to insist our procedure for 
settling the law about abortion must choose outcomes that coincide with his first-order 
judgments about the right to life. Lacking the appropriate epistemic modesty, he fails to 
appreciate the second-order, content-independent reasons for accepting representative outcomes 
in a situation of sincere disagreement.  
Judicial review, one might think, faces a similar problem. Judges overrule legislative 
outcomes based on equally controversial judgments. In Roe v. Wade, the justices used their 
personal judgments about the rights to bodily integrity and to life to overrule decisions by the 
people’s representatives. The justices’ epistemic immodesty creates a prima facie problem for 
the legitimacy of judicial review for basic rights. Why may justices, who are as fallible as anyone 
else, invalidate statutes based on controversial specifications? For that matter, why can the 
President veto statutes for similar reasons, or why should the Constitution require supermajority 
votes to for constitutional referenda? 
This Kantian approach better explains the protestor’s mistake and, consequently, the 
difference between the judgment of the private citizen and public officials. When an abortion 
protestor justifies obstructing clinics by claiming that Roe v. Wade was illegitimate, his mistake 
is not that he appeals to a controversial conception of justice. So did the Supreme Court, so 
would a President and so would any legislature. So would citizens in a referenda. We must have 
a shared decision about the scope of abortion rights. That decision will adopt some disputed 
conception of the right. The protestors’ mistake is not that his protest relies on controversial 
moral judgments. Rather, the reason a citizen cannot oppose outcomes as illegitimate based on 
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his own judgment about the right is that the right lacks a determinate specification without an 
authoritative settlement. By demanding that the positive law accord with his judgment about 
rights, he assumes the power to decide controversies about rights unilaterally. The abortion 
protestor uses force to impose his judgment about the contested right to an abortion on others. He 
denies the very condition that makes rightful relations possible. When a private citizen rejects a 
reasonable specification of rights provided by positive law, he cannot do otherwise. 
This leads into a common objection to Kant’s political philosophy. If a Catholic is 
required to accept a law that he believes licenses murder, does this mean that he may never use 
force to resist unjust laws? If the substantive component of legitimacy entails that citizens may 
never resist unjust laws, then it is a form of political absolutism. Kant is often interpreted as 
maintaining that citizens are obliged to accept any outcomes of an extant political authority, even 
unjust outcomes. Although Kant insists that the sovereign is obligated to act in ways that all 
citizens can accept in principle, he denies citizens the right to enforce this obligation with active 
resistance. Citizens may complain if the sovereign violates basic principles of political equality 
(such as by unequally distributing the burdens of taxation or recruitment) but they may not resist. 
They may not engage in sedition or rebellion to displace the sovereign or participate in active 
resistance to coerce the sovereign into following a just course of action.54 There is considerable 
controversy about how best to interpret Kant’s writings on the right to revolution.55 I do not 
intend to take a position in that debate. I only note Kant’s position and this debate because it 
allows me to dispel misconceptions about the duty to accept outcomes that we judge to be unjust. 
Kant writes in an absolutist tone that is at least misleading.56 The prohibition on forceful 
 
54 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, AK 6: 319-323, 371-372; Theory and Practice, AK 8:297-300. In these discussions, 
Kant also denies that a constitution could retain for the people the authority to resist unjust acts by their supreme 
commander. This appears similar to an argument against a right to revolution, Arthur Ripstein more convincingly 
recasts this as an argument about the supremacy of law and the authorization to use force. The legal system itself as 
a whole imposes closure on disputes by insisting that the official institutional answers are the last answers; the 
system could not, thus, authorize someone to answer that question to someone outside the law.  
55 Historically, Kant has been interpreted as an absolutist about citizen’s political obligations. See, e.g. Howard 
Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy, 200-206; Kant’s Critique of Hobbes, 146-48. Contemporary Kantians have 
contested this interpretation. A regime that violates the postulate of public right by not enabling rightful relations 
can only, in principle, use unilateral force. It loses any claim to represent an omnilateral public authority, such that 
now its ‘citizens’ are actually required to use force to bring about rightful relations. Once a state passes this minimal 
threshold, however, it becomes an imperfect public authority. Then officials can be obligated to act according to the 
ideal of the social contract, but citizens can also be obligated to regard its actions as attempts to maintain rightful 
relations. See, e.g. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 325-352; Helga Varden, "Kant’s Non-Absolutist 
Conception,” 30-40. 
56 Kant repeatedly states the prohibition on forceful resistance is “unconditional,” yet he offers a condition. “Theory 
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resistance to the state is conditional. These conditions are not satisfied in most circumstances 
where one would intuitively insist on a right to revolution. As I said above, citizens are obligated 
to accept state authority because only states can enable rightful relations among persons. A state 
that does not even protect a reasonable specification of basic rights has not fulfilled this function. 
If a state uses coercion in ways contrary to any reasonable specification of its citizens’ basic 
rights, citizens and state officials are not in a rightful relationship. Individuals who are not in 
rightful relations may justly force others to enter rightful relations.57 This right is all that 
legitimate revolutionaries need.58 Those who resist tyranny do not need a general right to 
revolution. They need a right to force tyrants to respect rights in general, under some reasonable 
specification. The obligation to enter and maintain rightful relations offers precisely the moral 
authority that they need. Revolutionaries do not obtain—and correctly so—a right to force the 
state to adopt their particular judgments about basic rights.59  
Moreover, if taken literally, Kant is mistaken. He writes that, “if it is only possible that a 
people could agree to [a public law], it is a duty to consider the law just, even if the people is at 
present in such a situation or frame of mind that, if consulted about it, would probably refuse its 
consent.”60 Read literally, this statement is imprecise, at best. When a person recognizes that the 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Practice,” AK 8:299-300. In the paragraph immediately before Kant claims the “prohibition is unconditional,” 
he explicitly offers a condition: “For, provided it is not self-contradictory that an entire people should agree to such 
a law, however bitter they might find it, the law is in conformity with right. But if a law is in conformity with this, 
and so beyond reproach with regard to right, then there is also joined with it an authorization to coerce and, on the 
other’s part, a prohibition against actively resisting the will of the legislator.” While minimal, this is a condition. 
Even here, however, I think Kant makes a crucial mistake. He asserts that laws which are not be self-contradictory 
for a people to accept are beyond reproach with regard to right, but actually they are only beyond reproach with 
regard to legitimacy. For elaboration, see infra Chapter 5.  
57 See supra Section 4.2.2. 
58 Those of a more purely Kantian perspective may insist that this is no longer a revolution.  
59 It is not a problem that they must use their own judgment to decide whether an extant state protects a specification 
of basic rights. Each individual must judge, for him or herself, whether a particular state departs so far from one’s 
conception of justice that it no longer represents a sufficiently attempt to respect rights. If we are truly in a state of 
nature because the state is not enabling rightful relations, what else could they rely on? 
60 Kant, “Theory and Practice,” AK 8:297-98 (italics in original). Kant begins this sentence with an important limit 
on the legislator’s will, but he refuses to recognize the citizens’ right to enforce that limit. “If a public law is so 
constituted that a whole people could not possibly give its consent to it (as, e.g. that a certain class of subjects should 
have the hereditary privilege of ruling rank) it is unjust; if it is only possible that a people could agree to it, it is a 
duty to consider the law just, even if the people is at present in such a situation or frame of mind that, if consulted 
about it, would probably refuse its consent. But this limitation obviously holds only for the judgment of the 
legislator not that of a subject” for whom “there is nothing to be done but obey.” While I would agree that private 
persons cannot have the right to use force to ensure their favored theory of rights are adopted, I think a person can 
rightfully submit to state authority only if (and thus the state is legitimate only if) it provides various institutional 
rights to challenge state laws and actions. 
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law attempts to protect a reasonable specification of a contested right, and thus that she could 
agree to it, she must regard the law as legitimate. She need not regard the law as just. That one 
has a duty to accept the law as legitimate does not entail that the state’s choice settles whether 
the law is just. Laws are substantively legitimate if they protect a conception of basic rights that 
respond to the values at stake in those rights.61 Yet, legitimate laws must make choices among 
various reasonable specifications of basic rights by adopting controversial value judgments.  
Although various specifications are legitimate, citizens rightly dispute which one their 
state adopts. For instance, a state must adopt a position on the contested right to physician 
assisted suicide. Private citizens disagree about whether respect for autonomy and welfare 
justifies allowing physicians to assist patients who decide to commit suicide. Whatever stance 
the law takes is substantively legitimate if it represents a recognizable resolution of those values. 
Nevertheless, some citizens will judge that stance as cruelly unjust. This judgment–even if 
correct–does not give them a right to resist the laws enforcement. However, that does not mean 
they must acquiesce to the injustice of denying assisted suicide. It means only that they must 
seek to change the law through the law’s own procedures. To enable rightful relations, the law 
must settle on a specification of basic rights; it does not settle disputes about basic rights. The 
merits of its decision are the proper subject of political debate. Citizens may seek to change the 
law by arguing that it substantively violates basic rights and mobilizing political power to change 
it. The substantive component of legitimacy provides limits on justified resistance but does not 
remove moral questions from the public agenda.62  
These responses alleviate some worries about the obligation to accept political outcomes 
that we regard as unjust. However, an ineliminable tension remains. Citizens can be obligated to 
follow laws that they believe are unjust. When the state maintains an overall condition of rightful 
relations, citizens cannot deny the legitimacy of unjust laws so long as the injustice is within the 
bounds of reasonable disagreement. The tension is alleviated by the procedural component of 
legitimacy, described in Chapter 5. It gives citizens the right to demand that the state 
demonstrate that its laws respect a reasonable specification of basic rights. However, the 
procedural component does not remove the gap between legitimate state outcomes and personal 
 
61 See supra Section 3.5. 
62 This mistaken objection is frequently urged against Rawls and deliberative democrats like Gutmann and 
Thompson. See, e.g. Iris Marion Young, “Justice, Inclusion and Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberative Politics: 
Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 151-158. 
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judgments of justice. This gap is the cost of political society. It is wider in pluralistic societies 
with more widely contested rights, but the gap is present even in homogenous societies.  
* * * * 
According to the substantive component of liberal legitimacy, a state is legitimate only if 
it enacts and enforces laws within the realm of citizens’ vague or contested rights. If a state 
respects a system of basic rights that represent a reasonable accommodation of the values at 
stake in those rights, then citizens should regard the state as substantively legitimate and ought 
not resist its laws with force. This obligation applies even when they judge the particular laws to 
be unjust. If they reject such minimally just laws as illegitimate because they believe the laws 
nevertheless violate rights, they choose to undermine the very conditions that make rightful 
relations among citizens possible. This Kantian obligation not to resist state authority is not a 
form of political absolutism, because it applies only if the state secures basic rights and because 
citizens may coherently contest the law as unjust from within legal procedures. The next two 
chapters articulate those procedural requirements of legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC REASON 
 
Reasonable disagreement about our vague or contested rights is inevitable. Anyone who 
accepts a duty to respect rights is obligated to support a third-party authority capable of settling 
such rights through positive law. However, we cannot submit to a third party authority without 
abdicating our judgment and violating our duty of self-respect. The liberal principle of 
legitimacy promised to alleviate this dilemma. The substantive component of legitimacy removes 
some of its sting, because the duty to accept authority is limited to minimally just authorities. 
This does not solve the problem, however. When we acquiesce to minimally reasonable yet 
unjust laws, why are we not still abdicating our judgment in violation of our duty of self-respect?  
The procedural element of liberal legitimacy addresses the remaining sense of dilemma. 
When the state is required to justify its actions to dissenting citizens in terms they can accept, the 
citizens who disagree need not abdicate their judgment. Citizens exercise practical judgment by 
recognizing that the state has adopted a reasonable specification, which is all that they can 
demand of the state. Citizens’ judgments that their state adopts a reasonable specification is also 
an acknowledgment that their state is fulfilling its function to enable rightful relations and, thus, 
that they cannot engage in coercive resistance without undermining the possibility of rightful 
relations. When a state offers public justifications that citizens can accept, then the obligation to 
follow its laws does not produce a dilemma, because its citizens need not abdicate their judgment 
to follow its laws.  
The trick, of course, is to figure out what reasons all citizens can accept. For this purpose, 
any theory of liberal legitimacy needs a theory of public reason. Unfortunately, it is not always 
clear what features a theory of public reason needs to serve this purpose. The most important 
question on this score is how to define the content of public reason. Many theorists assume a 
liberal theory of public reason must identify a set of reasons that all citizens can accept. This idea 
has an obvious tension with the idea of reasonable disagreement. How can political philosophy 
identify a set of shared reasons to justify decisions about rights if citizens inevitably and 
reasonably disagree about theories of justice?  
Attempts to specify the basic set of public reasons vacillate between two unappealing 
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alternatives. If public reason is limited to reasons that citizens actually accept, then reasonable 
disagreement about basic rights makes liberal legitimacy impossible. At the other extreme, if 
public reason includes any reasons that it is reasonable to accept—that is, (minimally) good 
reasons—then legitimacy would not be a normative limit distinct from minimal justice. In this 
chapter, I argue that these perspectives, represented by Waldron and Rawls respectively, share 
the same mistaken impulse to delimit the set of reasons that reasonable citizens can accept in 
advance of institutional deliberation. Waldron wants to limit citizens to the reasons they 
currently endorse and Rawls wants to open citizens to the reasons they should endorse. I adopt a 
different tactic to articulate public reason and, thus, legitimacy. I argue that the content of public 
reason must arise through the interaction between a political authority and its citizens—the only 
way to identify public reasons is to wait and see if the state offers reasons that citizens accept.  
I articulate the basic outlines of this procedural component of legitimacy and public 
reason in § 5.1. Some citizens will inevitably judge that their state impinges on basic rights. 
Liberal legitimacy is a principle of accountability to dissenting citizens. A state is legitimate 
insofar as it permits dissenting citizens to challenge whether it is respecting a reasonable 
specification of rights and responds to their challenges with justifications that convince them that 
it respects a reasonable specification of their basic rights. This is possible because citizens have 
the ability to accept reasons that they do not endorse.  
I call this ability appreciation. Citizens appreciate reasons that they realize are “in the 
ballpark,” even if those reasons are applied incorrectly or should not be applied in that context. 
As an initial approximation of this idea of appreciation, I suggest that a citizen appreciates a 
reason to the extent that endorsing it would require revision in beliefs she does endorse. 
However, the set of reasons that citizens appreciate emerges from the actual process of public 
justification and cannot be specified philosophically in advance of such public deliberation. 
Political philosophy should give up any ambition to specify a determinate set of public reasons 
that could supply a test for state legitimacy. With respect to legitimacy, the role of political 
philosophy is to explain appreciation (Chapter 6) and to identify institutions likely to articulate 
reason citizens appreciate (Chapter 7).  
In Section 5.2, I offer an indirect argument for this procedural theory of liberal legitimacy 
and public reason by contrasting it with Rawls’ theory of political liberalism. I argue that 
political liberalism encourages the mistaken belief that legitimacy requires finding shared 
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reasons that citizens may use to endorse state decisions. This idea, I argue, underlies Rawls’ 
theory of overlapping consensus and renders his theory of liberal legitimacy redundant. By 
contrasting procedural legitimacy with Rawls’ theory, I hope to head off some of the common 
intuitions that lead proponents of liberal legitimacy into obvious objections.  
5.1 PROCEDURAL COMPONENT OF LEGITIMACY 
The substantive limits of legitimacy are necessary but not sufficient. A state must also 
satisfy the procedural component of legitimacy:  
A legitimate coercive authority must follow procedures that 
respond to citizen’s challenges with a public demonstration that its 
actions respect a reasonable specification of basic rights using 
reasons that citizens appreciate.  
This principle has several intertwined elements. The state adopts institutions designed to respond 
to challenges from citizens with public justifications. When those justifications are reasonable, 
hopefully citizens appreciate them as such, but there can be no guaranty.  
5.1.1 Legitimacy as Accountability to the Judgment of Dissenting Citizens 
Procedural legitimacy is about accountability. Institutional procedures allow states to 
remain accountable to their citizens’ actual beliefs in the right way. The proper form of state 
accountability mirrors the problem that occasions the need for state power. As described in 
Chapter 4, individuals do not have a right to force others to accept their judgment about rights. 
Accordingly, in matters of basic rights, legitimacy does not require a state to satisfy each of its 
citizen’s reasonable beliefs about their rights. (In any case, that would be impossible. Given 
reasonable disagreement about rights, a state cannot convince every citizen that its actions accord 
with her reasonable beliefs about rights.) Nor is a state required to satisfy the majority’s 
reasonable beliefs about rights. If a state continually altered its specifications of rights to match 
the beliefs of the majority, then it would represent only the judgment of the each temporary 
majority.1 Accountability is not about aligning laws with citizens’ beliefs about their rights.  
Instead, the focus of accountability should be on dissenting citizens. The task of public 
justification is most important, and most difficult, when citizens believe that their state violates 
 
1 This is a plausible explanation of the concern when the Supreme Court reverses its prior decisions about basic 
rights in a short time-frame and in response to political pressure.  
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basic rights and, thus, may conclude that it no longer fulfills its necessary function of enabling 
rightful relations. The proper target for public justifications are citizens, in the majority or 
minority, who believe the state’s actions violate basic rights. The state need not alter its laws to 
accommodate dissenting beliefs, but it must reassure dissenting citizens that its actions respect a 
reasonable specification of basic rights and thus continues to fulfill its necessary function. A 
state is legitimate only insofar as it meets this obligation to demonstrate publicly to dissenting 
citizens that its laws respect a reasonable specification of their basic rights.  
Many institutional mechanisms exist for citizens to challenge whether their state respects 
a reasonable specification of basic rights. Democratic elections give citizens the power to 
demand individual representatives justify their decisions and actions.2 Committee hearings and 
committee reports enable a legislature to listen and respond to citizens and to demand other 
branches respond to public concerns. Administrative law includes commenting procedures that 
give citizens the right to challenge the executive’s implementation of laws. Judicial review gives 
individual citizens the power to demand executive officers and legislators articulate a coherent 
public justification for their decisions. A state is legitimate only if, by resolving conflicts through 
such justificatory procedures over time, it assures a sufficient proportion of dissenting citizens 
that it uses coercion only in ways consistent with a reasonable specification of basic rights.3 
5.1.2 The Content of Public Reason as the Outcome of Justificatory Procedures 
What reasons can a state use that its dissenting citizens can accept? With the goal of 
accountability to dissenting citizens in mind, we can reformulate the central challenge for 
legitimacy as follows 
When citizens persistently and reasonably disagree about vague or contested basic 
rights, what reasons can a public authority use to justify it chosen specification to 
dissenting citizens who reasonably believe that its actions are unjust under a 
different, yet equally reasonable, specification of basic rights? 
This question asks about the content of public reason, about where and how to draw the line 
between public and non-public reasons.4  
 
2 Elections are only a matter of basic justice because they are an effective method (perhaps the only one) for citizens 
to ensure that legislators follow public reason as a regulative ideal.  
3 I leave this intentionally vague, because legitimacy is scalar.  
4 I use ‘public reason’ in the contemporary sense, not Kant’s sense. For Kant, reasoning is public only if its scope is 
restricted only by limits of reason. Citizens and officials use private reason when their reasoning is addressed to an 
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The content of public reason might be defined negatively by excluding a class of reasons 
or positively by identifying acceptable reasons. Negatively defined sets often exclude any 
foundational moral and religious reasons, but might only exclude religious reasons or might 
exclude any controversial reasons. Gutmann and Thompson, for instance, offer a permissive 
negative account in which citizens engaged in public debate should use only reasons whose 
“essential content” other citizens can “understand,” which they believe includes any reasons that 
“cannot reasonably be dismissed out of hand by people who seek moral terms of cooperation.”5 
Their conception excludes aggressive or discriminatory reasons, but little else. Most theorists 
propose both positive and negative limits. Rawls, for instance, defines public reason negatively 
by excluding reasons drawn from moral or religious comprehensive doctrines. He also specifies 
its content positively by including rules of inference, common sense and scientific methodology, 
as well as basic tenants common to the family of liberal conceptions of justice.6  
My answer about the content of public reason is short and unsatisfying. Philosophy can 
identify minimal negative limits on the content of public reason, but the only way to identify its 
positive content is to offer reasons through public justificatory procedures and see if citizens 
appreciate them. The content of public reason is the outcome of justificatory procedures, not a 
precondition for legitimate deliberation.  
Minimal, negative boundaries for public reason may be identified through philosophical 
analysis. Some reasons may be excluded by the formal limits on reasoning about rights. For 
instance, there are some reasons no one can accept while regarding herself as a free and equal 
person, such as racist or sexist reasons.7 In addition, philosophical reasoning can identify the 
vague or contested contours of basic rights. I engaged in the former, formal type of reasoning 
when I argued that epistemic mistakes do not extend the boundaries of reasonable disagreement 
                                                                                                                                                       
audience limited by a shared source of positive authority, like a particular church. The sovereign should not restrict 
public discourse among persons acting as scholars, because unrestricted reasoning is necessary for enlightenment 
and may help it determine if its policies are consistent with rights. Kant, “Theory and Practice,” AK 8:304. Onora 
O’Neill, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 32-39.  
5 There are clearly two different formulations here, but I will not explore that ambiguity. Gutman, Amy and Dennis 
Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004): 4, 161. 
6 Rawls, PL, 59; “ IPRR” §2. 
7 Some think that all rights can be derived from this idea and, therefore, that it exhausts the content of public reason. 
This seems to be the ambitious version of Kant’s position supported by O’Neil and by Ripstein. Ripstein’s Force 
and Freedom is an intriguing attempt to explicate this limit as the sole basis of political authority. I find his 
arguments are fascinating but doubt they are successful. More importantly, even if successful, I think they could not 
define the boundaries of legitimate positions in a state with reasonable pluralism.  
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at the end of Chapter 3. I engaged in the latter, type of reasoning when I argued that we can 
identify the minimal contours of basic rights in premise 3 of the Kantian justification for the state 
in § 4.2.2. In both cases, I also noted that practical reasoning about formal limits or about 
practical concepts cannot yield a determinate specification of rights. The indeterminacy that 
sustains reasonable disagreement about rights also prevents philosophical analysis from 
identifying detailed positive content for public reason.  
Many political philosophers have grand ambitions for a conception of public reason. 
They hope to identify a test for determining whether a given reason is appropriately public. If 
one can demonstrate that any citizen (or reasonable citizen) accepts certain reasons, then one has 
demonstrated that it is possible to satisfy the principle of liberal legitimacy. Moreover, one can 
test whether particular state actions are legitimate by asking whether they are consistent with the 
public reasons. Public officials can ensure the legitimacy of their decisions by using only public 
reasons or, at least, reasons consistent with them. Once one articulated a theory of public reason, 
then one has demonstrated the possibility of legitimacy, defined the limits of appropriate 
deliberation and provided a test for measuring the legitimacy of any state action.8  
On my conception, public reason operates in the reverse direction. I will not define 
criteria to determine whether a reason is public or identify shared reasons with which to test the 
legitimacy of state actions. Instead, the positive content of public reason is revealed when the 
state runs its actions through deliberative procedures that subject them to public scrutiny. Public 
reasons emerge as the state attempts to assure citizens that it respects a reasonable specification 
of their basic rights. A reason is public if the state offers it in a public justification and citizens 
appreciate the reason. Each attempt at public justification must take off from the public discourse 
that preceded it. The limits of public reason emerge from the back-and-forth of institutional 
deliberation. This is why I call my theory an institutional theory of legitimacy.  
Political philosophy must scale back its ambition with respect to legitimacy. Philosophers 
can and should investigate the nature of justice and basic rights. However, beyond the minimal 
limits described above, philosophers can argue only that citizens should accept certain reasons. 
 
8 Rawls, PL, 226-27. “Each of us must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines 
we think other citizens (who are also free and equal) may be reasonably expected to endorse along with us. We must 
have some test we are ready to state as to when this condition is met. I have elsewhere suggested as a criterion the 
values expressed by the principles and guidelines that would be agreed to in the original position. Many will prefer 
another criterion.” 
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The philosopher is then arguing on the same level as citizens, judges and legislators, deep in the 
mud of a tradition of reasoning about rights. Philosophers search for public reasons the same way 
that citizens, judges and legislators do: by engaging with a tradition of institutional deliberation 
in an exegetical and normative fashion. Consequently, one goal of this dissertation is negative. 
Section 5.2 attempts to reconcile us to these limits, to disabuse us of the idea that liberal theory 
needs a determinate set of public reasons to demonstrate the possibility of legitimacy or to test 
the legitimacy of specific actions.  
5.1.3 Citizens Play their Part: Appreciation 
What use, then, is a theory of public reason if it cannot identify a set of public reasons to 
demonstrate that public justification is possible? As an element of political philosophy, a theory 
of public reason has two tasks.  
Its first task is to defend rational faith that liberal legitimacy is possible, by explaining 
why it is possible for citizens to accept outcomes they cannot endorse. Even if a state offers 
reasonable justifications for its chosen scheme of basic rights, it is legitimate only insofar as its 
citizens recognize those choices as reasonable. Legitimacy is a political norm that demands much 
from citizens, in some ways more than justice. A conception of public reason must defend faith 
that public justifications are possible. In the face of reasonable pluralism, this faith cannot rest on 
finding reasons all citizens can endorse as premises for political arguments.  
Instead, this faith can rest on an explanation for why citizens can recognize the state’s 
decisions as reasonable even if they do not and will not endorse its outcomes or reasons. This 
recognition is possible because humans have the ability to appreciate reasons we do not endorse. 
The “reasons all citizens can accept” should be understood as “reasons all actual citizens 
appreciate.” Intuitively, citizens appreciate reasons when they are “in the ballpark.” Slightly 
more formally, yet still intuitively, a citizen appreciates a reason that she does not endorse to the 
extent that, if she were to accept it, it would require revision of her present commitments.  
Reasons do not neatly divide into reasons that citizens appreciate or not. Just as people 
accept theories and ideas with varying degrees of confidence, they appreciate practical reasons to 
a greater or lesser degree. Consequently, political reasons do not neatly divide into public and 
non-public reasons. Reasons are more or less public, and states are more or less legitimate. 
Nevertheless, our capacity to appreciate reasons supports rational faith that the state can offer 
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justifications that it citizens, despite their disagreements, recognize as reasonable. In § 5.3, I 
explain how appreciation satisfies this role. In Chapter 6, I offer a formal definition and defense 
of appreciation as a theory of the reasons all citizens can accept.  
The second task for a conception of public reason is to identify effective justificatory 
procedures. By analyzing the features of various institutions, one can identify institutions that are 
likely to articulate reasons that meet the substantive limits of legitimacy and to help citizens 
appreciate reasonable justifications when they are offered. I turn to that task in Chapter 7.  
Before I engage in these detailed arguments, however, I want to address the unsatisfying 
consequence of my position that we can only determine if a state is legitimate by watching the 
relationship between its institutions and citizens over time to see whether the state offers good 
reasons and the citizens appreciate the reasons offered. 
5.2 USING REASONABLENESS TO DEFINE PUBLIC REASON’S CONTENT—RAWLS 
Liberals and their opponents often demand a powerful conception of public reason. They 
expect a theory of public reason to identify reasons or intermediate premises that all citizens can 
accept, so that when the state justifies its actions using those reasons, citizens can endorse those 
actions, at least indirectly by endorsing the principles on which the state action rests.  
Liberals and their opponents often make this same assumption. Cass Sunstein, for 
instance, argues that legitimacy rests on “incompletely-theorized agreements.” Despite our 
disagreements about political morality, self-government is possible because we can “shallowly” 
agree on abstract rights and on specific doctrines without agreeing on premises for their deeper 
justifications. If all citizens have different reasons to endorse the constitution at some level of 
abstraction, then we can accept a single constitutional order without sharing deep values. 
Liberalism’s opponents typically argue, against Rawls, that it is impossible to find shared 
reasons for endorsing the states’ basic structure or, against Sunstein, that it is impossible to find 
distinct reasons for overlapping endorsement. Communitarians like Michael Sandel and Alasdair 
MacIntyre argue that disputes about justice can be resolved only by the deeply shared values in 
our social practices. Democratic proceduralists, like Jeremy Waldron, retreat to procedural 
values because they believe agreement on outcomes or substantive values is impossible. These 
arguments against liberalism get off the ground by emphasizing how unlikely it is that citizens 
who disagree about justice will be able to endorse a shared definition of basic rights or shared 
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political values for reasoning about basic rights.  
These supporters and detractors of liberalism share a mistaken interpretation of liberal 
legitimacy. They believe liberal legitimacy requires citizens to endorse the state’s actions, at 
least indirectly. This assumption rests on a simple, appealing idea. If citizens can endorse state 
decisions, then they can regard its coercion as an extension of their judgment. This desire for 
shared reasons reflects concern for reciprocity and respect for other citizens’ autonomy. The state 
should respect its citizens by restricting justifications to reasons that do not conflict with their 
deeply held beliefs, so they need not abdicate their judgment to accept its decisions.9 Although 
initially appealing, this interpretation of legitimacy rests on mistaken notion of what it means to 
respect those with whom we disagree. By assuming that citizens cannot accept reasons that they 
do not endorse, it assumes citizens are unreasonable.  
This mistake is fostered by the dominant theory of liberal legitimacy: Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism. On a common reading, Rawls argues that any reasonable citizen can accept public 
justifications based on liberal principles, because all reasonable comprehensive doctrines can 
support some form of a liberal political conception of justice. Once all reasonable doctrines 
converge on the liberal political conception of justice, then it can specify the positive content of 
public reason. All citizens can accept liberal principles as public justifications for political 
outcomes, so their acceptance of those outcomes is not mere submission to more powerful 
factions. On this reading, one ambition of the Rawlsian theory is to identify a set of public 
reasons that enable citizens to demonstrate whether their state is legitimate.10  
If this is the relationship between legitimacy and public reason, then legitimacy becomes 
morally redundant. Legitimacy only requires the state to justify coercion to reasonable citizens in 
terms they can accept. However, in the first stage arguments, Rawls demonstrates that all 
reasonable citizens, insofar as they are reasonable, accept a liberal conception of justice. Thus, 
 
9 Sunstein, Constitution of Many Minds, 14-15. “If reciprocity and mutual respect are desirable, it follows that public 
officials or judges, perhaps even more than ordinary people, should not challenge their fellow citizens’ deepest and 
most defining commitments, at least if those commitments are reasonable and if there is no need for them to do so. 
Indeed, we can see a kind of political charity in the refusal to contest those commitments when life can proceed 
without any such contest."  
10 For instance, this reading is adopted by Freeman and Richardson. Samuel Freeman, Rawls (Routledge 2007), Ch. 
8 & 9; Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford 2002), Ch. 
11.  
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all liberal states are legitimate. I will call this the redundancy objection.11 This section develops a 
detailed version of the redundancy objection that undermines this Rawlsian conception of public 
reason and legitimacy. By exposing this failure and its underlying reason, I hope to deflate the 
desire for a more powerful positive conception of public reason.  
In §§ 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, I present an interpretation of Rawls’ Political Liberalism and argue 
that Rawls’ idea of overlapping consensus makes legitimacy redundant. I do not offer this as the 
most sympathetic reconstruction of Rawlsian theory, but as a natural and common interpretation 
of his text. This interpretation is common enough to avoid being a straw man,12 and it fuels the 
desire for strong conceptions of public reason. In § 5.2.3, I argue that we should salvage liberal 
legitimacy by dropping the idea of overlapping consensus, which is in any case motivated by 
mistaken ideas about the nature of public reason and reasonableness. The political beliefs of 
reasonable citizens are less tightly connected to their comprehensive moral beliefs, and this 
permits the content of public reason to be set by the reasons that citizens appreciate. 
Appreciation provides a sufficient basis to differentiate between acceptance of coercive authority 
as a form of submission to power or ideology and as a way to fulfill one’s obligation to respect 
rights. 
5.2.1 The Two Stages of Rawls’ Political Liberalism 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism is divided into two stages that roughly correspond with my 
distinction between justification and legitimacy.13 The first stage develops a liberal theory of 
justice from the shared values of democratic political culture. The second stage demonstrates that 
we can reasonably expect any reasonable citizens to accept public justifications based on the 
principles of this liberal theory of justice.  
The first stage of Political Liberalism derives basic principles of justice from ideas about 
fairness and practical reason implicit in the public culture of a constitutional democracy. This 
 
11 A repeating theme in Rawls criticism is that legitimacy is irrelevant. Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for 
Stability,” Ethics 105:4 (July 1995): 874-915 (see infra 125); Waldron, Law and Disagreement (see supra I.A.3); 
Simmons, “Justification” (see supra 4.1.3). Contrary to these philosophers, I argue redundancy is not a problem for 
liberal legitimacy, only for Rawls’ idea of overlapping consensus. 
12 Freeman, Rawls, 341-42, 377-79; T.M. Scanlon, “Rawls on justification,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls, Ed. S. Freeman (2003): 139-169.  
13 One significant difference is Rawls offers little to justify the duty of cooperation. Instead, he assumes it by 
beginning with the criterion of reciprocity as part of the public ideal of democratic citizenship.  
 92 
“political conception of justice” is “free-standing,” meaning it is grounded only in intermediate-
level moral beliefs. Accordingly, it is possible for many different “comprehensive” moral and 
religious theories to support it.14 Beginning only with the “two virtues of reasonable citizens” 
(allegedly elements of the public ideal of democratic citizenship shared by all reasonable people), 
Rawls argues that any reasonable citizen should accept a liberal political conception of justice.15  
Rawls makes this argument quickly, so I have reconstructed a more explicit version of the 
argument. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is only essential to understand his strategy and 
conclusions, rather than to examine its validity.16 
1) “The criterion of reciprocity”: Citizens should be willing to propose and accept fair 
terms of cooperation, as long as others are willing to do the same, where fair terms 
are principles one can expect reasonable persons to accept as free and equal and not 
as dominated or manipulated.17  
2) “The burdens of judgment”: Moral beliefs are subject to the many hazards of correct 
reasoning about moral life, such as the complexity of the relevant evidence, the 
weighing of values and vague or conflicting values.18 
3) “Reasonable persons:” Reasonable persons accept (a) the criterion of reciprocity and 
(b) that the burdens of judgment apply to themselves and others.19  
4) Reasonable persons accept that in a free society, not everyone will affirm the same 
comprehensive doctrine even after full, free and conscientious discussion [3b, 2] and, 
thus, that others may reasonably affirm different doctrines.20 (This is “the fact of 
reasonable pluralism.”) 
5) Because reasonable persons accept that their comprehensive doctrine has no claim on 
others beyond others’ judgment of its merits [3a, 1] and that others reasonably affirm 
different doctrines [4], they accept that no publicly acceptable standard for assessing 
comprehensive doctrines is possible in a free society. 
6) Because reasonable persons accept that a conception of justice should be based 
 
14 Rawls, PL, 12-13. 
15 Ibid. 60-61. 
16 Immediately following the first argument, Rawls suggests a second version of the argument using the original 
position. This argument is even less developed, so I will not pursue it here. Ibid. 60.  
17 Ibid. 49-50. 
18 Ibid. 56-57. 
19 Rawls, PL, 49-50, 54. I am skeptical of this claim. The criterion of reciprocity is a likely candidate for this status 
but many derivations of democracy (say, for the principle of majority rule) ignore this moral claim.  
20 Ibid. 58. 
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entirely on one comprehensive doctrine only if a publicly accepted standard of 
justification for evaluating doctrines exists [3a, 1] and no such standard is possible 
[5], they accept that to use one’s doctrine as the standard for choosing a conception of 
justice is to insist on enforcing beliefs that one cannot reasonably expect others to 
accept. 
7) Thus, reasonable persons accept that terms of cooperation to regulate political life 
should be based only on considerations that all reasonable people can accept. 
Choosing on any other basis would violate reciprocity by using state power to repress 
other reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  
The core of this argument is that commitment to reciprocity and the burdens of judgment 
restricts the class of reasons that citizens may use to justify coercion to others. Reasonable 
persons accept that it is only fair to use coercion on terms any reasonable person can accept 
despite their divergent moral beliefs. Such ‘political neutrality’ is a familiar basis for liberal 
theory. Building on this conclusion, Rawls later argues that any fair terms include liberal rights 
like liberty of conscience and the right to a minimal level of well-being. Rawls seems to be 
arguing that any reasonable citizen, insofar as he or she is reasonable, accepts some liberal 
conception of justice, including the liberal principle of legitimacy and the core liberal rights.  
Yet, Rawls’ description of the force of this argument is perplexing. In the introduction to 
the paperback edition (published two years later), he wrote that there is “strictly speaking no 
argument here.” These pages simply “describe” implications of the “institutional context” of 
democratic citizenship. From within that institution, a “duty arises on those citizens to follow the 
criterion of reciprocity. This is a duty arising from the idea of reasonableness of persons.”21 
Despites Rawls’ hesitancy, this appears to be a deductive argument resting on the two virtues of 
reasonable citizens.22 Foundationalists will insist we still need to justify premise (1)-(3). This 
could be done by appealing to a comprehensive moral theory. Alternatively, using reflective 
equilibrium, one might say the argument’s strength depends on our confidence in premises (1)-
(3) and in the principles of justice that follow.  
 
21 Ibid. xliv, n. 14. Rawls also describes premise (1)-(3) as “conception dependent desires.” Ibid. 84. 
22 Secondary interpreters are not helpful on this score. Samuel Freeman writes that these arguments “unfold,” 
“develop” or “explicate” the basic commitments of our shared ideal of citizenship. Freeman, Rawls, 338, 390. 
Perhaps one could draw on Rawls’ distinction between pro tanto, full and public justification. Rawls, “Reply to 
Habermas,” §2.1, in PL, 386. As presented, it offers a pro tanto justification for the liberal principle of legitimacy 
and a liberal political conceptions of justice. They only become fully justified when citizens embed it in their 
comprehensive doctrines to justify premises (1)-(3). It is publicly justified if all the reasonable doctrines in society 
support premises (1)-(3). This does not ultimately clarify the problem, as we will see below.  
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In either case, if sound, this first stage argument supports two conclusions. First, a person 
who accepts the democratic ideal of citizenship is committed to a liberal political conception of 
justice. This commitment rests only on the criterion of reciprocity and burdens of judgment, and 
acceptance of these two premises is what makes a citizen reasonable. Thus, one is unreasonable 
insofar as one’s political actions are inconsistent with a liberal conception of justice. 
The second conclusion is that reasonable citizens use public coercion only in ways they 
sincerely believe other reasonable citizens can accept. That is, reasonable people accept a liberal 
principle of legitimacy. Premise (7) becomes Rawls’ principle of liberal legitimacy:  
[P]olitical power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of their common 
human reason… [A]ll questions arising in the legislature that 
concern or border on constitutional essentials, or basic questions of 
justice, should also be settled, so far as possible, by principles and 
ideals that can be similarly endorsed.23 
A state is legitimate only if it regulates its “basic structure” according to a conception of justice 
that all reasonable citizens can accept. “The basic structure” consists in constitutional essentials 
and matters of basic economic justice. The constitutional essentials outline state powers and 
basic substantive and procedural rights (such as rights to participation, conscience, association, 
and rule of law).24 Matters of basic justice include social and economic inequalities, such as 
legislative debates about matters of basic distributive justice.25 Legitimacy is possible only if we 
can expect all reasonable persons to share a conception of justice. “Only a political conception of 
justice that all citizens might be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as a basis of public 
reason and justification.”26 
This condition of legitimacy seems to conflict with premise 4. If citizens in a free society 
inevitably and reasonably endorse many different moral and religious beliefs,27 how can Rawls 
 
23 Rawls, PL, 137. See also PL, 143-144. “Justice as fairness is not reasonable in the first place unless in a suitable 
way it can win its support by addressing each citizen’s reason, as explained within its own framework. Only so is it 
an account of the legitimacy of political authority as opposed to an account of how those who hold power can satisfy 
themselves, and not citizens generally, that they are acting properly.” 
24 Ibid. 227. 
25 Ibid. 229, n. 10. While Rawls only hopes to “settle questions [questions of constitutional essentials] by reference 
to political values,” he still maintains that debates about distributive justice like fair or merely equal opportunity 
should be “decided by political values of public reason.” 
26 Ibid. 137. 
27 Ibid. II.2ff. 
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reasonably expect all citizens to accept a single set of political principles?28 The second stage of 
Political Liberalism explains how this is possible. Rawls’ solution is an “overlapping consensus” 
among “comprehensive doctrines.” We can reasonably expect citizens to endorse a shared basis 
for public justification, because diverse “comprehensive doctrines” can converge on “a political 
conception of justice,” or at least on a family of such conceptions.29  
A “comprehensive doctrine” is a tradition of practical or theoretical reason that offers a 
theory of what is valuable and virtuous to guide human conduct across a wide range of moral and 
religious issues. Rawls’ examples include utilitarianism, Kantianism, discourse ethics, value 
pluralism and Catholicism.30 Doctrines vary to the extent that they are articulated into coherent 
systems and to the extent that they cover the full breadth of values.31 Rawls assumes that each 
person has a determinate conception of the good that is tied to a comprehensive doctrine.32 Yet, a 
comprehensive doctrine is not simply a single person’s idiosyncratic set of beliefs. It is, in some 
sense, a set of beliefs that she shares with a group of people and a tradition of thought.33  
According to Rawls, it is unreasonable to expect a citizen to accept a political conception 
that criticizes or rejects the judgments of her comprehensive doctrine.34 We may reasonably 
expect all reasonable citizens to endorse a liberal conception of justice only if it can be supported 
by “the totality of reasons specified within the comprehensive doctrines affirmed by each citizen.” 
A state cannot be legitimate if its actions fundamentally conflict with the judgment of its citizens 
expressed through their comprehensive doctrines. A state can “win support by addressing each 
 
28 Ibid. xxxix. The problem of religious disagreement is especially pressing, so Rawls often frames the question: 
“How is it possible for those affirming a religious doctrine that is based on religious authority, for example, the 
Church or the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception that supports a just democratic regime? The point 
is that not all reasonable comprehensive doctrines are liberal comprehensive doctrines; so the question is whether 
they can still be compatible for the right reasons with a liberal political conception.” 
29 Ibid. 171. 
30 E.g., see ibid. liv, 170, 374.  
31 Rawls, PL, 12, 175; Reply to Habermas, 389. Rawls regards moral, religious, metaphysical and epistemological 
theories as comprehensive doctrines. A fully comprehensive doctrine “covers all recognized values and virtuous in 
one rather precisely articulated scheme of thought; whereas…” a partially comprehensive doctrine “comprises 
certain (but not all) nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated.” PL, 175. Rawls implies that 
most doctrines aspire to cover all values in a single coherent system. Ibid. 12, 175.  
32 Rawls, PL II.7, 81 “Citizens are assumed c) to have at any given time a determinate conception of the good 
interpreted in light of a (reasonable) comprehensive view.” See also PL I.3.3, 19-20; III.4.1, 108. 
33 Ibid. 59. If the idea of a “comprehensive doctrine” reduces to the totality of any single person’s practical beliefs, 
or the subset of her fundamental moral beliefs, then an overlapping consensus among doctrines is identical to the 
claim that each reasonable person endorses (or maybe should endorse) the political conception. A state would be 
legitimate when everyone endorsed the political conception. Overlapping consensus among the major social 
traditions of thought might make this agreement easier to achieve, but it would be neither necessary or sufficient.  
34 Rawls, Reply, § 2.1, in PL, 390. 
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citizen’s reason” only if it uses a political conception of justice supported by each reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine.35 Thus, a liberal state can be legitimate only if the many reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that exist and that are likely to gain support in that society can accept 
some liberal political conception of justice.36 (Note the slide here from addressing each citizen’s 
reason to winning the support of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by citizens; it will 
become important later.37) In summary, legitimacy is possible if it is possible for all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines in a society to support an overlapping consensus.38  
Rawls’ second stage, then, argues that it is possible for diverse reasonable doctrines to 
join an overlapping consensus on liberalism. His core claim is that a liberal political conception 
of justice developed in the first stage is well positioned to attain support from many reasonable 
doctrines, because it is (1) limited to political issues, (2) derived only from public values, and (3) 
derived only from values constitutive of reasonableness itself.  
Once Rawls is sure an overlapping consensus on a family of liberal political conceptions 
is possible, then he can use core liberal principles can define the positive content of public 
reason. The content of public reason is defined by the family of liberal political conceptions of 
justice.39 Different conceptions of liberal justice may order or balance these liberal principles and 
values differently, but all must ensure religious and expressive liberty and substantive fairness of 
opportunity. Thus, the positive content of public reason will include a list of basic rights and 
opportunities, the priority of these rights with respect to claims about common welfare, and 
commitment to provide adequate means to use these rights.40  
The idea of overlapping consensus explains how it is possible to justify state coercion in 
terms any other reasonable citizen can accept. If all major doctrines can join an overlapping 
consensus on a liberal conception of justice, then we can reasonably expect any other citizen to 
accept actions justified by liberal principles. Citizens in a liberal constitutional democracy need 
 
35 Rawls, PL, 143. 
36 Ibid. 141, 171. 
37 Simmons could identify this as the switch from a personalized theory of legitimacy to a universal theory of 
justification, from the reasoning of imperfect individuals to the abstract world of reasons. Along with Simmons, I 
think this switch is mistake.  
38 Rawls, PL, § 7.4, 167. 
39 Rawls, IPRR, § 2.1, in PL, 450. “Thus, the content of public reason is given by a family of liberal political 
conceptions…. The limiting feature of these forms is the criterion of reciprocity, viewed as applied between free and 
equal citizens, themselves seen as reasonable and rational.” See also Freeman, Rawls, 388-391. 
40 Rawls, IPRR, § 2.1, in PL, 450.  
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not simply acquiesce to political power. Their public commitment to liberalism need not be a 
modus vivendi, a strategic stalemate between warring factions waiting for the chance to enforce 
their own beliefs. When an overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines exists, any citizen 
can endorse liberal political outcomes, precisely because liberal political principles “rest on the 
totality of reasons specified within the comprehensive doctrine affirmed by each citizen.”41  
5.2.2 The First Stage Makes the Second Redundant 
Now that I have described the basic features of the Rawls’ Political Liberalism, we are in 
a position to see why the first stage argument makes the second stage redundant. The first stage 
demonstrates that all reasonable citizens accept a liberal conception of justice. Citizens are 
unreasonable insofar as their political beliefs diverge from a liberal conception. The second stage 
maintains that legitimacy requires an overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines on a liberal political conception of justice.42 When would these two come apart? If all 
reasonable citizens accept a liberal conception of justice, why would reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines ever endorse a non-liberal conception of justice? 
Unfortunately, Rawls’ uses “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” in a frustratingly fluid 
fashion. The first stage clearly defines reasonable citizens as ones who accept reciprocity and the 
burdens of judgment. The second stage, however, uses three definitions of reasonable doctrines. 
None is sufficiently independent of the definitions of reasonable citizens.  
The first, explicit definition of reasonable doctrines includes only formal or epistemic 
criteria. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines are (1) relatively coherent systems of theoretical 
and practical reasoning that (2) belong to a tradition of thought that (3) evolves in light of what it 
considers good reasons.43 If any doctrine that meets these three epistemic limits is reasonable, 
then reasonable doctrines are frequently non-liberal. Libertarianism and Marxism certainly meet 
this definition. Yet, this cannot be the whole story. The formal epistemic criteria are so weak that 
almost any doctrine qualifies. A tradition like Sharia is a coherent system of practical reasoning 
 
41 Rawls, PL, IV §8, 171 
42 Ibid. 144. “We look for a consensus of reasonable (as oppose to unreasonable or irrational) comprehensive 
doctrines. The crucial fact is not the fact of pluralism as such, but of reasonable pluralism (I:6.2)… The fact of 
reasonable pluralism is not an unfortunate condition of human life, as we might say of pluralism as such, allowing 
for doctrines that are not only irrational but mad and aggressive… The fact of reasonable pluralism [is] itself the 
outcome of free human reason under conditions of liberty.”  
43 Ibid. 59. 
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that evolves according to what its practitioners consider good reasons. Consensus would require 
either bending to such radical doctrines or reshaping them.  
Immediately after offering these three formal epistemic criteria, Rawls asserts that this 
account is “deliberately loose” because he wants to avoid arbitrarily excluding “doctrines as 
unreasonable without strong grounds based on clear aspects of the reasonable itself.”44 This hints 
that a substantively discriminating definition of reasonable doctrines is possible. Unfortunately, 
Rawls frequently uses such substantive criteria without formally defining the substantive limits 
on reasonable doctrines.  
Sometimes Rawls implies that a doctrine is reasonable if affirms the fundamental ideals 
of constitutional democracy.45 Like persons, doctrines are reasonable to the extent they affirm 
the criterion of reciprocity and the burdens of judgment.46 If this is correct, then first stage 
arguments could be repackaged to apply directly to doctrines. Simply substitute “reasonable 
doctrine” for “reasonable person” in the first stage argument and the first stage guarantees the 
possibility of overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines. Thus, this definition makes 
the second stage argument for legitimacy through overlapping consensus redundant. Adherents 
of unreasonable doctrines cannot accept the liberal political conception, but their disagreement 
does not threaten the possibility of legitimacy. We need not worry that our overlapping 
consensus excludes religious fundamentalism (that rejects the burdens of judgment) or right 
libertarianism (that rejects reciprocity). Citizens who hold unreasonable doctrines can be 
motivated by other, non-rational, reasons for compliance. When unreasonable doctrines become 
too common, they will make the liberal state less practically stable, but they cannot undermine 
its legitimacy.47  
 
44 Ibid. 60. 
45 Rawls, IPRR, § 6.2 at PL, 488. “Reasonable comprehensive doctrines do not reject the essentials of a 
constitutional democratic polity.”  
46 Rawls, IPRR, § 6.3 at PL, 483: “Thus, all reasonable doctrines affirm such a society with its corresponding 
political institutions: equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens, including liberty of conscience and the freedom 
of religion. On the other hand, comprehensive doctrines that cannot support such a democratic society are not 
reasonable. Their principles and ideals do not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and in various ways fail to establish 
equal basic liberties… Since the criterion of reciprocity is an essential ingredient specifying public reason and its 
content, political liberalism rejects as unreasonable all such doctrines. ” 
47 Rawls, IPRR, §7.2 at PL, 489. Rawls is unclear on this points. He says that the existence of unreasonable 
doctrines does not question the validity of this ideal of legitimacy and the importance of attempting to realize that 
ideal. Rather, it only sets limits on our ability to fully realize the ideal. If it limits our ability to realize the ideal, does 
that not question the validity of that idea for people in our circumstances? For a similar point, see Barry, “Search for 
Stability,” 901. 
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At other times, Rawls say that any doctrine is reasonable if reasonable citizens may come 
to hold it. The reasonable doctrines are “the doctrines that reasonable people affirm and that 
Political Liberalism must address.”48 If this third definition means doctrines are reasonable when 
reasonable citizens (who accept reciprocity and the burdens of judgment) in fact hold them, then 
it offers no real constraint on the reasonable doctrines. People can be wildly inconsistent. On the 
other hand, if this definition means a doctrine is reasonable if reasonable citizens could endorse it 
consistent with reciprocity and pluralism, then the category of reasonable doctrines again is 
morally irrelevant. The first stage demonstrated that citizens are reasonable insofar as they accept 
the liberal principle of legitimacy.49 Reasonable citizens can consistently accept only doctrines 
with liberal political implications. Political consensus among those doctrines held by reasonable 
citizens is ensured, at least insofar as their beliefs remain reasonable and within the circle of 
reciprocal concern.50 Overlapping consensus adds nothing to the moral justification of liberalism.  
On the second and third definitions (in its latter form), reasonable doctrines are defined 
by the same standards as reasonable citizens. This is, I think, a fundamental mistake. Since the 
two definitions of reasonableness are not independent, Rawls’ claim that a state is legitimate 
when reasonable doctrines can support its political conception reduces to the claim that it is 
legitimate if reasonable citizens should accept that political conception. The first stage argument 
that reasonable citizens should accept a liberal political conception does all the normative work. A 
just liberal state is always legitimate, making legitimacy morally redundant. At most, the second 
stage addresses practical worries about whether we can realize a liberal state in non-ideal 
situations with unreasonable citizens.51 Liberal states may not be practically feasible if too many 
 
48 Rawls, PL, 39.  
49 This follows from the first stage arguments described above, but Rawls is also explicitly committed to this 
conclusion. “Since reasonable citizens hold reasonable doctrines (II:3.1), they are ready to offer or endorse a 
political conception of justice.” Rawls, PL, 392. 
50 As I explain below, the way to avoid this problem is to resist the idealization that assumes citizens’ attitudes are 
highly consistent. Citizens can accept political outcomes contrary to their doctrinal beliefs. Out of concern for 
reciprocity, they can accept outcomes without endorsing them and without adopting inconsistent beliefs that place 
psychological and motivational stress on their commitment. However, this perspective cannot provide a way to 
capture the idea of reasonable doctrines, because the very idea of a doctrine is an idealization that does not seem to 
admit of this form of inconsistency. Either a doctrine recognizes political reasons to supports an outcomes based on 
reciprocity, or it admits that comprehensive reasons overrule the political reasons.  
51 Barry embraces this conclusion. At this point, the only problem left is what to do with unreasonable persons and 
doctrines. Barry speculates that Rawls’ concern for stability in Political Liberalism, just like his concern for stability 
in Theory of Justice, is primarily a practical desire to limit the disrupting force of unreasonable persons and 
doctrines. Barry, “Search for Stability,” 904-06. Rawls’ discussion of “shaping” comprehensive doctrines to move 
beyond a modus vivendi supports this interpretation.  
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citizens develop unreasonable beliefs, but education and sanctions can address these prudential 
concerns.52 It seems Simmons was correct—liberal legitimacy provides no independent moral 
constraints beyond minimal justice. 
The defining feature of this interpretation of Rawls is the central role for overlapping 
consensus. For Rawls, the existence of an overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines is 
a necessary condition of legitimacy.53 When various doctrines can join an overlapping consensus 
on a liberal political conception, then it is possible to offer reasons that all citizens can accept. 
Accordingly, legitimacy is a plausible political value only if Rawls can defend rational faith in 
the possibility of overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines. I suggest we drop the idea 
of overlapping consensus among comprehensive doctrines. This is the wrong target for 
legitimacy. In the next section, I attempt to expose and undercut the basic motivation for 
thinking that overlapping consensus is necessary for legitimacy.  
5.2.3 The Implicit Premise in the Demand for Overlapping Consensus 
Although prominent interpreters of Rawls support this interpretation of Political 
Liberalism,54 I think it misunderstands the relationship between citizens and their comprehensive 
doctrines by assuming that reasonable people accept only reasonable doctrines. There seem to be 
two reasons for this assumption. The first, I think, is a misunderstanding of Rawls. The second, I 
think is encouraged by Rawls’ conception of legitimacy.  
First, one might think that reasonable people accept only reasonable doctrines because of 
their commitment to the reciprocity and the burdens of judgment. If reasonable people accept a 
liberal political conception—including the priority of liberty—then it may seem that the all 
 
52 Brian Barry similarly argues that the first stage renders the second stage irrelevant to the justification of a 
conception of justice (he does not clearly distinguish justice from legitimacy). His argument inspired this objection, 
but I think he misunderstands Rawls’ project in PL and misidentifies the basic problem. Barry locates the problem in 
the criterion of reciprocity. Stability for the right reasons requires consensus among reasonable people, because 
reciprocity only requires us to justify coercion to those who accept the burden of justifying their actions to us. If an 
individual or comprehensive doctrine cannot support a liberal conception and is willing to enforce its doctrine, they 
are simply beyond our realm of political (moral) concern. Since the first stage proves that all reasonable people 
accept a liberal conception and that we may use force to prevent anyone from enforcing their doctrine, this 
guarantees stability. Barry, “Search for Stability,” 899-901.  
53 Rawls, PL, 149; see also PL, 387: “The express content of the doctrines have no normative role in the public 
justification… only the fact – the existence – of the reasonable overlapping consensus itself” maters. The footnote 
emphasizes that the existence of consensus among reasonable doctrines is a brute fact about the political and culture 
of the society. 
54 See, e.g. Freeman, Rawls, 341-42, 377-79; Scanlon, “Rawls on justification.” 
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things considered judgment of a reasonable person should always give political values priority 
over comprehensive ones.55 However, this is a misreading of Rawls and the first stage 
justification of the political conception. A reasonable person may reach unreasonable political 
conclusions because of strong comprehensive beliefs or incompletely formed political beliefs.56  
First, strong comprehensive beliefs may override a reasonable person’s liberal political 
beliefs. Reasonable people accept reciprocity and pluralism, which makes them implicitly 
committed to the priority of liberty, with its injunction not to sacrifice liberty for comprehensive 
beliefs. This implicit commitment rests on the political ideal of citizens as free and equal, 
including its values of autonomy and fairness. These political values are significant, but not 
absolute. Their strength depends on how citizens embed the freestanding justification into their 
other beliefs. Rawls describes three ways for doctrines to incorporate the political conception, 
which can be adapted for persons. A person may regard liberal values (1) as deduced from her 
comprehensive values, (2) as the best approximation of her comprehensive values given practical 
limits, or (3) as the best balance of a pluralistic range of comprehensive values.57 The priority of 
liberty is determinative only if a person deduced the political conception from her wider beliefs. 
If her liberal political beliefs are the best practical choice or the balance of her wider values, then 
she will give liberal political values priority in most cases, but this priority can be overridden. 
Political values take prominence but may be overridden by strong wider values.  
This assumption makes another, related mistake: it treats a person’s beliefs as a coherent 
and settled whole. The idea of comprehensive doctrines is an idealization that imposes a degree 
of coherence on an evolving set of beliefs. Real people hold various beliefs with no idea of the 
relationship to one another or even contradictions between them. Moreover, a person may have 
no beliefs on a particular issue until they asked. Insofar as there is “slippage” in her beliefs, a 
person may endorse a liberal political conception and unreasonable positions. Either because of 
strongly held moral beliefs or because of the limits of our beliefs, a generally reasonable person 
may endorse an all-things-considered judgment that is unreasonable.  
Consider, for example, an egalitarian who accepts reciprocity as the best approximation 
of full equality given people’s selfish nature. As part of her comprehensive egalitarianism, she 
 
55 This, I think, is the source of Barry’s misunderstanding. See supra 125, n. 130. 
56 The later explanation is Rawls’ account of the Catholic abortion doctrine. PL, 243, fn. 32. 
57 Rawls, PL, IV §8, 168-172. 
 102 
also believes that taxing the wealthy to lessen economic disparity would make society more just 
even if it reduces overall welfare. Strong arguments exist that she cannot justify this position in 
terms that others can reasonably accept. However, there are public reasons in the vicinity and she 
may conflate her comprehensive beliefs with these reasons. For instance, economic inequality 
can threaten political equality by distorting elections and concrete inequalities can test citizens’ 
commitment to a just society. Moreover, even if she does not make these mistakes, she may 
judge that the sacrifice to equal respect from the violation of reciprocity is worth the 
improvement in distributive justice. Each person must judge how to order the values of justice 
and fairness that underlie our shared public values.  
A second – more philosophically interesting – assumption may underlie this belief that 
reasonable citizens must hold reasonable doctrines: that a person can support a conception of 
justice only if their comprehensive doctrine supports it. This assumption is implicit in Rawls’ 
theory. I believe it is the fundamental source of his redundancy problem. I doubt Rawls would 
have endorsed this proposition once it is made explicit, but it is supported by the relationship he 
defines between overlapping consensus and legitimacy. It underlies Rawls’ switch, which I noted 
above, between asking whether all reasonable citizens can accept a political conception to asking 
whether various comprehensive doctrines can support it. 
Rawls rejects this assumption explicitly in sections of Political Liberalism, but even there 
he ignores the implications of its rejection. When he is arguing that overlapping consensus is a 
realistic possibility (not idealistic fantasy), he notes that most doctrines do not cover the full range 
of values. “[T]he comprehensive doctrines of most people are not fully comprehensive, and this 
allows scope for the development of an independent allegiance to the political conception that 
helps to bring about a consensus.”58 Once citizens develop an “independent allegiance” to liberal 
political values without recognizing the relation of liberal values to their broader beliefs,59 then 
they can revise their comprehensive doctrines to fit their political beliefs. Even here, however, he 
betrays his implicit assumption. If citizens have independent reasons to accept liberal principles, 
why demand they revise doctrines to rid them of non-liberal conclusions? Why the intermediate 
 
58 Ibid. 168. 
59 Ibid. IV §6, 160-164. The political values that support individual allegiance to the liberal principles are that (1) 
they reduce the stakes of political controversy by fixing basic rights; (2) their simplicity establishes trust because 
they do not involve complex calculations that we may suspect others use as a mask for self-interest; and (3) it 
encourages the cooperative virtues when we others demonstrate their willingness to follow public reason.  
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step? Rawls seems to lack confidence in citizens’ independent allegiance to the freestanding 
political conception. Instead of accepting that citizens may hold a reasonable doctrine that 
conflicts with the justification offered by the public authority and may deal with that conflict, he 
uses the possibility of independent allegiance to argue that citizens will eventually shape 
unreasonable doctrines into reasonable ones to eliminate the tension.60 The intermediate step, 
again, appears to be motivated by an implicit premise that genuine and reliable political 
commitments must be mediated by doctrinal beliefs.  
We have exposed the underlying motivation for overlapping consensus: citizens can 
accept political outcomes supported by a liberal political conception of justice only if they 
endorse a liberal conception from within their comprehensive doctrine. This implicit premise is 
the fundamental source of Rawls’ redundancy problem. In § 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, I argue that it is 
mistaken. As I discuss in § 5.2.4, it ignores a basic feature of practical rationality, that humans 
can appreciate reasons that they do not endorse. And, as I discuss in § 5.2.5, it demands too little 
of citizens, adopting an unnecessarily limited ideal of the reasonable citizen.  
I suggest we drop the idea of overlapping consensus, because it is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for legitimacy. First, it is not sufficient. If the major comprehensive doctrines in a 
society join an overlapping consensus, then citizens will likely endorse political principles that 
are similar at a high level of abstraction. This makes it easier for citizens to recognize when their 
state chooses a reasonable specification of rights; however, it cannot guarantee that they can 
accept the state’s specification, because the principles are not sufficient to settle disagreements 
about the correct specification of the right or about its application in particular cases. One needs 
to appeal to a full set of values to make these judgments. Given reasonable pluralism, the state 
cannot offer reasons for its operational rules or its specific applications that will be consistent 
with each citizen’s balance of the comprehensive reasons. 
 
60 Richardson adopts this interpretation of Rawls. Henry Richardson, “Moral Reasoning,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2007). Richardson argues that the lack of rigidity in doctrines permits individuals to revise doctrines to 
accommodate political values. “The idea of overlapping consensus suggests how, against the background of such 
holism, their joint effort at working towards moral agreement can proceed on the basis of any initial agreement 
whatsoever. . . . When moral disagreement is deep, we want to know more about how the parties can reasonably 
approach agreement. Each will need to be willing to compromise: to revise his or her view in a way that he or she 
would not have been willing to do, but for some modicum of concern or respect that he or she has for the other 
party.” Notably, even before Political Liberalism, Raz criticized Rawls for his perplexing position that “the fact that 
an agreement is demanded of us by our own conception of the good renders that conception open to revision in order 
to secure that agreement.” Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 19:1 (Winter 1990): 3-46. 
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It is also not enough to say that all reasonable citizens indirectly endorse the state’s 
choices, because they endorse the liberal principle of legitimacy (as part of the liberal political 
conception) and should accept any outcome consistent with liberal principles, rather than attempt 
to advance the specification of rights supported by their comprehensive reasons. When a citizen's 
comprehensive reasons support a liberal political conception, she has second-order reasons to 
accept outcomes consistent with first-order liberal principles; however, those second-order 
reasons do not necessarily exclude her other competing first-order reasons. The possibility of 
conflict among her political and comprehensive reasons is only excluded if the political reasons 
are deduced from her comprehensive reasons. As we saw above, not all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines support the political conception deductively. Overlapping consensus on 
political reasons cannot ensure that citizens can accept the reasons the state offers for its 
specifications of rights.  
Fortunately, overlapping consensus is also not necessary for the type of genuine public 
reasoning about rights that supports legitimacy. Because citizens can appreciate reasons they do 
not endorse, they can recognize when the state protects a reasonable specification of rights 
without endorsing its actions or reasons indirectly via an overlapping consensus. It is not 
necessary for a citizen to revise her comprehensive beliefs (or for citizens to shape their 
comprehensive doctrines) so that they support a shared set of high-level principles for political 
reasoning. Compliance may be psychologically easer if citizen reduce the conflict in their beliefs 
by revising their doctrines to support reasonable political beliefs. Legitimacy, however, does not 
demand that citizens (directly or indirectly) endorse the state’s actions from within a consistent 
theory. Overlapping consensus may facilitate compliance, but it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for legitimacy.  
5.2.4 Appreciation Rather than Indirect Endorsement 
The ideal of possible acceptance as indirect endorsement of reasons (Rawls) or outcomes 
(Sunstein) demands too little of citizens. To enable rightful relations in circumstances of 
disagreement, citizens precisely must accept reasons and outcomes they do not endorse, whether 
directly or indirectly. Citizens are obligated to accept state decisions that conflict with their 
judgment about rights, because rightful relations are possible only if we allow a practical 
authority to specify a shared scheme of rights—which requires us to abdicate our right to insist 
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that our private judgment governs our disputes.  
We can abdicate our judgment to a political authority so long as we can recognize that the 
authority fulfills its function to specify our rights. That may include living in a society regulated 
by a scheme of rights inconsistent with our fundamental beliefs about justice. We need not be 
able to endorse the law, even indirectly or abstractly. Instead, we need only recognize that the 
state’s laws sincerely attempt to respect a reasonable specification of our rights. This requires 
only that we recognize the force of the justification offered by the state. How can we recognize 
the force of reasoning that conflicts with our fundamental beliefs about justice?  
Because the content of public reason is not limited to those reasons that (1) all citizens 
presently endorse within their comprehensive system of beliefs, (2) could endorse consistent 
with those beliefs or (3) will endorse after revising their beliefs. The conception of public reason 
based on agreement (whether actual, hypothetical or postulated) ignores a basic feature of human 
rationality: that we appreciate reasons or values we do not and will not endorse. A state 
justification is public to the extent that citizens recognize the force of the reasoning, because it 
uses reasons or values they appreciate as appropriate for specification of the rights at stake. 
The idea of appreciation rests on the gap between those practical reasons that I appreciate 
and those that I endorse. This gap is a precondition of practical reasoning. A similar gap between 
belief and truth is essential to epistemic reasoning. The concept of belief carries an implicit 
distinction between what is true and what I believe is true. This gap is a precondition of rational 
persuasion and our ability to change our minds. To believe something, I must believe it is true 
(or accurate); however, I cannot believe it is true (or accurate) without acknowledging the 
difference between my belief in its truth and it actually being true. Belief carries an implicit 
recognition that mistake is possible. I recognize when an assertion that I judge is false remains, 
nevertheless, potentially viable. Similarly, I appreciate when a practical reason I do not accept 
and will not accept is, nonetheless, potentially viable.  
While we need not incorporate a reason into our beliefs to appreciate it, our ability to 
appreciate reasons we do not endorse is inversely related to the degree to which it would require 
a revision of our present commitments to endorse that reason. Beginning with my actual beliefs, 
I ask how different my beliefs would have to be for me to accept the reason offered. (This is an 
excessively cognitive description of a judgment that is typically intuitive.) The more we must 
revise our beliefs, the less we appreciate the reason. This ability to appreciate reasons we do not 
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endorse enables us to accept political positions as reasonable even if we judge them mistaken. 
Note that appreciation is a practical judgment about the reasons offered for a position.  
It should be evident by now that appreciation places only minimal limits on public reason 
and makes significant demands of citizens. Citizens need not conclude that the state ordered the 
relevant values correctly. Citizens may reject the justification the state offers, as long as it still 
meets the minimal substantive limits in Chapter 3. Citizens may even conclude that the state 
justification contradicts reasons that citizens regard as central, as long as the state does not 
entirely ignore or discount their central reasons. On the other hand, it does not require citizens to 
actually revise their fundamental commitments. Chapter 6 provides the full articulation and 
defense of appreciation as a conception of reasons all can accept.  
5.2.5 Reasonableness and Appreciation 
Appreciation is a central aspect of the political virtue of reasonableness. A politically 
reasonable citizen is not one who endorses minimally correct political positions. Rather, a 
reasonable citizen is one who can disassociate sufficiently from her political beliefs to judge 
when contrary positions about rights are grounded in reasons she appreciates. Our ability to 
appreciate reasons we do not endorse allows us to recognize when a position as reasonable, even 
if comprehensive reasons lead us to conclude it is substantively unjust (though minimally just). 
The virtue of reasonableness builds on the provisional nature of all human belief, exploits the 
gap between belief and truth that is implicit in the concept of belief and a precondition of rational 
persuasion. To assume we cannot appreciate reasons that conflict with the reasons or positions of 
our comprehensive beliefs is precisely to treat us as unreasonable.  
In a sense, my position is a return to the form of political liberalism advocated by Nagel 
in his famous 1987 article. According to Nagel, a person is reasonable if she is willing to (1) 
subject her beliefs to public examination and (2), when she believes others are wrong, provide 
non-circular explanations of the mistake.61 Nagel used the latter condition to offer a negative 
definition of the content of public reason. Any justification is not public if it ends in instincts 
internal to a point of view that cannot serve as shared premises, such as religious revelation or 
 
61 Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16:3 (Summer 1987): 
215-240.  
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similar moral beliefs (e.g. veganism).62 I think Nagel was correct to conceive of reasonableness 
as related to one’s ability to maintain a critical distance from one’s beliefs. However, Nagel 
envisions reasonableness as an attitude or temperament that citizens adopt to constrain public 
debates.  
In contrast, I think political reasonableness is better understood as a virtue related to 
practical wisdom. We exercise practical wisdom by making practical judgments. Similarly, we 
exercise the virtue of reasonableness by making judgments—judgments about the reasons that 
supports another’s position. Citizens exercise the virtue of political reasonableness when they 
evaluate the public justification for an exercise of coercive power. Appreciation is a practical 
judgment about a reason (or set of them). Similarly, to recognize that a position is reasonable is 
to make a judgment about the reasons for the position. When a citizen judges that the state (or 
other authority) has offered reasons that she appreciates but does not endorse, she has adopted a 
practical attitude with respect to the justification for its decisions.  
Moreover, again similar to practical wisdom, reasonableness is a virtue that citizens 
exercise fully only by making accurate judgments. A person can only fully realize the virtue of 
political reasonableness in a society that engages in public justification for its actions and offers 
reasons that in fact relate to the right at question.  
Reasonableness is thus also a virtue of the public justification for coercive exercise of 
state power. If the state and its citizen are wrong about the reasonableness of its political 
justifications, then neither has fully realized the ideal. This connection—between the substantive 
justification for laws and a persons’ ability to recognize reasonable attempts at public 
justification—provides the link between the substantive and procedural components of 
legitimacy.  
5.2.6 Legitimacy as an Independent Moral Ideal  
If one thinks that philosophical analysis of reasonableness can identify a set of reasons 
that all citizens can accept, then legitimacy is satisfied by an imaginative inquiry into the beliefs 
 
62 When Nagel uses this criteria, he makes the same mistake as Rawls. He argues that the content of public reason 
cannot be defined as a set of shared reasonable beliefs, because too few beliefs cannot be reasonably rejected. Nagel 
is assuming that the reasons which citizens can reasonably accept is the inverse of the set of reasons which they 
cannot reasonably reject. In other words, any reason that citizens can reasonably reject cannot be part of public 
reason. This assumption is mistaken, because most public reasons can be reasonably rejected.  
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of some hypothetical reasonable person. In that situation, legitimacy is no more than a rephrased 
version of justification. On the other hand, if one accepts that reasonable people may hold 
comprehensive beliefs that conflict with reasonable political outcomes, then legitimacy is no 
longer morally redundant. Legitimacy can be an ideal in its own right when one demands that 
states accept citizens as they are.  
On my conception, a state is legitimate insofar as (1) it follows procedures that empower 
citizens to demand public officials explain why the state’s actions are consistent with a 
reasonable specification of basic rights and (2) the citizens in fact recognize that specification as 
reasonable because the state offers reasons they appreciate. Even citizens who disagree with the 
state’s decision and reasons may recognize them as reasonable, because humans are capable of 
appreciating reasons they do not endorse. If citizens appreciate their state’s reasons, they 
recognize that it is acting as a public authority, rather than simply another private agent enforcing 
its arbitrary will. Thus, they may and should accept that its actions create obligations for them. 
In this conception, public reason still operates as a regulative ideal: state officials should 
engage in public justifications using reasons that citizens appreciate. However, the content of 
public reason emerges as the state follows this regulative ideal. We separate public from 
nonpublic reasons by forcing officials to follow procedures that articulate reasons and waiting to 
see if citizens in fact appreciate those reasons. Public reasons are constituted by the process of 
institutionalized debate.63 Following this regulative ideal does not guarantee the state is 
legitimate, because citizens may not be ready to appreciate the reasons offered. Nevertheless, a 
state that follows this ideal lays the ground for its legitimate authority.  
Political philosophers may enter these debates. Philosophical analysis can help identify 
public reasons by engaging with our traditions in an exegetical and normative fashion. However, 
political philosophy cannot circumscribe the limits of public reason. The philosophical theory of 
public reason offers only limited constraints on our institutional debates. The more important 
task for philosophy is to explain this idea of appreciation that explains how we can accept 
reasons that we do not and will not endorse. The next chapter turns to this task.  
 
63 Deliberative democrats have started down this road, but their faith in deliberative process underestimates the 
extent and intractability of our disagreements and the moral salience of political coercion. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
INTERPRETING “CAN ACCEPT” AS “APPRECIATE”  
 
This section is detailed and technical. To help keep its purpose in sight, I begin with a 
brief summary of the dissertation so far. Chapter 3 explains how vague or contested rights 
sustain persistent, yet reasonable, disagreements about justice. Chapter 4 argues that anyone who 
accepts a duty to respect rights is obliged, in the face of such disagreement, to maintain a 
practical authority to specify vague or contested rights. Unfortunately, entirely abdicating one’s 
judgment to another private authority seems to violate the duty of self-respect. Chapter 5 argues 
that a legitimate public authority resolves this dilemma. A state is legitimate if citizens may 
demand officials explain why their actions are consistent with basic rights and officials in fact 
supply justifications based on reasons citizens appreciate. Section 5.2 began to explain how 
citizens can accept justifications based on reasons they cannot endorse. Its’ primary task was 
ground clearing. It combated the mistaken idea, encouraged by Rawls’ idea of overlapping 
consensus, that legitimacy requires citizens to endorse the constitutional essentials based on 
shared reasons. I introduced my account of “appreciation” as an alternative explanation for how 
citizens can accept a state’s actions without appealing to indirect endorsement.  
Chapter 6 develops and defends this idea of appreciation as an account of the content of 
public reason. It offers my formal positive account of the reasons that all can accept. We must be 
careful, because the phrase “reasons all can accept” is highly ambiguous. Although the idea is 
central for any theory of public reason, and public reason is a popular topic in political 
philosophy, I have found no rigorous and productive analyses of this idea.1 Accordingly, Chapter 
6 has two tasks. It surveys the conceptual space to identify the possible interpretations of 
“reasons all can accept.” This idea might invoke different modal judgments. It is not clear which 
modal claim most authors intend, because they rarely distinguish among crucially distinct 
possibilities. A large part of this section involves analyzing the different modal interpretations of 
possible acceptance. As we will see, this idea is vastly ambiguous. Second, Chapter 6 argues that 
 
1 Bohman and Richardson offer the closest to a direct attempt to map the options for interpreting the idea of “reasons 
all can accept.” James Bohman and Henry Richardson, “Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and ‘Reasons that All 
Can Accept’,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17:3 (2009): 253–274. 
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appreciation offers the best philosophical reconstruction of the idea that there are “reasons all can 
accept.” As I survey the conceptual space, I argue that each alternative possibility is less 
promising than my conception. 
First, a brief note on methodology. When precision is necessary, I use a possible-worlds 
semantics to analyze the modal interpretations of possible acceptance. I not do pretend to be 
qualified to defend a particular semantics of counterfactuals, but we need some semantics to help 
disambiguate this idea of possible acceptance. I believe these distinctions could be reformulated 
and evaluated in other modal semantics. At times, however, I assume that modal claims can have 
meaningful truth-values and that de re modal claims are sensible,2 which I recognize are not 
uncontroverted assumptions. Nevertheless, I believe they are shared implicitly by most people 
who use the idea of possible acceptance.  
6.1 ABSOLUTE POSSIBILITY  
I will begin with the straightforward interpretation of the idea that there are reasons all 
persons can accept. If one interprets “can accept” modally as “it is possible to accept,” then the 
standard formulation of public reason will be 
1) A reason is a public reason iff it is possible for all persons to accept the reason.  
On the standard interpretation of possibility, a thing is possible if and only if its negation is not 
necessary. It is possible for kangaroos not to have tails if and only if it is not necessary for 
kangaroos to have tails. In this context, that would mean it is possible for a person to accept a 
reason if and only if it is not necessary for her to reject a reason. Thus, (1) is equivalent to:  
2) A reason is a public reason iff it is not necessary for some person to reject the reason.  
Several versions of this standard formulation emerge from different interpretations of its central 
terms “possibility,” “all,” “persons,” and “accept/reject” and of their relation to one another. For 
most of this chapter, I take (1) and (2) as the canonical formulations of “reasons all can accept”. 
Before exploring (1) and (2), I should make a slight digression to note an important 
alternative interpretation of “reasons all can accept.” Some theorists, especially Kantians, argue 
 
2 Quine famously denied the latter. W.V.O. Quine, “Reference and Modality,” in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1961): 139-59. 
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that there are some reasons that no person can accept as a matter of consistency (or, consistent 
with regarding herself as a person or as an equal). For instance, any justifications for segregation 
that appeals to a group’s natural inferiority relies on reasons no one could accept while regarding 
herself as an equal person. Thus, natural inferiority is never an appropriately public reason. One 
might define an exclusionary conception of public reason that excludes only such reasons, 
yielding the following very broad set of public reasons:  
3) A reason is public if it is not necessary for all persons to reject the reason. 
To my knowledge, only Onora O’Neill has suggested (in an early review of Political Liberalism) 
that (3) is a necessary and sufficient criteria for the “reasons all can accept.”3 A more ambitious 
Kantian might seek reasons that all rational beings must accept. One might define a positive set 
of public reason using to the following formula:  
3*) A reason is public if it is necessary for all persons to accept the reason. 
While the ends that every rational beings must adopt play a large role in Kant’s imperfect duties 
in “The Doctrine of Virtue,” I am not aware of anyone who accepts (3*) as a conception of 
public reason for political purposes and so do not address this possibility. I address formulation 
(3), such as O’Neill’s conception of public reason, in § 6.2 below. For the most part, I focus on 
(1) and (2). If there are reasons that no person can accept or that everyone must accept, then 
those reasons will also be included in the weaker set of reasons defined by (1) or (2). I now turn 
back to these formulations.  
Despite their attractive simplicity, formulations (1) and (2) remain significantly 
ambiguous. Any plausible interpretation of them must identify the relevant class of persons and 
types of possible acceptance. We can see this by considering one obvious non-starter: absolute 
possibility. It is controversial which type of possibility maps onto our absolute, or unrestricted, 
notion of possibility, but it is either logical, metaphysical or nomological possibility. The 
logically possible worlds are all the possible worlds that are not logically contradictory. The 
metaphysically possible worlds are the subset of logically possible worlds that are consistent 
with the nature and identity conditions of things. Finally, the nomologically (or “physically”) 
possible worlds consist in the subset of metaphysically possible worlds with the same laws of 
 
3 Onora O'Neill. “Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political Liberalism.” 
Philosophical Review 106:3 (1997): 411-428. 
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nature as our own.  
Using absolute possibility to define possible acceptance would yield a conception of 
public reason that is vastly over-inclusive. While we should clearly restrict possible acceptance 
to logically or metaphysically possible worlds, these constraints are not nearly sufficient for an 
account of public reason. There are many logically and metaphysically possible worlds that are 
irrelevant for legitimacy. For instance, it is logically and metaphysically possible to develop 
technology that alters a person’s beliefs – call it a “belief ray.” A state would not increase its 
legitimacy by using the “belief ray” to alter its citizens’ beliefs so they accept the reasons it 
offers for its actions. This fanciful example also illustrates that our concern for possible 
acceptance is not logical possibility. It is metaphysically impossible for me to have different 
beliefs only if some of my beliefs are intrinsic and essential properties of my identity, such that I 
would not be the same person (or a person at all) if those beliefs changed. For instance, there is 
no metaphysically possible world in which I was born to different parents. It may be 
metaphysical impossibility for me to reject some beliefs of a very limited Cartesian self-identity 
variety. Metaphysical possibility, however, cannot discriminate among ordinary practical beliefs. 
The theorist of public reason needs a restricted form of possibility capable of confining the 
relevant set of possible worlds beyond bare logical or metaphysical possibility.  
At the very least, possible acceptance must be restricted to nomological possibility. 
Perhaps all we mean by “it is possible for a person to accept r” is that there is some 
nomologically possible world in which she accepts r. In some nomologically possible world, she 
developed different beliefs or she changes her beliefs so that she accepts the reason.  
Again, however, this is not sufficient. The “reason ray” is just a science-fiction analogy 
for the ideological warfare used by totalitarian regimes and taken to its logical extension in the 
dystopian novels like 1984 and Brave New World. In Brave New World, the World State uses 
hypnopaedia (sleep-learning) to mold the beliefs and preferences of Delta and Epsilon children 
so they love the restrictions imposed on their caste. Hypnopaedic conversion is consistent with 
our laws of nature, but this nomological possibility is irrelevant for legitimacy. This argument 
need not trade on fanciful or nefarious forms of belief-formation. There is some nomologically 
possible world in which I became a Buddhist after attending an intensive training program in a 
monastery while a child. It is also nomologically possible for (actual) me to become a Buddhist 
next year by similar means. Neither possibility renders the Eight-Fold-Path a legitimate source of 
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public reasons for me.  
Stated more abstractly, nomological possibility is not a plausible candidate for 
interpreting the idea of “possible acceptance,” because many methods of belief-formation and 
belief-change are nomologically possible but irrelevant for questions of political justification or 
legitimacy. The bare concept of nomological possibility does not distinguish between acceptance 
based on different processes – whether it is “reasonable reflection,” “imaginative efforts at 
enlarged thinking,” conversion, ideological distortion or physical manipulation. Moreover, on 
any plausible conception of human psychology, using nomological possibility for (2) still offers 
few – if any – constraints on the set of public reasons. Perhaps there are a few beliefs it is 
physically impossible for anyone to believe. Yet, generally speaking, humans are doxastically 
messy creatures. We can believe things we do not really understand. We can hold inconsistent 
beliefs because we are unaware of the logical or empirical contradictions among our beliefs, 
reasons and values. We can even hold explicitly contradictory beliefs, thanks to our remarkable 
ability to compartmentalize beliefs. Any theory of liberal legitimacy needs a more restricted 
interpretation of the reasons all can accept.4  
6.2 IDEALIZING INTERPRETATIONS: PERSONS, CITIZENS, IDEAL AGENTS 
One option is to maintain a broad sense of possibility but restrict one of the other key 
terms. Instead of narrowing the sense of possibility, one might restrict the conception of persons 
or methods of acceptance. Drawing on the last problem discussed above about human’s 
inconsistent beliefs, one might try to clean up the conception of persons. Instead of asking 
whether it is possible for a person to accept the reason, one might ask whether it is possible for a 
person to accept the reason if they were consistent, or if they were reasonable, or if they were 
fully rational. On this interpretation, the term “persons” no longer identifies a class of natural 
objects, but instead refers to an idealization of these persons.  
A strictly Kantian account – along the lines of O’Neil (1994) – might combine broad 
notions of possibility with a conception of persons as rational agents that set ends in the world. If 
 
4 We want to restrict ourselves to alethic modalities in which the actual world is among the possible worlds that 
satisfy a modal proposition. Deontic modalities are not alethic. It is morally necessary for everyone not to murder, 
yet many people in the actual world do. We cannot infer from the necessity of A to the truth of A in the actual 
world. That A is true in the actual world also does not support the inference that A is morally possible (it is possible 
that A is moral). 
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one can identify the constitutive commitments for any rational and embodied agent, then one can 
recover a set of the reasons that no persons can accept and that all persons must accept. 
Alternatively, one might rely on a more explicitly moral conception of persons. At times, Rawls 
appears to adopt this strategy. The set of public reasons is not simply the reasons that all can 
accept, but the reasons that “all can accept as free and equal citizens.” The quantifier no longer 
ranges over all persons, but only over persons with a certain set of beliefs: namely, citizens who 
regard themselves as free and equal. Public reasons, then, are any reasons that are consistent with 
the constitutive commitments of free and equal democratic citizens. The defining feature of this 
strategy for interpreting “reasons all can accept” is that, if it is possible for some person to accept 
the reason consistent with the relevant beliefs, then it is possible for all persons to accept the 
reason. The result is that any conception along these lines must abstract from some set of the 
features that distinguish actual persons from one another.  
This abstraction is harmless if it is constrained to universalizations like (3). When the 
idealizing interpretation of persons is used in a theory like (3), then a reason is non-public if it is 
not possible for any person to accept it as a matter of consistency. This element of the idea of the 
reasons all can accept is largely taken for granted in the literature. In the obvious case, we cannot 
reasonably expect others to accept reasons for segregation premised on the superiority of one 
race, because it is not possible for anyone to accept such reasons and regard themselves as equal 
citizens. I suggested above in Chapter 3 and 5 that this is the absolute minimal constraint on 
reasonableness (though far from trivial, since it only gained ground in the last century and many 
nations still ignore it). What makes this idealization harmless is that it openly and honestly 
attempts to abstract from all particular features of individuals. Nevertheless, it is not clear 
whether this conception of public reason eliminates any more than reasons than those that are 
openly inconsistent with equality with respect to rights.  
On the other hand, if one starts with a concept of public reason similar to (1) or (2), then 
the idealizing interpretation of persons or citizens fail to take seriously the idea that legitimacy 
requires us to accept people as they are. Consider Rawls’ specification of persons as “citizens 
who regard themselves as free and equal” that we encountered above in Chapter 5.2.  
4) A reason is public if and only if it is possible for all citizens to accept the reason 
while regarding themselves as free and equal.  
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This theory seems to begin with real people and simply add an innocent idealization. For each 
person, one asks, can he or she accept the reason and still regard him or herself as free and 
equal? However, the role of “while” in (4) is ambiguous, especially because we are to imagine 
that all people can accept the reason. In fact, (4) involves a double idealization. It does not 
simply ask whether each individual can accept the reason consistent with belief in her own 
equality, but whether all people can accept it consistent with belief in their equality. It not only 
abstracts from unreasonable beliefs or irrationalities of particular individuals; it also abstracts 
from the particular beliefs of individuals.  
The problem this poses becomes clearer when one asks how to determine which reasons 
are not public. The question is not whether it is possible for some particular person to accept the 
reason while regarding herself as free or equal. Rather, the question is whether the reason 
conflicts with regarding herself as free and equal. Her specific beliefs no longer play any role. 
Reasons are divided into public and non-public only by their consistency with the commitments 
of free and equal citizenship. This is an alternative argument for Chapter 5’s conclusion about 
Rawls. If the set of public reasons includes only reasons consistent with the constitutive 
commitments of free and equal citizenship, then the set of public reasons is simply the reasons of 
the liberal political conception, and legitimacy is not a distinct normative constraint.  
This problem is not the typical objection that idealizing conceptions of public reason 
exclude certain classes of people as unreasonable. That is not how (4) restricts the scope of 
public reasons. Instead, it bypasses everyone’s particular beliefs. It reforms everyone, asking 
whether they could accept the reasons if they were more reasonable or rational than they actually 
are. This idealization of persons or citizens cannot be constrained. When the moral idealization 
conception of public reason includes a universal requirement, it collapses into a mere consistency 
constraint with its set of moral ideals. Public reason then offer no limits beyond the substantive 
constraints on reasonableness identified within the justification of the state.   
6.3 POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE AND RESTRICTED POSSIBILITY CLAIMS  
If one wants to restrict the scope of public reasons while avoiding this idealization – so 
that legitimacy can be a distinct normative constraint that in some sense respects people as they 
are – then the other option is to employ a more restricted notion of possibility. To develop this 
idea, we must clearly delineate two moments in this idea of “reasons all can accept” that so far 
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have been largely intermingled. First, it invokes a modal idea of possible acceptance for an 
individual person. I propose to interpret the sentence “Adam can accept reason r” as it is possible 
for Adam to accept reason r. When is it possible for an actual individual to accept a reason that 
she does not actually accept? The first task will be to isolate each sense of possible acceptance 
for individual persons. I will identify at least four potential interpretations.  
The second moment in this idea is its universal quantification. It is not clear how the 
universal quantifier and modal claim interact. There are three possible interpretations of the 
relation between the modal claim and the quantifier. One of them can be ruled out right away. 
Assume for now that “persons” refers to a natural class of adult humans in a given political state, 
a class capable of extensional definition. One might interpret “reasons all persons can accept” as: 
(a) There is some possible world w at which all persons in w accept r.  
While (a) seems to capture our sense that there are reasons that it is possible for everyone to 
accept, it does so by quantifying over possible worlds and not over actual persons. However one 
specifies the idea of acceptance, (a) could be made true by a possible world with people vastly 
different from us. This method of universalizing the possible acceptance claim recreates the 
problem from the idealizing versions of § 6.2. If we want to respect the intuition that legitimacy 
concerns respecting actually existing individuals, then we need to universalize the claim of 
possible acceptance in one of the following fashions:  
(b) There is some possible world in which every actual person has a counterpart and each 
of those counterparts accepts r. 
Alternatively, it might mean that  
(c) For all actual persons, there is some possible world in which she has a counterpart 
and that counterpart accepts r.  
Between (b) and (c), (b) is more demanding. Version (b) is true only if there is one possible 
world in which everyone accepts the reason. In contrast, (c) is also true when each of us accepts 
that reason in some possible world, which may be different worlds.5 In the following sections, I 
 
5 One interesting interpretive possibility is that a contractualist may use (a) for a theory of justice and (b) or (c) for 
legitimacy. As I am not currently developing a theory of justice, I will not pursue that possibility.  
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focus on four potential interpretation of “possible acceptance” for an individual that might be 
relevant to legitimacy, considering each under universalized variants following formulations (b) 
and (c).  
6.4 HISTORICALLY ACCESSIBLE WORLDS  
Taking a hint from the ambition of legitimacy theorists to respect individuals as they are 
(and from a possible interpretation of Chapter 4 of Rawls’ Political Liberalism), one might 
interpret possible acceptance through historically accessible worlds. A historically accessible 
world is a nomologically possible world that matches the actual world perfectly until a given 
time, at which a new variable is added and the worlds are permitted to diverge. David Lewis 
famously uses the notion of historically accessible worlds to capture the semantics of 
counterfactual conditionals. If Operation Barbarossa had begun as scheduled on May 15 as 
planned rather than June 22, would Germany have conquered Russia? According to Lewis, we 
evaluate the truth of this counterfactual by asking whether Germany conquers Russia in the 
‘nearest’ possible world in which everything is identical (or as much as possible) up until May 
1941.  
On a historical accessibility interpretation of possibility, Adam can accept a reason if and 
only if 
5) There is some possible world w, which is historically accessible from w* at t1, at 
which Adam has a counterpart who accepts the reason. 
This historical-accessibility interpretation of possible acceptance has several advantages. It 
respects the stipulation in Chapter 5 that a person need not actually accept the reason offered. If 
Adam has a counterpart with an identical history who accepts a reason or value, then it is 
possible for Adam to accept this reason or value, even if Adam does not in the actual world.  
Moreover, it enables us to identify with some specificity what makes a claim of possible 
acceptance true or false. Assume Adam is an economic conservative and devout Catholic. We 
want to know whether it is possible for Adam to accept socialist reasons for state control of 
health care. Socialist reasons are inconsistent with his present beliefs and he vows to protest 
socialist medicine, but that conflict does not mean that he cannot accept these reasons. Assuming 
t1 is the moment at which the putative public reasons were offered, it also does not matter 
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whether Adam’s parents considered attending a Catholic church with a liberal priest when he 
was five or whether Adam would have become engrossed in Marx if he had read The Communist 
Manifesto instead of Atlas Shrugged as a college freshman. Even if Adam would have become a 
socialist under those circumstances, those nomologically possible worlds with a different history 
are irrelevant for the truth-value of (5). However, if there is some possible world (including the 
actual one) in which Adam’s counterpart switches churches or picks up Das Capital in the future 
and then develops an admiration for socialist reasons, then it is possible for Adam to accept 
socialist reasons. Interpretation (5) begins with the beliefs of specific individuals in the actual 
world, and asks whether they might accept the reason going forward. Its primary concern is with 
the possibility of belief-change. Keeping in mind that the actual world is one of the possible 
worlds, (5) is true for Adam if and only if Adam accepts socialist reasons or he or any of his 
counterparts change their beliefs to accept socialist reasons.  
Unfortunately, the historical accessibility interpretation does not avoid the difficulty 
faced by unrestricted nomological possibility: many of the ways in which a person’s beliefs 
change are irrelevant for legitimacy. A states’ legitimacy does not increase when citizens accept 
its actions because of effective ideological manipulation. It seems intuitively wrong to say that it 
is possible for Adam to accept R, because hypnotic suggestion might alter his beliefs. Therefore, 
a proponent of historical possibility must introduce another restriction on the quantifier to 
specify the relevant forms of belief-change for Adam’s counterpart. Because (5) is a 
counterfactual, to evaluate the truth of (5) one must specify the context with antecedent 
conditions that pick out the relevant possible worlds. One must ask whether possible for them 
Adam to accept the reason after what? After the state publishes the reason? After the state 
embarks on a public relations campaign? After Adam engages in sincere reflection? Or after 
Adam lives for a while under a just constitution founded on this reason? 
There seem to be two basic strategies for specifying the relevant possible worlds for 
evaluating instances of (5). One option we have already encountered is to restrict the changes in 
Adam’s beliefs to rational or reasonable processes. On this account, it is possible for Adam to 
accept a reason if and only if 
6) There is some possible world w, which is historically accessible from w* at t1, in 
which Adam has a counterpart and at which this counterpart accepts the reason 
through an appropriate form of reflection (e.g. uncoerced, rational, reasonable, etc.). 
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The alternative is to limit the methods of persuasion that the state may use. On this account, it is 
possible for Adam to accept a reason if and only if  
7) There is some possible world w, which is historically accessible from w* at t1, in 
which the state uses appropriate means of persuasion only (e.g. unrestricted 
deliberation, civic education) and at which Adam has a counterpart and this 
counterpart accepts the reason. 
A full specification of (6) or (7) must specify the appropriate forms of reflection or methods of 
state persuasion without reference to the publicity of the reasons employed. Nevertheless, these 
are the first plausible interpretations of possible acceptance for an individual. Another potential 
option is to combine the two formulations. For the remainder of this section, I will focus on (7). 
Initially, (7) appears preferable because it restricts only the state’s behavior and thus clearly 
respects the aspiration of legitimacy to respect citizens as they are. In § 6.5 below, I will argue 
against (6) as a distinct possibility and that a conjunction of (6) and (7) either inherits the 
problems of both accounts or collapses back into (6).  
The problems with (7) arise as one develops a universalized version as the framework for 
theories of “reasons all can accept”. As I described in § 6.3, there are three ways to interpret 
possible acceptance as a universal claim. For historical accessibility, universalization by (a) 
yields (8), by (b) yields (9) and by (c) yields (10). Assume for now that “persons” identifies a 
natural and extensional class specified relative to a given political community (rather than a form 
of normative idealization as in § 6.2). A reason is public if and only if  
8) There is some possible world w, which is historically accessible from w* at t1 and in 
which the state uses only legitimate means of persuasion only, at which all persons 
accept the reason.  
9) There is some possible world w, which is historically accessible from w* at t1 and in 
which the state uses legitimate means of persuasion only, at which every actual 
person has a counterpart and this counterpart accepts the reason. 
10) For all actual persons, there is some possible world w, which is historically accessible 
from w* at t1 and in which the state uses legitimate means of persuasion only, at 
which that person has a counterpart and this counterpart accepts the reason. 
According to (9), a reason is non-public if and only if (a) there is no possible world where 
everyone accepts the reason or (b) the only possible worlds in which everyone accepts the reason 
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are ones where the state influences citizens’ beliefs in an inappropriate way. This is restrictive 
conception of public reason. I will argue below that (9) is in tension with the idea of the burdens 
of judgment. Despite appearances, (8) and (9) are equivalent. Given the definition of historically 
accessible worlds, the domain of objects in historically accessible worlds must be equivalent to 
the objects in the domain of the actual world. Any historically accessible world must have a 
counterpart for each actual person and no extraneous new persons. The historical accessibility 
restriction, thus, carries with it an implicit restriction to the set of actual persons. The 
quantification over actual persons in the final clause of (9) is strictly speaking, redundant. I will 
refer only to (9) for the remainder, because it makes this restriction explicit. Nevertheless, we 
will see that (9) suffers from the same general problem of any universalization along the lines of 
(a) mentioned above. The requirements of (10) are looser. Rather than needing one world in 
which all persons accept the reason, a reason is public if and only if there is some historically 
accessible world for each person in which his or her counterpart accepts the reason. A reason is 
non-public if and only if there is some actual person for whom there is no historically accessible 
possible world in which his counterpart accepts the reason. There need not be one world in 
which we all accept the reason.  
Formulation (9) is similar to a potential interpretation of Rawls’ argument in Chapter III 
of Political Liberalism, which I discussed in Chapter 5. Rawls might claim that the liberal 
political conception may form the basis of public reason, because it is possible for all actual 
individuals in a free society to support it for moral reasons. Legitimacy does not require an actual 
overlapping consensus, but only the possibility of an overlapping consensus. Since the liberal 
political conception can be justified independent of any comprehensive doctrine, it is possible for 
everyone in the society to come to accept it by altering his or her doctrines. The appropriate 
“procedural protections” are represented by the presupposition that the individuals live in a well-
ordered society that protects liberty of thought and participation.6 Therefore, the liberal political 
conception supplies the reasons that all can accept, because there is some possible world in 
which the state is well-ordered and in which every person has a counterpart who supports the 
liberal political conception through an overlapping consensus.  
 
6 This might also be a mixed account that requires both appropriate persuasion and appropriate reflection. The 
appropriate methods of reflection are represented by the requirement that citizens develop an independent moral 
commitment and embed the political conception in their comprehensive doctrine, rather than rationally accept the 
principles as a mere strategic compromise. 
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Is (9) or (10) a plausible formula for developing a conception of the “reasons all can 
accept”? They avoid several common criticisms of liberal theories of public reason. First, these 
interpretations do not require everyone to actually endorse a single set of reasons; rather, they 
require only that there be some possible world in which we all endorse that set of reasons.7 They 
do not require persons in the actual world to change their beliefs. Second, by beginning with the 
current beliefs of actual persons, they diminish the criticism that public reason relies on a pure 
idealization of persons.  
Any account of (9) or (10), however, will face two difficult interpretative tasks and two 
fundamental problems. First, they remain susceptible to the idealization criticism insofar as they 
rely on the possibility of belief-change. I can accept a reason, on this account, if it is possible for 
me to change my beliefs to endorse it. A reason is public when it is possible for everyone to 
change his or her beliefs to endorse it. Our beliefs are the starting point for any analysis of the 
publicity of a reason, but ultimately it is the possibility that we might change our beliefs that 
makes reasons public. The account must explain why legitimacy hangs on whether it is possible 
for us to change our beliefs. Why is belief-change relevant to legitimacy? Next, the account must 
specify the forms of legitimate state persuasion. To avoid patent circularity, the account cannot 
rely on the content of the reasons used. While there are obviously legitimate and illegitimate 
methods of persuasion, it seems an impossibly difficult task to specify legitimate methods with 
the precision necessary to isolate a set of public and non-public reasons. Fortunately, I need not 
explore these two difficult interpretive options, because the account suffers from two 
fundamental problems.  
First, these formulations are not sufficient to identify the class of public reasons. The 
reason for restricting the state to legitimate methods of persuasion is an intuition that somehow 
legitimate methods of persuasion render the reasons used public. However, (9) and (10) do not 
include any necessary connection between the methods of state persuasion and the content of the 
public reasons in a way that enables them to distinguish public from non-public reasons. A 
reason may satisfy (9) or (10) for some world and yet not be public. Public bulletins are a 
legitimate form of public persuasion if anything is. Assume that a state declares in its public 
 
7 This reveals yet another ambiguity. Must there be a possible world in which everyone accepts the full set of public 
reasons? Or, is it sufficient to piece together a set of public reasons {a, b, … xn} from a possible world w1 in which 
everyone accepts reason a, a distinct possible world w2 in which everyone accepts reason b, … a distinct possible 
world wn in which everyone accepts xn? I think most theorists implicitly accept the latter option.  
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bulletins that it intends to make citizens compassionate by initiating a retributive tax scheme. 
Adam rejects compassion as a legitimate public reason. Nevertheless, there is some historically 
accessible world at which Adam undergoes a conversion to Tibetan Buddhism and, therefore, it 
is possible for him to accept compassion as reason. There is a world in which the state restricted 
itself only to appropriate means (bulletins) and Adam accepts the reasons its offers (because he is 
Buddhist). Intuitively, however, this is not sufficient to render compassion a public reason. The 
counterfactual (7) is true for Adam, and (9) and (10) are likely true for everyone, yet the reasons 
are not public. We must identify some further restriction on either the belief-content or processes 
of belief-change. One might be tempted to insist on some causal connection between the process 
of justification and the belief-change, but that would clearly be too strong. It would classify 
reasons as non-public simply because everyone accepted the reason before the state ever relied 
on it. 
Second, the historical accessibility formulas must rely on a similarity metric across 
possible worlds and this makes the historical restriction arbitrary. It is intuitively incorrect to say 
that it is possible for someone to accept a reason because there is some world in which her 
counterpart, who has radically different beliefs, accepts that reason. There is some possible world 
in which the left-wing populist Michael Moore (the producer of Roger & Me) finally sits down to 
read Atlas Shrugged. Surprisingly, the novel sparks a deep and prolonged process of self-
reflection in which Moore converts to a right-wing Libertarian. Surely, this is an example of both 
an appropriate means of persuasion and of belief-change. Does that make it true that it is possible 
for Moore to accept a Libertarian conception of equality? I think the intuitive response is to say 
that this counterpart is too dissimilar to Moore to be relevant for legitimacy analysis.  
To identify the worlds in which we have counterparts relevant to the truth-evaluation of a 
possibility claim, one needs a conception of similarity to identify the relevant dimensions of 
similarity and their rough thresholds. To identify a counterpart in other possible worlds, we must 
make some judgments about how similar the putative counterpart’s beliefs must be to my actual 
beliefs to qualify as my counterpart.  
Once one accepts similarity judgments, the limitation to forward-looking changes in our 
beliefs seems to be an arbitrary restriction. If one is willing to make similarity judgments across 
counterparts, then why limit the comparisons to possible differences that develop after the state 
presents its putative public reason? Why accept that possible future changes in my beliefs are 
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more relevant than possible past differences in my beliefs? There seems to be no relevant 
difference between a possible world in which Adam accepts the reason in the future based on 
small changes in his beliefs and a possible world in which he accepts the reason now because 
several years ago he made the same change. If Socialist reasons are ones Adam can accept 
because there is some possible world in which he sits down to read The Communist Manifesto, it 
should not matter whether that possibility came true tomorrow or 15 years ago in college.  
Finally, (9) suffers from an additional problem. A universalized version of historical 
possibility along the lines of (9) is inconsistent with the premise of reasonable disagreement. A 
fundamental presupposition of this dissertation, and of disagreement theories, is that citizens in a 
free society persistently and reasonably disagree about the correct specification and application 
of their basic rights. This premise is equivalent to the claim that it is not possible for everyone to 
agree about the basic limits of state authority. There is some dispute about whether this 
impossibility depends on metaethical features of the rights, on necessary laws (e.g. about human 
nature), or on contingent yet entrenched epistemic limits of citizens. For now, assume only the 
weaker epistemic claim. As long as one does not abstract away the contingent epistemic limits of 
actual persons, then the premise of reasonable disagreement assumes there is no historically 
accessible world in which every actual person has a counterpart who accepts the same set of 
reasons for legitimate state action. This tension only affects (9) and not (10), since (10) does not 
require there be a single world in which everyone accepts the reason.  
It seemed promising to limit the scope of historically accessible worlds to worlds where 
the state relied only on appropriate methods of persuasion, but this approach is ultimately 
insufficient. Once we recognize that it must rely on similarity judgments, then the historical 
restriction in general seems arbitrary.  
6.5 IDEALIZED HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS 
I will return, now, to the interpretive possibility of (6). Remember that (6) was an attempt 
to combine the idealization of § 6.2 with the historical accessibility claims of § 6.4. It is possible 
for Adam to accept a reason if and only if 
6) There is some possible world w, which is historically accessible from w* at t1, at 
which Adam has a counterpart and this counterpart accepts the reason through the 
appropriate forms of reflection (e.g. rational, non-coercive, reasonable, etc.). 
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When universalized into an account of public reason, this formulation yields either (11) or (12): 
11) There is some possible world w, which is historically accessible from w* at t1, at 
which every actual person has a counterpart and this counterpart accepts the reason 
through an appropriate form of reflection. 
12) For all actual persons, there is some possible world w, which is historically accessible 
from w* at t1, at which that person has a counterpart and this counterpart accepts the 
reason through an appropriate form of reflection. 
By focusing on appropriate methods of belief change for counterparts in historically accessible 
worlds, the conception of possible acceptance in (6) promises the benefits of the idealizing 
formulas in § 6.2 and the historically accessible worlds formulas in § 6.4 without some of their 
drawbacks. 
It suggests a way to retain respect for actual persons while recapturing some of the 
attractive features of the idealizing constructions. It is possible for me to accept a reason if and 
only if there is some appropriate method of reasoning that could lead me to accept that reason. 
By treating a person’s actual beliefs as the starting point for evaluation, this conception respects 
individuals as they are. And, like the other historical formulations, it does not insist that we 
change our beliefs. A reason is acceptable so long as there is some possible world in which our 
counterparts reasonably alter their beliefs. Moreover, it captures our concern for appropriate 
methods of persuasion, while maintaining the connection between these methods and the 
publicity of the reason. Instead of saying that any reason imposed by manipulation is non-public, 
this account says a reason is public if it is possible for appropriate methods of belief-formation to 
lead to its acceptance. Reasons are non-public if they can garner acceptance only through 
manipulation or coercion.  
Habermas might be interpreted as offering version of the mixed formula of (11). Consider 
Habermas’ justification of basic rights of liberty and political participation. Habermas’ discourse 
principle (D) states that a rule of action is justified if all those affected could assent to it in a 
reasonable discourse.8 In the context of modern law, the preconditions of reasonable discourse 
require that actual individuals can accept political authority only if it ensures private autonomy 
(basic liberal rights) through public autonomy (participatory rights). Habermas’ theory presumes 
 
8 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996): 110.  
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it is possible for actual persons who engage in reasonable deliberation to reach consensus on 
these abstract basic rights because they are a presupposition of reasonable deliberation. These 
rights then constrain further institutional requirements of public discourse. While actual 
discourse is necessary for political decisions that flesh out these abstract rights, the abstract 
rights are fully reasonable even if they do not issue from actual discourse (unlike the dialogical 
principle of universalization used for moral discourse which only yields fully reasonable 
outcomes if it actual discourse occurs among all involved). The abstract rights would be accepted 
by any persons deliberating in the ideal discourse situation. Habermas’ ideal discourse situation 
combines the appropriate methods of persuasion and reflection by insisting that these are two 
sides of the same coin. Individuals who are subject only to appropriate methods of persuasion – 
full and free discourse – will come to accept the basic rights and liberty through the appropriate 
method of reflection – reasonable interpersonal deliberation. 
While this formulation is more promising than the appropriate state methods restriction, it 
remains susceptible to the fundamental problems with any historical accessibility account. First, 
the difficult theoretical task for any idealized historical account is to specify the appropriate 
methods of belief change. There as many options here as there are theories of practical 
reasoning, from rational choice theory focusing on models of inductive and deductive logic to 
constructivist accounts focusing on the conditions of forming value commitments. Any account 
of (6) walks a very fine line when choosing legitimate methods of belief change. The appropriate 
methods of reflection must permit some revision to the content of our beliefs, but methods that 
permit too great a revision of our beliefs will lose the requisite level of determinateness. On the 
one hand, given the controversial nature about moral epistemology, one might be tempted to rely 
on a loose idea of reflection. Such a loose account, however, may make it possible to accept just 
about any reason. On the other hand, one might lean more heavily on rational or reasonable 
methods of belief-change. More strict accounts, however, threaten to limit public reasons to 
beliefs that are broadly consistent with our actual beliefs.  
Consider first the problem with relying on a weak notion of appropriate reflection, a 
problem well illustrated in an article by Bowman and Richardson. (They implicitly assume that a 
weak conception of reflection is the only option for a modal conception of public reason.) They 
claim that it is possible for a person to accept a reason if that person, beginning with the beliefs 
they actually hold, “could, via a reasonable process of thinking, come to accept” the reason. 
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Elsewhere, they ask whether she could come to accept it “with sufficient effort of imagination” 
or “with sufficient effort at enlarged thinking.”9 Although certainly not synonymous, each of 
these phrases represent an intuitively appropriate method for developing fundamental value 
judgments, because they appeal to intellectual but not narrowly rational forms of reflection. 
Bowman and Richardson correctly argue that there are no reasons – short of known false reasons 
– that one cannot accept based on such methods of reflection.  
Their argument is convincing, especially if one stipulates, as they do, that reasons are 
always defeasible. Imaginative reflection may reveal a minimal reason that I overlooked because 
I regarded it as unimportant or vastly overridden. For example, I currently believe that I have no 
reason to visit the Indianapolis Motor Speedway because stock car racing is boring.10 However, 
by spending time with NASCAR fans and imagining racing from the perspective of a participant, 
I might begin to appreciate the skill required to drive a drive around a loop at 200 miles an hour. 
If so, then it is possible for me to accept that there is a reason to watch stock-car races, although 
my boredom has until now vastly outweighed this reason. Bowman and Richardson admits that 
“accepting this reason would mark a change in [my] views of what matters, but nothing 
precludes this change in view.”11  
Similarly, they argue, it is possible for a religious fundamentalist to “come to appreciate 
the value of individual autonomy and find a way of reconciling it with a perhaps narrowed and 
revised version of their religious beliefs,” just as it is possible for a liberal to “come to accept a 
fundamentalism that declared autonomy anathema.”12 According to Bowman and Richardson, 
“appropriate reflection” means open-minded reflection on the alternatives with a willingness to 
revise even our fundamental beliefs and acceptance means only recognizing that the reason has a 
minimal yet over-ridden force. On this conception, (12) will be true for virtually any reason. For 
any given reason, there is some historically accessible world in which a searching, open-minded 
appreciation of others’ perspectives leads my counterpart to recognize their reasons have 
minimal force. A universalization like (11) might yield range a slightly smaller range of public 
 
9 Bowman and Richardson, “Reasons All Can Accept,” 257-58. This position seems similar to the theory of public 
reason offered by Gutmann and Thompson, in which public reason includes any reasons whose “essential content” 
other citizens can “understand,” which means any reasons that “cannot reasonably be dismissed out of hand by 
people who seek moral terms of cooperation.” The final clause may add a level of moral idealization.  
10 They use orchid appreciation as an example but I revised the example to make it easier to follow.  
11 Bowman and Richardson, “Reasons All Can Accept,” 258. 
12 Ibid.  
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reasons, but not much.  
Alternatively, a theorist might use a stronger version of appropriate reflection. If one uses 
too strong a conception of rational belief-change, then it will turn out that it is only possible for 
us to accept reasons that are consistent with our current beliefs. At one extreme, appropriate 
reflection will include only inductively logical reasoning. This is attractive, because it is a well-
defined method and excludes clearly irrational forms of belief-change. On this account, it is 
possible to accept new reasons only if they are consistent with the set of our current beliefs. 
More accurately, it is possible to accept a reason only if it is consistent with some revised subset 
of our beliefs. As we actually hold many inconsistent beliefs and anything logically follows from 
an inconsistent set, ideally rational reflection would need to start by isolating a consistent subset 
of our beliefs. Logical consistency, of course, would provide no criteria for selecting which 
beliefs to preserve. The account needs to be supplemented by a non-logical yet formal constraint, 
like the maximal consistent set (that set that preserves as the most number of our consistent 
beliefs). However this account is specified, it will be unacceptable, because it is precisely the 
kind of limitation that I argued was unreasonable in the previous chapter. To say we can only 
accept reasons consistent with our present beliefs is to treat us as unreasonable, unwilling to 
admit that we may be incorrect.13 As one weakens the notion of appropriate reflection, the set of 
acceptable reasons will expand. One must find some intermediate notion of appropriate 
reflection that permits some changes in beliefs but still provides real constraints. I do not intend 
to attempt to reconstruct this possibility, however, because even if this task is completed, the 
account will remain incomplete.  
So long as the account of appropriate reflection permits belief change, it will need to be 
supplemented to prevent it from being too promiscuous in a different way. If one permits a 
significantly long chain of appropriate inferences, any method of reflection may still result in 
vastly differences in beliefs. This is most obvious when the reflection occurs over a long period 
of time. A lifetime of reflection may lead one from a fundamentalist religion to atheism or 
libertarianism to Marxism. When, as in (6), our concern is with the appropriateness of the 
reasoning that leads to the change in belief, then this temporal distance is not relevant. A vast 
logical space separates the beliefs of Michael Moore from Ayn Rand, but nothing intrinsic to the 
 
13 In fairness, the account does recognize that we do not appreciate the full implications of our beliefs.  
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idea of rational or reasonable reflection excludes the possibility that a long chain of reasoning 
will lead Moore to endorse Libertarianism. As in the appropriate state methods account, the 
appropriate methods of reflection must be supplemented by a form of similarity judgment across 
worlds. And, once we realize we are relying on similarity to determine the truth of the claim of 
possible acceptance, then again it appears arbitrary to restrict the similar worlds to future-
directed differences. 
While the historical accessibility account was a promising way to respect the beliefs of 
actual persons, both the appropriate persuasion and appropriate reflection strands seem too 
permissive. Their account of possible acceptance is sufficiently restrictive to form the basis of a 
theory of public reason only once it is supplemented by a similarity metric. This similarity 
metric, however, renders the limit to historically accessible worlds arbitrary. It is time we 
considered the possibility of resting only on this similarity metric.14 
6.6 APPRECIATION: SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS FROM FIRST PERSON PERSPECTIVE  
Because accounts based on historically accessible worlds must appeal either to 
idealizations or to similarity judgments, we need to look for another alternative. I suggest that the 
best way to understand possible acceptance is to drop the historical accessibility formula and let 
the similarity judgments stand on their own. On my account,  
13) There is a possible world in which Adam has a counterpart who accepts the reason 
and this world is sufficiently similar to the actual world.  
The universalized version used for specifying the reasons all can accept, then, would be either: 
14) A reason is public iff, for all actual persons, there is a possible world in which every 
person has a counterpart who accepts the reason and this world is sufficiently similar 
to the actual world, or  
15) A reason is public iff, for all actual persons, there is a possible world in which he or 
she has a counterpart who accepts the reason and this world is sufficiently similar to 
the actual world.  
 
14 It is also possible to conjoin the two restrictions on historically accessible worlds. One might evaluate claims of 
possible acceptance in historically accessible worlds where the state uses only appropriate methods of reflection and 
persons use only appropriate methods of reflection. The advantage of this formula is that each conjuncts limits the 
other’s over-inclusiveness; however, the conjoined formula would still have all of the theoretical difficulties that 
plague each individual conjunct. 
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The next step is to specify an ordering of the possible worlds that one should use to determine 
the relevant similarity across worlds.15 I will begin with the similarity interpretation of possible 
acceptance and return to the universal variants.  
Instead of asking whether there is some possible world with the relevant specification in 
which one’s counterpart accepts this reason, one should look for the nearest possible world in 
which one’s counterpart accepts this reason and ask how similar or close this world is to the 
actual world. I appreciate a reason more or less depending on the type and degree of divergence 
between these worlds. Of course, the plausibility of this account rests entirely on our ability to 
specify a sufficiently determinate account of similarity to be convincing.  
A notion of bare similarity is not promising. Given the numerous features of the world, a 
person and her beliefs, similarity tout court may border on incoherence. Rather, I need to specify 
the relevant respects for comparison across worlds.  
For guidance, I will draw on an analogy to an account of approximation to truth based on 
“closeness of possible worlds.” Philosophers often regard truth and falsity as bivalent. However, 
although all false theories are equally false, we also intuitively think that some false statements 
or theories are closer to the truth than others. Newtonian mechanics, though strictly speaking 
false, is closer to the truth than Aristotelian teleology. Many of our scientific theories are 
idealizations, like frictionless motion or the ideal gas laws. Risto Hilpinen proposes a formal 
account of closeness to truth, or “verisimilitude,” in terms of possible worlds. A theory is close 
to the truth “to the extent that our world resembles some world where the theory is exactly 
true.”16 One measures verisimilitude by determining how similar the nearest world in which that 
theory is true is to the actual world. One compares the class of possible worlds in which the 
theory is true (the T-worlds) to the whole truth (the set including only our own world) according 
to (1) the size of the region of T-worlds, (2) the shape or compactness of the region of T-worlds, 
and (3) the distance between that region and our world.  
 
15 I chose to use an ordering function to determine similarity because I find it more intuitive, but I assume something 
similar could be constructed using a situation or premise-semantics. One might use linguistic practice and context to 
define a premise frame to identify the relevant premises to lump together, which Kratzer calls “a partition function.” 
Angelika Kratzer, “Partition and Revision: The Semantics of Counterfactuals,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 10:2 
(1981), pp. 201-216; David Lewis, “Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics for Counterfactuals,” Journal of 
Philosophical Logic 10 (1981): 217–234. 
16 Risto Hilpinen, "Approximate truth and truthlikeness" in Formal Methods in the Methodology of the Empirical 
Sciences, eds. Marian Przelecki, et al. (Ossolineum, 1976):19-42 
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This is a promising analogy, because the idea of closeness to truth shares many formal 
features with the idea of appreciation I described in Chapter 5. Verisimilitude provides way to 
evaluate closeness to an apparently bivalent concept in a scalar fashion. Moreover, verisimilitude 
can account for many different dimensions of similarity. Finally, claims about verisimilitude are 
normative judgment about the merits of a statement, but verisimilitude judgments not commit the 
person making them to the truth of the statement.  
While it would be nice to have a precise definition of similarity, we will have to make do 
with a rather messy conception. Any conception of similarity must accommodate three aspects of 
similarity: differences in the facts about the world, in our beliefs and in methods of persuasion.  
6.6.1 Differences in Facts about the World  
Claims about possible acceptance cannot be judged based only on changes in a person’s 
beliefs, although most accounts of public reason focus on the subjective aspects of belief. Many 
of our moral and political beliefs depend on objective features of the world. If the world were 
different, my moral and political beliefs would (hopefully) change accordingly. For example, I 
believe redistribution is necessary, because it is the only way to reconcile equal liberty with 
coercive protection of private property under conditions of scarcity. On the other hand, in a 
possible world without scarcity, because the population is sufficiently low or the resources are 
infinite, coercive protection of private property could be consistent with equal liberty even 
without redistribution. In that possible world, I might not believe redistribution is necessary.  
Thus, the possible worlds account of appreciation needs more than judgments about the 
similarity between us and our counterparts. The similarity judgments should also include 
changes in the worldly context of one’s beliefs. If the nearest counterpart who accepts a reason 
inhabits a world vastly different from one’s own, then this reason will be more difficult to 
appreciate. As the differences between this possible world and the actual world increase, the 
acceptance of one’s counterpart becomes less relevant. While one should evaluate claims of 
possible acceptance in nomologically accessible worlds, we should not rule out substantial 
changes in contingent natural and historical facts.  
Although this aspect of similarity judgments makes them vastly more complicated, it 
represents a significant advantage. An account of reasons all can accept based on historically 
accessible worlds simply cannot accommodate this essential feature of possible acceptance. A 
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world is only historically accessible if all features of the world are the same up until the moment 
at which one wants to evaluate the modal claim. The relevant possible world simply cannot 
involve significant contextual changes in the natural world. A historically accessible worlds 
account could include changes in our belief about the world, but this is a fundamentally different 
phenomenon and subject to very different constraints.  
Which aspects of the comparison world and actual world must be similar and how 
dissimilar may they be? It is not enough simply to count differences. The relevance of any given 
difference depends on its relation to the moral-political judgment at stake and on its plausibility. 
Many differences are morally irrelevant. My ancestors must be the same, because they are 
necessary features of my identity, but otherwise my society could consist of entirely different 
people. However, if a putative reason is only relevant given states of affairs that are 
systematically different from the actual world, then the nearest possible world(s) in which my 
counterpart accepts that reason are farther away from the actual world and the reason becomes 
more difficult for me to appreciate.  
There is a possible world, for instance, in which a Jewish conspiracy controls the 
financial sector, but that world is vastly different from our own. There is also a possible world 
where a few corporations own most television and print media. That world also differs from our 
own, but not as much. While I appreciate the latter as a reason for legislative restrictions on 
corporate election expenditures, I do not appreciate the former as a reason for similar restrictions. 
This measure of similarity is analogous to the idea in the closeness of worlds account of 
verisimilitude. The closeness of the possible world in which the reason would have force can 
provide a measure of our ability to appreciate the reason, so long as we remember that the 
relevant criteria of closeness depend on the nature of the reason. Our judgments of closeness also 
parallel a familiar feature of our attempts to appreciate others’ basic value judgments. It is easier 
to appreciate their value perspective to the extent that we can imagine what it would be like to 
‘see the world’ as they do. Often, this requires assuming that their basic beliefs about the nature 
of the world to be true. The more fundamentally different their factual assumptions, the harder it 
is for us to appreciate. The first major aspect of similarity judgments, then, is to judge the 
variation in the morally relevant facts about the world. 
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6.6.2 Differences in our Beliefs 
The second set of similarity criteria concern the similarity between my beliefs and the 
beliefs of the nearest counterpart who accepts the reason. Reasons are more difficult for one to 
appreciate insofar as the counterpart’s beliefs differ from one’s own.17 I will identify three 
aspects of an individual’s beliefs relevant for the similarity judgment: fundamentality, resilience 
and centrality. I intend this as an illustrative list, not an exhaustive account of the possible 
measures of similarity.  
First, certain beliefs are more fundamental. Fundamentality, for my purposes, is related to 
the functional role of the belief in our system of beliefs. A belief is more fundamental insofar as 
altering it while preserving consistency (either psychological or logical) requires altering a large 
variety of others beliefs. For instance, the idea that space and time are absolute is a fundamental 
premise of Newtonian mechanics. Changing these assumptions requires changing many other 
propositions about the nature of location and movement. In Western legal culture, the idea that 
one official should not both make and apply the law is a fundamental assumption that shapes 
most jurisprudential theories about the nature of written law. This term ‘fundamentality’ may 
seem to imply a foundationalist theory of justification, but a coherentist could interpret 
fundamentality in terms of the number of logical relations between a belief and other beliefs. In 
either case, the fundamentality of a belief is largely a function of the logical and justificatory 
roles that it plays in a system of beliefs.  
A related, but not identical characteristic of beliefs is resilience. Resilience is a measure 
of belief entrenchment. There are several possible measures of resilience, but here I will note just 
one. A belief is resilient if our confidence in the belief remains unchanged despite changes to a 
large number of other beliefs.18 Our belief that the material world exists, for instance, is highly 
resilient. Most people will retain this belief even at the cost of doubting their own sanity. 
Resilient statements need not be significant beliefs; ordinary observation statements exhibit a 
relatively high degree of resilience. For American lawyers, the idea that Brown v. Board of 
 
17 There is a related, but distinct, category of possibility often used in epistemology: doxastic possibility. A world is 
doxatstically possible for a person if and only if the world is consistent with the set of her beliefs (although it may 
include facts about which we have no occurrent or dispositional beliefs).  
18 Brian Skyrms offers a counterfactual, Bayesian account of resilience in terms of the probability that one will 
change their belief given new evidence. Brian Skyrms and Karel Lambert, “The Middle Ground: Resiliency and 
Laws in the Web of Belief,” in Laws of Nature: Essays on the Philosophical, Scientific and Historical Dimensions, 
ed. Friedel Weinert (de Gruyter, 1995): 139-156.  
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Education reached the correct outcome is a highly resilient belief. A legal theory unable to 
accommodate Brown is unlikely to gain many adherents. Specific propositions that are highly 
resilient often form the strong “intuitions” for epistemic methods like reflective equilibrium.19 
General propositions may also be highly resilient, however. Fundamental moral or religious 
beliefs, which are often highly general, are likely candidates for highly resilient beliefs. As these 
examples indicate, numerous factors can affect a belief’s resilience, including (a) its pragmatic 
role, (b) its logical role, (c) a high degree of certitude or (d) psychological attachments. While 
our reflective estimates of the resilience of a belief may affect its resilience, our subjective 
judgments about the resilience of our beliefs are fallible. Resilience is a fact about our beliefs – 
not our beliefs about our belief.  
Finally, some beliefs are more central. By centrality, I mean a person’s subjective 
estimate of the importance of a particular belief. While a person’s judgments about the centrality 
of a belief may rely on its fundamentality or resilience, centrality is distinct from fundamentality 
and resilience. For instance, a person may regard belief in God as a central aspect of her identity, 
even if her belief in God is a relatively autonomous set of beliefs without many logical relations 
to other beliefs (and thus not fundamental) and her confidence in God’s existence is shaky and 
could not survive a large change in other related beliefs (and thus is not resilient).  
It may help one achieve a better intuitive grasp on these characteristics if we consider 
how they operate in a slightly different context. We often make similarity judgments as we try to 
understand people with different beliefs than our one. The type and extent to which another’s 
beliefs differ from one’s own affects one’s ability to understand them. It is more difficult for us 
to understand others to the extent their highly resilient beliefs are different from our own. Can 
the average person imagine what it would be like to believe that gravity does not exist, that pain 
feels good, or that murder is permissible? A person with such beliefs is hardly intelligible for the 
average person. On the other hand, it is difficult but not impossible for us to imagine a person 
whose perspective is based on a different fundamental belief. I can imagine what it would be like 
to believe that events have final causes or that the Bible is infallible. Our success at this task 
depends on how different those fundamental beliefs are from our own and how implausible we 
 
19 When reflective equilibrium is offered as a theory of justification, then these resilient specific beliefs may also be 
fundamental. American constitutional scholars often justify their theories by using them to explain polestar cases 
like Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade and a few of First Amendment cases. 
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regard them. I can scarcely imagine what it is like to believe a secret Jewish conspiracy runs the 
world. To accept it, I would have to alter all of my judgments about how the social and political 
world operates based on evidence that I now regard as highly specious. Lastly, it is relatively 
easy to imagine holding different central beliefs, if those beliefs are neither resilient nor 
fundamental. A musicologist, for instance, might orient his life around the study of Beethoven, 
because he believes that Beethoven is the greatest composer. This belief, while a central belief in 
his life, is neither fundamental nor resilient. He should be able to appreciate what it would be 
like to believe Schoenberg is the world’s greatest composer or that other people have not 
oriented their life around their belief in the greatness of some specific composers.  
Reasoning of this type might form the basis of a rank ordering among these three 
characteristics of similarity in beliefs. A fully explicated theory of appreciation would provide a 
rank ordering among these three characteristics. For now, I must bracket these problems and note 
only that these are the kind of questions that need further investigation.  
6.6.3 Length and Breadth of Argument Chains 
The last aspect of similarity is orthogonal to differences in the world and in our beliefs.20 
For purposes of appreciation, a possible world is more similar to the actual world the shorter the 
chain of inferences and the less narrow the scope of arguments needed for one’s counterpart to 
accept the reason being evaluated. The longer the chain of inferences or the broader the scope of 
arguments required to change one’s beliefs, the less similar the world.  
Consider Adamw, a dyed in the wool Marxist. In two possible worlds, his counterparts 
Adam1 and Adam2 convert to Left-Libertarians in response to rational means of persuasion. The 
experiences that lead them to change their beliefs differ. Adam1 read a brilliant Lockean paper 
about the unfairness of collective ownership in contemporary conditions. The paper led him to 
reconsider coercive interference with liberty, and the changes just rippled through his belief-
system. Adam2 attended the Eastern APA. Always rearing for a fight with his Libertarian 
nemeses, Adam2 attended twenty sessions on Lockean theory. Each presentation offered an 
elaborate argument about some minute disagreement between Socialists and Libertarians (the 
relation between intrinsic and economic value of work, the incentives created by collective 
 
20 I would like to thank Lawrence Solum for suggesting this dimension of possible acceptance.  
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ownership, etc.). Little by little, Adam2 begins endorsing Libertarian positions until ultimately he 
is converted. By hypothesis, Adamw’s beliefs are equally similar to the beliefs of each 
counterpart. Adam1 and Adam2 alter beliefs of the same resilience, fundamentality and centrality. 
The differences in their worlds seem insignificant. The means of their persuasion are equally 
rational. Nevertheless, it seems that Adamw is more similar to Adam1 than Adam2.  
* * * 
In summary, it is possible for one to accept a reason if and only if there is a possible 
world that is sufficiently similar to the actual world and in which one’s counterpart accepts the 
reason. The similarity between the worlds will depend on the degree of difference in respective 
worlds, in the beliefs of a person and her counterpart, and on the length and breadth of the 
argument chains necessary to convince one’s counterpart. This similarity judgment is scalar and 
highly contextual. When made with careful and conscious reflection, whether one appreciates a 
reason is a highly complex question. Nevertheless, we often make such judgment in a snap 
fashion and with little reflection. 
6.7 UNIVERSALIZING APPRECIATION 
The similar worlds theory provides the foundation of possible acceptance as appreciation. 
It explains how a person can accept reasons without endorsing them. My last task is to describe 
how to universalize appreciation so as to provide a theory of the content of public reason, the set 
of reasons all can accept. As with any interpretation of possible acceptance, appreciation can be 
universalized in two ways: 
14) A reason is public iff, for all actual persons, there is a possible world in which every 
person has a counterpart who accepts the reason and this world is sufficiently similar 
to the actual world, or  
15) A reason is public iff, for all actual persons, there is a possible world in which he or 
she has a counterpart who accepts the reason and this world is sufficiently similar to 
the actual world.  
I see no reason to accept the stronger requirement in (14) and one significant reason to reject it. 
According to (14), a reason is only public if there is a world in which everyone endorses the 
reason. Such convergence would contradict the fact of reasonable pluralism about rights. This 
fundamental premise of my dissertation, defended in Chapter 3 and parts of Chapter 4, states that 
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citizens in a free society will inevitably and reasonably reach different judgments about the best 
specification of their basic rights and about their application to particular cases. This fact of 
reasonable pluralism is a strong modal claim. Any possible world in which everyone agrees on 
the reasons for specifying rights must be significantly different from our own. Perhaps human 
relationships are less complex or humans are reliably disinterested. In any case, any world 
satisfying (14) is distant from the actual world. Proposition (14) is not a viable candidate for 
specifying the content of public reason.  
Fortunately, the weaker requirement of (15) fulfills the functions of public reason on my 
conception of legitimacy. As I described in Chapter 5, dissenting citizens are the primary target 
of public justification. If dissenting citizens appreciate reasons that they believe are incorrect, 
then they may rightfully abdicate their judgment to the state even when it specifies rights in ways 
they regard as incorrect. On the intuitive level, each citizen must ask whether the state offers 
good enough reasons. Are they reasons she can appreciate? Can she recognize their “pull,” even 
if she ultimately disagrees? This feeling is common in our everyday interactions with the state.  
This ordinary question invokes the complex modal judgment described in (13) above. With 
respect to any individual citizen, a state maintains its status as public authority if, over a period 
of time, it responds to that citizen’s objections using reasons that she appreciates. When this 
happens, then she recognizes that it is enforcing reciprocal specifications of basic rights rather 
than the private will of particular individuals. She recognizes it as a genuine public authority, 
representing her will to maintain rightful relations. Thus, she may submit to its specifications and 
enforcement of basic rights. For her part, this resolves the dilemma that ended Chapter 4 and 
motivated Chapter 5. 
A state would be fully legitimate if its institutional procedures responded to challenges 
using reasons that each citizen appreciates. A reason is fully public when (13) is true for each 
citizen considered individually. It is possible for everyone in the actual world to appreciate a 
reason, even if there is no single world in which everyone has a counterpart that endorses the 
reason. A reason is fully public if all citizens appreciate the reason. Proposition (15), thus, 
represents the best expression of the publicity of a reason. Proposition (15) is a long conjunction, 
with one conjunct with the form of (13) for each citizen. We must remember, however, that 
publicity, like legitimacy, is scalar. A reason is more public insofar as (13) is true for a larger 
proportion of citizens. The ideal of full publicity in (15) is a limit concept.  
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Finally, I have reached a point where I can provide a precise specification of the content 
of public reason or the set of reasons that all citizens can accept: 
16) For all reasons x, x is a member of the set of public reasons if and only if, for all 
citizens y, there is a possible world in which y has a counterpart who accepts the 
reason and this world is sufficiently similar to the actual world.  
Alternatively, one might identify proposition (16) by first identifying the set of reasons that each 
citizen can appreciate and then finding the intersection of that set for all citizens.  
While (13) and (16) are objective facts about the beliefs of actual citizens, philosophical 
analysis of (13) or (16) is frustrated by the contextual nature of their truth conditions. 
Appreciation is an objective fact about a citizen’s beliefs. In principle, either a citizen herself or 
an external observer might determine whether she appreciates certain reasons. Nevertheless, this 
determination involves a significant amount of judgment. The mere task of determining whether 
any single reason is public, of evaluating a single instance of proposition (13), involves a 
daunting level of epistemic complexity.  
For a given reason, (15) will be true if a proposition of the form (13) is true each citizen. 
Imagine what it would take to evaluate one instance of (13) from the perspective of an external 
observer. Adam, a Socialist, is living in Texas when it passes a law requiring welfare recipients 
to work for the state to receive benefits. Believing this a degrading form of indentured servitude, 
Adam sues to enjoin the law under the 13th Amendment. Texas offers a common Lockean 
justification: a society with near-total private ownership of property must provide some method 
for those who have no means to acquire property, because no one can be entirely deprived of the 
right to acquire new means consistent with the first proviso. Nevertheless, the material needs of 
adult citizens who waste their means do not generate a right to the property against others who 
use their means productively. Requiring welfare beneficiaries to work in exchange for their 
benefits is a just accommodation that meets the proviso without infringing other’s property 
rights. How could I – without engaging in a dialogue with Adam – decide whether he appreciates 
these reasons? 
Any external judgments about whether Adam appreciates a reason will likely degenerate 
into arguments that Adam should appreciate it. I would begin with Adamw’s own beliefs and 
compare them to the beliefs of his Libertarian counterpart Adam1 who endorses this reasoning. I 
may claim that Adam1 emphasizes some reasons Adamw already appreciates. For instance, 
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Adamw’s opposition to the work-for-benefits scheme and Adam1’s opposition to welfare 
handouts rest on a similar distaste for unmerited, forced labor. Adam1 believes it is unjust to 
force taxpayers to work to support welfare beneficiaries. Or, I might claim that Adam1 endorses 
the state’s reasoning because his world is slightly different or his beliefs differ slightly without 
affecting Adamw’s resilient, fundamental or central beliefs. Adamw opposes the schema because 
the poor are not responsible for their plight, but this is a contingent factual claim about economic 
relations of individual people that may be different in Adam1’s world. Adam1 might have 
different beliefs about what causes poverty while maintaining Adamw’s other resilient or 
fundamental beliefs (assuming Adamw is not a Marxist). Finally, I might claim Adam1 could be 
convinced to endorse this line of reasoning by a relatively short and shallow chain of arguments. 
Of course, to do that, I would have to present the argument chain.  
Each of these claims involves delicate judgments about Adamw and his beliefs. I must 
evaluate the resilience, fundamentality and centrality of Adamw’s beliefs, the relation between 
Adamw’s beliefs and the world and the kind of reasoning that resonates with Adamw. Most 
importantly, I will also likely need to determine what Adamw believes about matters that he has 
never considered. He may strongly believe the poor do not deserve their plight without ever 
deciding whether he thinks poverty is a structural feature of capitalist society or a contingent side 
effect of market inefficiencies. If Adam were asking these questions, the process of thinking 
about them would crystallize his beliefs. As I described at the end of § 6.3 above, the process of 
institutional deliberation can build its own foundation. Citizens may come to appreciate new 
reasons by engaging in the process. A particular public justification may bring citizens to 
appreciate new reasons, even without altering the reasons they in fact endorse. From the external 
perspective, I can only guess at what Adam’s current beliefs are or about what beliefs he would 
develop.  
As illustrated, evaluating claims about appreciation involve difficult judgments. The 
hazards of making these judgments for one person should counsel against trying to offer, by 
philosophical analysis of the public culture, a positive account of public reason that makes this 
judgment true for all citizens. This is not a form of modal anti-realism or skepticism, nor is it 
skepticism about the possibility of public justification. For many reasons and citizens, (13) is 
determinately true or false, and we can have justified beliefs about their truth. A person will 
likely make many justified judgments for herself across a range of reasons. However, epistemic 
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humility is appropriate regarding our ability to make modal judgments premised on another 
people’s beliefs. I do not intend to imply that a person has privileged (or more reliable) access to 
her own beliefs. Most of our beliefs are implicit, and we do not even have beliefs about many 
issues. However, it is one thing for someone to ask herself what she believes or what she would 
be like if her beliefs were different; it is quite another for us to answer by articulating her beliefs 
on her behalf.  
What, then, can political philosophy say about the content of public reason? From the 
perspective of a third-party attempting to provide an objective assessment of the publicity of a 
reason or the legitimacy of the state, often the best one can do is survey citizens’ (often implicit) 
judgments about the state’s public justifications. Although in Chapter 3.1.1 I was largely 
dismissive of the descriptive conception of legitimacy adopted by political science, the theory is 
correct, in a sense. The overall legitimacy of a state may be best measured sociologically. Given 
the complexity of judgments like (13) and the number of citizens in modern states, precise 
polling may be the best way to measure legitimacy.  
The political scientists were wrong in two respects, however. First, they accepted the 
wrong target. Legitimacy is not a measure of citizens’ loyalty or willingness to resist laws. It is 
not a sociological fact. Rather, citizen’s loyalty is a function of their present beliefs about their 
rights and the justifications offered by the state. Accurate legitimacy surveys would poll whether 
citizens believe a particular (or a series of) public justification is adequate. Polls should measure 
citizens’ beliefs about the quality of the reasons used by state, as a simple measure of the 
complex modal judgment in (13). Second, the citizens’ beliefs are not constitutive of legitimacy. 
Their beliefs are not self-legitimizing, because they are not reporting a simple belief. Rather, 
they are reporting a judgment about the sufficiency of the state’s reasons. They can be wrong. 
Citizens may be ignorant about the nature of world or the reasons offered, self-deceived about 
their own beliefs, or too biased to evaluate their beliefs or the reasons offered.  
Those who exercise coercive power, however, do not have the luxury of detachment. 
Public officials and citizens exercising political power adopt the internal perspective of someone 
invested in maintaining a legitimate public authority. They want to know in advance that they are 
relying on reasons that many appreciate. Their hope is to foster as many individual relations of 
legitimate authority between citizens and the state as possible. They have little choice except to 
resort to reasons they believe all citizens can appreciate. And, given their epistemic situation, this 
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will often means they have no alternative except to use an idealization about persons that will 
necessarily abstract from the reality of any particular person. In Chapter 6, I explore several 
guidelines for the content of public reason that emerge from this theory of appreciation and the 
institutional conception of legitimacy.  
* * * * 
In intuitive terms, what is appreciation and how does it contribute to legitimacy? A 
person appreciates a reason when it is close enough to the reasons she endorses that she feels its 
pull. Whether it is “close enough” depends on the distance between it and the reasons she 
believes are correct. If her state offers close enough reasons, she will recognize that it strives to 
protect a reasonable version of basic rights, even if not her own preferred formulation. When 
citizens deeply disagree about their basic rights, a state can foster this recognition by adopting 
procedures that empower citizens to demand state agents public justify their actions. The state 
will be legitimate when officials find reasons that all citizens recognize as close enough. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
LEGITIMACY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
A state is legitimate to the extent that it protects a reasonable specification of basic rights 
and justifies that conception using reasons citizens appreciate. Accountability – the ability of 
citizens to insist the state justify its actions according to such a conception of rights – is a crucial 
means for ensuring legitimacy. This institutional conception of liberal legitimacy has wide 
ramifications for the use of public reason and the design of legal institutions. This chapter 
explores its practical implication for the institution of judicial review.  
Judicial review for basic rights supports liberal legitimacy by empowering individual 
citizens to demand the state, as a collective, articulate a reasonable justification for actions that 
affect basic rights. A careful combination of doctrinal and institutional restraints can help ensure 
the state is required to articulate public justifications while reconciling judicial power with 
reciprocity. Finally, the classical doctrine of stare decisis supplements judicial review, enabling 
it to develop a specification of rights and of public reasons that is, in a real sense, not reducible 
to the will of a particular individual or identifiable group.  
7.1 JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LEGITIMACY 
As I discuss it in this chapter, the power of judicial review refers to the power of the 
judiciary to review statutes and legislative actions for consistency with basic rights, whether 
expressly stated in a constitutional text or not. Chapter 2 recounted the principal argument 
against judicial review for basic rights: it conflicts with a procedural conception of democratic 
legitimacy in a pluralist state. If citizens should have (formally) equal power to influence 
outcomes on topics about which they reasonably disagree, and they reasonably disagree about 
the contours of their vague or contested basic rights, then a constitution that permits unelected 
judges to invalidate laws based on their contested conception of rights violates the basic principle 
of democratic legitimacy.  
There are four traditional arguments for vindicating judicial review. First, straightforward 
consequentialist approaches argue that judges are more likely than other officials to select just 
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specifications of basic rights, because they are better educated, more dispassionate, and less 
influenced by political expediency (among other virtues).1 Despite its intuitive force, the success 
of this theory depends on empirical facts about comparative abilities that are in short supply, 
leaving theorists to speculate based on incentives created by institutional structures.2 Second, 
according to representation-reinforcing approaches, judicial review can help ensure democratic 
procedures represent the will of the people by correcting for systemic defects.3 Judges broaden 
representation by preventing the majority from rigging the franchise to ignore minority opinions 
through direct exclusion or gerrymandering or from ignoring them by suppressing speech.  
The third approach tries to reconcile judicial review with the idea of popular sovereignty. 
The people adopted a constitution with basic rights, so judges who invalidate laws violating 
those rights are fulfilling “the people’s” will to restrict the desires of transient majorities in favor 
of the considered views in the constitution.4 The final approach argues that judicial review is 
essential to legitimacy, only on a non-majoritarian conception. For example, Samuel Freeman 
argues that democratic rule is legitimate only if citizens commit to fair terms of social 
cooperation that treat each as free and equal. Constitutional rights embody those fundamental 
commitments, and judicial review may help secure them.5 Similarly, Ronald Dworkin argues that 
democratic rule is legitimate only if citizens regard themselves as “moral members” of the 
community (rather than subjects) and regard the state’s actions as collective decisions of “the 
people” (rather than external impositions). Judicial review may help ensure both possibilities by 
removing certain fundamental decisions from the political agenda.6  
 
1 Michael J. Perry, “Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?” Wake Forest Law 
Review 38 (2003): 654-58; Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, Ch. 1.  
2 Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). The available 
empirical data suggests that there is no statistically significant correlation between the existence of judicial review 
and successful protection of the rights listed in a constitution. David Law and Mila Versteeg, “Sham Constitutions” 
(October 27, 2012), California Law Review 101 (forthcoming 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1989979. 
3 This theory developed around Footnote 4 of Carolene Products and was first explored by John Hart Ely in his 
“participation-oriented, representation reinforcing approach to judicial review.” Ely identifies two goals for judicial 
review: (1) broaden access to channels of political change to prevent a transient majority from entrenching itself; 
and (2) broaden access to the benefits of representative government by demanding a convincing reason for 
discrimination. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980): Ch. IV.  
4 Bruce A. Ackerman, “The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,” Yale Law Journal 93 (1984): 1013-72. 
For a devastating critique, see Jeremy Waldron, “Precommitment and Disagreement,” in Constitutionalism: 
Philosophical Foundations, Larry Alexander ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 271-300. 
5 Samuel Freeman, “Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review,” Law and Philosophy 9 
(1990-1991): 327-370. 
6 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, Ch. 1.  
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My argument is a variant of this final strategy. However, unlike Freeman or Dworkin, I 
do not assume or argue that judges protect basic rights better. Rather, I argue that, over time, 
judicial review develops a collective specification of the minimal boundaries of basic rights and 
a set of public reason that citizens are likely to appreciate. This grounds citizens’ obligation to 
obey, regardless whether judges are better at protecting rights. Judicial review can enhance a 
state’s legitimacy if judges (1) require other branches to articulate a reasonable justification for 
actions affecting basic rights but also (2) defer to the other branches’ reasonable judgments about 
these matters. I will call this combination of features “intermediate judicial review.”  
Three features of judicial practices enable them to enhance legitimacy. Judicial review 
creates a forum for public accountability, empowering citizens as individuals to demand the state 
as a collective justify its actions. Doctrinal and institutional principles of judicial deference limit 
judges to articulating the boundaries of reasonableness and create institutional dialogue that 
fosters public justification. Finally, judicial precedent encourages the judiciary to develop a body 
of collective reasons about the minimal limits of reasonableness. Intermediate judicial review for 
basic rights is an exceptional process: individual citizens demand the state justify its actions, 
various public officials come together to articulate a justification of those actions and a body of 
impersonal reasons develops to form the basis of public justification.  
7.2 JUDICIAL REVIEW AS PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
Jurisprudential theorists are fascinated by an image of judges ruminating over the correct 
answer to constitutional controversies and then declaring their rules in published opinions. This 
image feeds into the assertion that judges select and legislate their preferred vision of rights. 
However, judges are neither academics nor legislators. Both perspectives ignore the role of 
litigation, individual citizens and other officials in rights controversies. Judges are constitutional 
backstops. They review actions taken by other branches based on the arguments presented by 
litigants. A judge crafts the final product, but judicial opinions emerge from a litigation process 
in which many agents frame the debate and supply the reasons on which judges rely.  
7.2.1 Judicial Review as Accountability to Individual Citizens 
 Constitutional challenges often begin when a citizen files a civil complaint (or as a 
defense to a criminal prosecution). The practice has become so routine that we rarely reflect on 
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its novelty. I will begin by describing a simplified version of the practice of judicial review as it 
has developed in the United States, to serve as a baseline for the discussion.7  
In the United States, anyone who believes the state is violating their constitutional rights 
may sue public officials.8 Private citizens normally initiate these suits as individuals, not in a 
representative capacity.9 Public officials normally cannot invoke sovereign immunity to decline 
to respond.10 As long as a citizen alleges that a statute or state action infringes her putative 
constitutional rights, she has the power to demand the state respond with a justification.  
A constitutional litigant does not approach the state as a supplicant, pleading for 
consideration. She need not mobilize a large group of citizens to wield political or revolutionary 
power. Instead, she demands the state explain why its actions are consistent with basic rights. 
Moreover, the citizen-litigant has a chance to articulate her specification of basic rights and 
explain why she believes the facts show her rights were or are being violated. She initiates the 
process of public justification by demanding the state respond to her judgments about her basic 
rights. Judicial review provides a forum in which each citizen may hold the state accountable, 
demanding it demonstrate its legitimacy.  
This makes judicial review fundamentally different from the other central form of public 
accountability: elections. Elections require public officials to face their constituents, empowering 
citizens to hold their representative accountable for her judgment. Even presidents and prime 
ministers must stand before the people and explain their actions. The electoral process forces 
candidates to articulate reasons that citizens appreciate to show their decisions are reasonable. 
Citizens demonstrate with their votes whether they believe their representatives have respected 
basic rights. However, elections also empower citizens to choose representatives whose 
decisions align with their own. In this regard, an individual citizen approaches an elected official 
only as a single voter. Electoral accountability requires groups of citizens to mobilize political 
 
7 I do not purport to offer a fine-grained account of the details and exceptions in American law, and many of the 
details in my exposition are contested.  
8 To be more precise, the citizen must have “standing” to file suits to be heard in federal court, which requires injury 
in fact, causation of the injury by the complained of action and redressability. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737 (1984). 
9 In some cases, however, a citizen may bring a “class action” on behalf of all similarly situated individuals. 
10 The complex body of 11th Amendment doctrine bars some direct suits against states and limits the remedies 
available in some actions against state officials. For example, a citizen may not sue a public official for damages 
under the doctrine of qualified immunity if, at the time, the asserted constitutional right was uncertain or its 
application to those circumstances was uncertain. See, e.g. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
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power. 
7.2.2 Judicial Opinions as the Collective Reasoning of the State 
Moreover, elections only empower citizens to hold individual officials accountable, and 
officials in electoral campaigns do not speak on behalf of the state. Only judicial review 
empowers individual citizens to hold the state accountable as such. Judicial reviews require the 
state as such to explain why its actions respect her basic rights. After the private citizen initiates 
the judicial process, the three branches of government (at least in the United States) participate in 
the public justification declared in the judicial opinion.  
The defendants in constitutional litigation are typically executive officials, even in cases 
challenging the validity of statutes.11 Executive officials have the responsibility for 
demonstrating to the satisfaction of a judge or jury that the state’s statutes and actions respect a 
reasonable specification of basic rights. The executive contributes to public justifications by 
developing the facts underlying the state’s judgments and articulating the state’s purported 
specification. At the trial level, executive officials develop the evidence. They draw on evidence 
collected by the legislature in hearings and committee reports but also have their own extensive 
investigative resources. This role is crucial in the United States because the judiciary has few, if 
any, investigative resources. Judges rely on litigants to develop the facts and may even be bound 
to limit themselves to facts presented by the litigants. The executive’s trial and appellate briefs 
play a crucial role in developing the state’s specification of the right and its justification.  
The executive is highly influential, in part because it has more resources than private 
litigants. Consider, for instance, the United States Solicitor General. The Office of the Solicitor 
General reviews all decisions unfavorable to the federal government, chooses which cases to 
appeal and supervises the appeals. In appeals before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General 
has an overall success rate of 75% and success rate of 89% between 2005 and 2007.12 Of course, 
the executive’s ability to influence judicial outcomes is limited by the soundness of its argument 
and openness of the judicial audience. Nevertheless, executive officials significantly affect the 
construction of our basic rights.  
 
11 If the executive refuses to defend a duly enacted statute, the legislature may be permitted to defend it. 
12 Ryan Juliano, “Note: Policy Coordination: The Solicitor General as amicus curiae in the first two years of the 
Robert’s court,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 (2008-2009): 549, 552.  
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The executive’s role in litigation differs fundamentally from its political responsibilities. 
Elections require officials to justify their actions, but campaign dialogue is unrestrained. 
Elections create a weak incentive for an individual to be consistent with her prior positions, but 
elected officials are not bound by the state’s prior positions. In contrast, when an executive 
official participates in litigation, she adopts the perspective of the state. She must confront past 
judicial opinions and state actions. In many cases, she will disagree with a past opinion, statute 
or state action but must nevertheless argue within its perspective. In this fashion, the executive 
contributes to the ongoing body of public justifications attributable to the state as such.  
Legislatures have less opportunity to participate in constitutional judicial review. In the 
United States, legislatures compile a legislative history and respond to opinions with revised 
legislation after they are issued. In addition, individual congresspersons or groups of them may 
file amicus briefs.13 Other constitutional democracies permit legislatures a more direct role. I 
discuss various options for legislative participation in detail in § 7.3.2 below, but a brief preview 
is helpful. In Germany, a legislative majority may refer interpretive questions to its 
Constitutional Court. In France, a twenty percent minority in parliament may file a challenge 
with the Constitutional Council before legislation is promulgated.14 After the Supreme Court of 
Canada strikes a law, a legislature may ask the court to take a second look or reenact the law for 
five years despite the judicial decision. Judicial construction of basic rights, in fact, is a joint 
effort between the judiciary, litigants, the executive and, in some cases, the legislature.  
In summary, judicial review is a potent form of public accountability that empowers 
citizens, as individuals, to demand the state justify its specification of basic rights. It then 
entrusts the state, as a collective, to articulate a reasonable justification for those specifications.  
 
13 Judithanne McLauchlan, Congressional participation as amicus curiae before the US Supreme Court (LFB 
Scholarly Publishing 2005). For example, 145 Democratic members of the House recently joined an amicus brief in 
Windsor v. United States that argues the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional. 
14 United States federal courts cannot adopt similar procedures, because Article III have the power to hear “actual 
controversies,” which the Supreme Court interprets to mean there must be a particular litigant with some injury or 
imminent threat of injury. However, ten states have referral provisions that permit the governor or legislature to 
request an advisory opinion from the state supreme court. Mel A. Topf, “Jurisprudence of the Advisory Opinion 
Process in Rhode Island,” Roger Williams University Law Review 2 (1996-1997): 254-56 (collecting advisory 
opinion provisions); Helen Hershkoff, “State Courts and the ‘Passive Virtues’: Rethinking the Judicial Function,” 
Harvard Law Review 114 (May 2001): 1833-1941.  
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7.3 JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
Although constitutional litigation requires the state to articulate a justification for its 
actions, judicial decisions reflect the beliefs of identifiable individuals. A judgment is issued 
either by a judge or by a small panel. The judge (or panel) considers the litigants’ arguments, 
selects a specification of the rights at stake and presents justifications for that selection. Giving 
such power to a single individual (or panel) seems to conflict with the principle of liberal 
legitimacy—in particular, the requirement of reciprocity. Judges have no more right than other 
citizens to enact their choice of reasonable specifications. Why should the arguments of these 
judges be constitutive of the public justification of the state? 
Two traditions help reconcile this apparent tension. The first is the tradition of judicial 
deference. Judges should only ask whether other public officials have respected a reasonable 
specification of citizens’ basic rights. For purposes of the theory of judicial review offered here, 
a judge should not select her preferred specification of a right but only judge the reasonableness 
of the state’s specification by insisting it be supported by reasons citizens appreciate. Second, 
through the doctrine of stare decisis, judges engage with and develop a collective determination 
of the minimally reasonable specifications and the content of public reason – together, they 
define the scope of reasonable disagreement. This section discusses judicial deference and the 
next section will discuss precedent.  
Two general methods have developed to encourage deference in the exercise of judicial 
review. First, doctrinal restraints inform judges’ reasoning. Doctrinal restraints provide a legal 
reason – a rule, principle or factor – that judges should consider. These include principles of 
constitutional avoidance (principles that expressly counsel deference) and standards of review.15 
Institutional restraints, in contrast, are restraints that arise when other institutions have the power 
to overrule or influence the political efficacy of judicial decisions. While the American system 
 
15 Jeff King notes two approaches to “institutional restraint:” “restrictive” and “contextual” institutionalism. Jeff 
King, “Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008): pp. 409–41. In 
my classification, both are doctrinal. The restrictive form urges bright line rules for deference, as a general posture 
or within pre-designated areas. In this camp, he includes Vermuele, Sunstein, Adam Tomkins and Richard Bellamy. 
The contextual approach urges judges to consider institutional concerns (flexibility, polycentricity, expertise, and 
democratic legitimacy) when reasoning. King recommends a contextual approach that would apply principles of 
restraint only after the court determines that “existing legal standards leave significant judicial discretion, and either 
(i) there is potential for significant impact beyond the parties to the dispute or (ii) there is a significant measure of 
uncertainty as to a relevant fact or moral principle.” Ibid. 438. Whether judges use restraint as a general method or to 
decide whether restraint is appropriate in the context of each decision, both are doctrinal restraints.  
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contains few institutional restraints on judicial review, other nations have adopted what Michael 
Perry calls “judicial penultimacy,” which permits the judiciary to invalidate laws but the 
legislature can override the judiciary by a majority or supermajority vote.16  
7.3.1 Doctrinal Restraint 
Principles of restraint represent a delicate balancing act. From the perspective of 
procedural legitimacy, one of the worst things a state can do is reject its obligation to justify 
actions to dissenting citizens. Clearly illegitimate states often deny this obligation in a deliberate 
and transparent fashion. They may not have procedures that permit citizens’ to file formal 
complaints or fail to respond to informal displays of dissent through political protest. Often, 
however, illegitimate states adopt sham procedures that provide a pretense of public justification 
while preventing officials from exercising independent judgment, such as by restricting judicial 
independence or maintaining single-party electoral systems. However, even in a reasonably just 
state, a refusal to provide public justifications can damage legitimacy. Principles of constitutional 
avoidance can become a subtle way to deny the obligation of accountability. Doctrines such as 
standing and ripeness have valid uses;17 however, Bickel suggested the Court should use them to 
limit the counter-majoritarian difficulty by avoiding controversial issues.18  
This desire to avoid contested issues is precisely backwards in basic rights cases. Judicial 
review enhances legitimacy by forcing the state to demonstrate to dissenting citizens that the 
state respects a reasonable specification of basic rights. When the court uses procedural 
mechanisms simply to avoid reaching the merits of controversial rights issues, it rejects the 
state’s obligation to justify its actions to dissenting citizens.  
 
16 Perry, “Protecting.” Perry offers an instrumental argument for penultimacy. He argues that judges reach more 
principled decisions, but allowing citizens to override judicial decisions limits legitimacy objections and generates 
dialogue that may lead to better decisions. See also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Judicial Review, Legislative Override, 
and Democracy,” Wake Forest Law Review 38 (2003): 451-470. The American system is often denominated 
“judicial ultimacy.” At least literally, the label is incorrect because Congress and the state legislatures (or 
conventions) may override judicial decisions through the amendment process. The process is simply difficult. 
17 The standing doctrine states that a plaintiff cannot bring suit unless injured by the challenged action and it is 
possible for the court to redress that injury. See supra, n. 8. Standing problems often prevent challenges to potential 
violations of the religious establishment clause. Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 
(2011). The ripeness doctrine states that courts may not hear cases of speculative injuries which are threatened but 
not imminent, unless further factual development will not aid the inquiry and the plaintiff will suffer hardship from 
denying review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Ripeness issues often arise in pre-
enforcement review of statutes and regulations, although also in actions for declaratory relief. 
18 Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale University Press, 
1986): 111-198.  
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Principles of doctrinal restraint should mirror a citizen’s right to a reasonable justification 
for coercive actions that affect her rights. We often think of lawsuits as attempts to vindicate 
rights, but challenges to the laws of a reasonably just state rarely involve determinate rights. A 
citizen is not entitled to have her rights vindicated on the basis of her understanding of the 
content of the right. She is entitled only to have her rights protected under a reasonable 
specification resting on reasons she appreciates and applying to all citizens reciprocally. 
Accordingly, doctrinal restraints can enhance the legitimacy of judicial review only if they do 
not prevent courts from asking whether the state respects a reasonable specification and whether 
it offers a justification in reasons that citizens appreciate.19 Courts can ensure that the state 
remains accountable while restraining judges to this limited question by adopting doctrinal 
restraint through standards of review.  
7.3.1.1 Stages of review and standards of review 
The more appropriate form of doctrinal restraint to respect disagreement about rights is to 
adopt varying standards of review for basic rights. Most constitutional courts follow a two-stage 
process for analyzing basic rights cases. First, the court asks whether the state’s action implicates 
a basic right. Answering this question involves identifying the minimal boundaries of the 
putative right. If the state’s action falls within the scope of a basic right, then the court asks if the 
state has sufficient justification for impinging or restricting it in this case. These stages suggest 
two analytical points at which a judiciary might exercise independent judgment or defer to 
reasonable judgments of other institutional actors: (1) in the identification of basic rights or (2) in 
the justification for restricting rights in this particular case.  
I should caution, however, that this distinction should not be taken too literally. One 
might think about the first stage as defining the right and the second as asking whether it is 
outweighed by other reasons. I think the more accurate description is the first stage identifies the 
contours of the state’s conception of the right and the second develops a precise specification for 
the factual context. On this interpretation, the two stages are not distinct but lay along the 
 
19 This judgment, as described in Chapter 6, § G, must rely on the judge’s evaluation of whether the state offers a 
minimally reasonable justification. An individual citizen asking whether the state action is legitimate engages in 
implicit counterfactual analysis of its justification. However, because the truth of the proposition that all citizens can 
appreciate a reason is inaccessible as a practical matter, judges ought not ask themselves whether all citizens 
appreciate the reasons (“can appreciate” is redundant). The process of precedent limits the extent to which judges 
must rely directly on their own substantive judgments about reasonableness, because it develops a set of reasons 
generally recognized as minimally reasonable.  
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continuum necessary for any basic rights judgments. Nevertheless, the stages identify analytical 
moments that can provide a useful heuristic for analyzing a court’s behavior.  
First, a judiciary may defer to another institution’s identification or definition of basic 
rights. Neither the liberal nor the conservative majorities on the United States Supreme Court20 
have shown any inclination to defer to Congressional decisions about the list of basic rights or 
about their minimal definition. Twice in the 1990s, the Court explicitly declined to reconsider its 
decisions in light of subsequent Congressional attempts to identify or define basic rights.  
In 1993, the Court refused to give any weight to Congress’ definition of religious liberty. 
From 1963 until 1990, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to mean that any law 
which substantially burdened religious practice must pass strict scrutiny, which requires the state 
to prove its laws are the least restrictive means to further a compelling state interest.21 In Oregon 
v. Smith, the Court changed this longstanding interpretation. It held that Oregon was not required 
to create an exception in its drug laws for Native Americans to use peyote in religious rituals. 
The Court adopted a new rule that a law may substantially burden religious practice without even 
implicating religious liberty, as long as it is facially neutral and applied equally.22 Because 
Oregon’s drug laws were facially neutral, they did not implicate religious liberty and Oregon 
needed only show the drug laws had a rational basis.  
Congress tried to reinstate the Court’s prior standard of review in the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).23 RFRA provided that any law substantially burdening religious 
exercise must pass strict scrutiny. It did not identify what laws violated religious liberty. Instead, 
it proposed to define the minimal specification of religious liberty by identifying when a law 
sufficiently affects religious practice that citizens should be empowered to demand a public 
justification. Congress claimed to pass the RFRA as an exercise of its power to “enforce” the Bill 
of Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (among other arguable bases). 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court reaffirmed that the judiciary retained exclusive 
authority to interpret basic rights and that Congress’ power is limited to “remedying” existing 
 
20 I use the United States Supreme Court as my example, because it is the only court for which I adequately familiar 
with its specific doctrines.  
21 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
22 Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
23 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (2010) (in the revised version, the RFARA applies only to the federal government) 
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rights violations, as the courts sees them.24 Congress may limit the federal government to broader 
notions of religious liberty, but cannot alter the basic right of free exercise that must apply to the 
federal and state governments.25 Only the Court can interpret constitutional rights. Moreover, the 
Court rejected any obligation to reconsider its change in light of Congress’ action. The Court 
noted Congress’ “findings” that many neutral laws can hinder religious practice, but then simply 
repeated its conclusion from Smith.  
Similarly, the Court rejected any role for Congress in defining the guarantee of equal 
protection. In the infamous 1883 Civil Rights Cases, the Court concluded that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits only state action, not actions by private citizens.26 In 1994, Congress 
passed the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), which gave citizens the right to sue in 
federal court when another private citizen injured them in an act of gender-motivated violence. 
In United States v. Morrison, the Court held that the VAWA exceeded Congress’ authority to 
enforce the Equal Protection Clause as defined by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases.27 As in 
Flores, the Court acknowledged the “voluminous congressional record” documenting “pervasive 
bias in state criminal systems against victims of gender-motivated bias.” However, the Court 
ignored Congress’ judgment that citizens have a right to equal protection that is violated when a 
state pervasively or deliberately (as in the Civil Rights Cases) fails to protect a class of citizens 
from physical violence by other citizens. Flores and Morrison are just two recent examples of 
the Court’s consistent position that it has no obligation to defer to reasonable Congressional 
interpretations of individual rights in the Constitution.28  
On the other hand, even a judiciary unwilling to defer in the identification of rights may 
defer in “the justification stage.” American courts have developed various “standards of review” 
or “levels of scrutiny” to describe the scope of their inquiry into the putative public justification. 
 
24 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507, 519 (1997). 
25 The court’s opinion concentrates curiously on the legislative history, noting that Congress rejected an early draft 
that would have given the federal government power to make all laws “proper to secure to the citizens of each State 
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,” because that early draft would effectively abolish 
state legislatures. It largely ignored the dispute about whether Congress or the judiciary should define the Bill of 
Rights, assuming that those rights are “self-executing,” so their interpretation is left to the judiciary. Ibid. at 524. 
The idea that these rights are self-executing is, of course, obviously false.  
26 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases struck the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which 
outlawed discrimination in all public accommodations, reasoning that the CRA is “primary and direct” legislation 
but the guarantee of equal protection and the enforcement provision of the 14th Amendment only license Congress to 
enact corrective legislation to redress past discrimination by “State laws or proceedings of State officers.” 
27 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
28 The Court may defer on so-called political questions. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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The more lenient standards of review leave a substantial role for the legislature and executive in 
specifying basic rights. According to the traditional analysis, the Supreme Court uses three 
standards of review for basic rights cases: rational basis, intermediate and strict scrutiny.  
The “rational basis test” is the most deferential. This test creates a presumption of 
constitutionality for actions that involve no “suspect classes” or “fundamental rights.” The state 
action is upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest under any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts. The test applies in its harshest forms to a citizen’s claim that welfare 
or regulatory statutes violate her property or contract rights (or the right to equal protection of an 
economically defined class, like insurers or bakers). An interest qualifies as “legitimate” so long 
as it involves some public purpose, irrespective of the weight or strength of the interest. Judges 
defer to any facts a legislature could have found to show the action is rationally related to the 
legitimate end, even if the legislature performed no investigation, the state offers no evidence 
during the litigation to support its factual claims, the legislature did not even consider this 
putative rationale and the plaintiff proves the legislature was motivated by favoritism for special 
interests.29 Rights that receive only rational basis review may be classified among the 
“underenforced constitutional norms” which the Court trusts the popularly elected branches to 
define and protect.30 Alternatively, one might argue the truly basic aspects of property or 
contracts rights are protected by the takings and contracts clauses.  
Strict scrutiny falls at the opposite end of the spectrum. In the context of the Equal 
Protection Clause, for example, the Court applies (true) strict scrutiny when laws explicitly 
classify by race or ancestry or when officials use facially neutral laws for racially discriminatory 
purposes. Under strict scrutiny, the state must prove its actions are narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest. The state’s interest is “compelling” only if no just government could 
ignore it, and its chosen means are “narrowly tailored” only if they are the only way to protect 
this interest.31 The Court has identified only five sufficiently compelling interests: correcting past 
racial discrimination by public officials,32 avoiding dilution of minority votes,33 increasing 
 
29 Lee Optical of Oklahoma v. Williamson, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
30 Lawrence Gene Sager, “Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,” Harvard Law 
Review 91:6 (1978): 1212-64. 
31 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
32 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989). 
33 Abrams v. Johnson, 521 US 74 (1997). 
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diversity in higher education,34 preventing racial violence in prisons35 and national security.36  
Between these extremes falls the aptly named, but ambiguous, “intermediate scrutiny.” It 
applies to state actions that classify based on sex or legitimacy or that substantially interfere with 
fundamental rights.37 A law passes intermediate scrutiny if the government can prove that it is 
“substantially related to an important government interest” (alternatively, “reasonably related to 
a substantial government interest”). The Court considers the judgment of other branches or the 
states, but it independently assesses the importance of the interest and the effectiveness of the 
chosen means; however, the interest need not be as important as in strict scrutiny and the state 
need not adopt the most effective or best tailored means. Other nations, such as Canada and 
South Africa, have adopted intermediate standards of review in their constitutions.38  
With these levels of scrutiny, the court has adopted three standards of deference. Does the 
institutional theory of legitimacy explain which is appropriate? As always when philosophy hits 
the road, there is no simple answer—but there is a general lesson.  
The appropriate level of scrutiny depends on the citizen’s right to challenge the decision. 
Intermediate scrutiny is typically the best place to start a line of cases to define a basic right. The 
balancing test of intermediate scrutiny may represent either (1) the early process of specifying a 
right or (2) a genuine principle of deference. In the first situation, the initial cases applying a 
basic right identify the interests at stake and adopt a balancing test. These balancing tests 
represent the first, hazy conception of the right. The judiciary and legislatures then engage in a 
back-and-forth process to clarify appropriate interests and the means to serve them. Legislatures 
pass laws, the judiciary evaluates them and legislatures try again. In this process, the court 
 
34 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
35 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 512 (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)).  
36 Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
37 The Court often claims it is using strict scrutiny in fundamental rights cases, but its application of the compelling 
interest test in fundamental rights cases is closer to intermediate scrutiny. The only other situation when strict 
scrutiny applies in practice is when the state targets a speaker based on the content of his or her speech and the 
content does not fall within one of the specially recognized categories.  
38 Section 1 of the Canadian Charter provides basic rights are subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 1998 Section 36(1) of the South African 
Constitution provides: The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law or general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including: (a) the nature of the right; (b) the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the 
limitation and its puçpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” See Kevin Iles, “A fresh look at 
limitations: unpacking section 36,” South African Journal on Human Rights 23:1 (2007): 68-92.  
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should ask only whether the government has shown its law respects a reasonable balance of the 
interests specified in prior cases or is supported by new arguments extending recognized reasons. 
As the courts engage various laws and factual scenarios, they will develop implementing rules. 
These rules identify classes of cases for which strict scrutiny is appropriate (because in prior 
cases no reasons have been offered that citizens can appreciate) and less strict scrutiny is 
appropriate (because prior decisions found similar actions supported by sufficient reasons). 
Eventually, the implementing rules supplant the balancing test as a more precise conception of 
the right.39  
We can imagine how a court might use intermediate scrutiny for its initial approach to an 
abstract right, such as freedom of expression. Early cases adopt a balancing test because the 
right’s contours, justification and impact on other interests are unexplored. Over time, courts 
grapple with the reasons for protecting expression and the means to do so in particular cases. 
They identify topics of speech worthy of no protection (threats) or less protection (commercial 
advertising). They identify situations where the manner of speech must be regulated, and 
encounter ways such otherwise valid regulations may be misused. Over the years, courts develop 
specific operational rules that specify the minimal protections of freedom of expression. For laws 
restricting speech outside one of these well-defined categories, the court can place the burden on 
the state to justify its actions under strict scrutiny.  
In some situations, however, intermediate scrutiny is more than a weigh station. Once a 
right is well-defined, intermediate scrutiny can remain as a true principle of deference. Within 
certain bounds of reasonable judgments, courts may defer to the other branches’ precise 
specification of a right or application of it to particular cases. Several situations may justify using 
intermediate scrutiny as a principle of deference. First, the government may have legitimate 
reasons for using a classification that implicates the right, such as when the state needs to use 
gender classifications for medical treatment. Second, a right’s boundaries may be uncertain or 
highly contextual, such as privacy rights in the face of technological development. Finally, a 
 
39 Sometimes, the United States Supreme Court is wary of the inefficiency, uncertainty and likely insincerity that 
accompanies the legislative role in this process. Consequently, the Court short-circuits the process by simply 
declaring refined operational rules in one fell swoop. However, it rarely maintains these rules. Instead, the initial 
case is usually followed by a gradual restriction and refinement of the original rules (legislatures test the rule 
anyway) or an explicit return to forms of intermediate scrutiny. After Roe, for instance, legislatures kept testing 
specific laws and eventually the Court replaced the rigid trimester rule with the “undue burden test;” hopefully, 
something similar will happen with Citizens United.  
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right may require the state to take affirmative steps, such as enforcing the rules for divorce that 
implement the right to marriage.  
Despite these advantages, intermediate scrutiny has traditionally posed the most difficulty 
for legitimacy theorists. Cases under intermediate scrutiny lack the absolutist tone of strict 
scrutiny that helps judges claim to be following the people’s will as written in the constitution. 
Democratic theorists object that balancing tests involve policy judgments and that judges engage 
in legislation by adopting specific rules that transcend the text. On the other hand, “common law 
constitutionalists” like David Strauss welcome the conclusion that these decisions are legislative. 
Strauss notes the similarities between the judicial development of constitutional rights and the 
common law development of property, tort and contract rights, which is recognized as a general 
success and which no one seems to argue was illegitimate.40  
However, both appearances are misleading. Common law reasoning and reasoning about 
constitutional rights are less similar than Strauss believes. Common law judging is legislative in 
a straightforward way. In incremental steps, judges announce rules that become the “black letter” 
law. Often, common law judges reason directly about the best rule to govern this and other 
similar situations. In contrast, a judge exercising deference should not ask what specification best 
protects citizens’ basic rights. The judge’s function is to evaluate the reasoning of the state 
actors, asking only whether their actions respect a reasonable specification and whether they 
presented a reasonable justification. The state may adopt different reasonable specifications in 
the future or adopt new rights not yet recognized by the courts. On the other hand, the 
democratic objections underemphasize the process of intermediate scrutiny. It leads to 
implementing rules, but these rules unfold based on successive judgments about the sufficiency 
of the justifications presented by the state – not from a specific judge’s first-order judgment 
about the best operational rules to implement a basic right. When the deferential attitude of 
doctrinal restraint is combined with institutional restraints (§ 7.3.2) and a doctrine of precedent 
(§ 7.4), the specific rules develop as the collective judgment of successive judges and legislatures 
about the boundaries of public reason.  
7.3.1.2 Improper doctrinal restraints 
For the same reasons that principles of constitutional avoidance are misguided, several of 
 
40 David Strauss, The Living Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010): 51-77.  
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the doctrinal restraints adopted by the United States Supreme Court for fundamental rights cases 
are also mistaken. For example, the Court has adopted a historical test for defining substantive 
due process rights that limits the ability of judicial review to increase legitimacy.  
The court used this test prominently in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and 
Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). I will use Glucksberg as my example. In 
Glucksberg, four terminally-ill patients alleged that the state of Washington infringed their basic 
liberty rights by punishing anyone who “knowingly causes or aides another person to attempt 
suicide” with up to five years in prison and a $10,000 fine. The Court rejected the challenge 
unanimously. While I will argue that this was the correct outcome, I also argue that the majority 
opinion interpreted Substantive Due Process doctrine in a way that undermines the ability of 
judicial review to enhance the state’s legitimacy in the face of reasonable disagreement.  
The majority accurately rehearsed the two-step framework for analyzing fundamental 
rights cases. According to black-letter law, Substantive Due Process analysis has two stages. 
First, the court determines whether the statute infringes on a fundamental liberty. As the Court 
noted, this ‘threshold’ analysis has several primary features: 
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause 
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, 
objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition” 
and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Second, we 
have required in substantive-due-process cases a “careful 
description” of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our 
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the 
crucial “guideposts for responsible decision-making” that direct 
and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.41 
If the action infringes a “fundamental” right, then the state must meet strict scrutiny (in practice, 
intermediate); if not, then the state need only meet the rational basis test.  
However, the majority then adopted an interpretation of the tradition test that relieved 
Washington of any burden to justify its statute. To “reign in the subjective elements” of 
substantive due process and avoid “the need for complex balancing of competing interests in 
every case,” the majority insisted that a right is fundamental only if western legal traditions 
 
41 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997) (citations omitted). 
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historically respected it.42 The Court’s “careful description” of the asserted liberty interest was 
the “right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”  
With this explanation of the historical test and this definition of the right, the outcome 
was a foregone conclusion. Anglo-American law has prohibited suicide since the twelfth century. 
Assisted suicide was a crime in most states before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. In 
1997, forty-nine states banned assisted suicide.43 Once the majority concluded that suicide was 
not historically protected and, therefore, not a fundamental right, the state was not required to 
defend its statute. Under rational basis review, courts do not second-guess legislatures’ factual 
premises. The arguments for physician-assisted suicide rest on the slippery slope to involuntary 
euthanasia. The only difference between a fallacious slippery slope and a valid causal argument 
is the probability of the links in the causal implications, so courts almost always conclude that 
slippery slope arguments provide a rational basis – unless they rest on outlandish causal 
conditionals or extensive chains of conditionals. 
From the perspective of the theory offered here, it was a mistake for the majority to 
assume that whether a right is fundamental can be settled by a historical survey of whether laws 
historically permitted or banned the activity.44 By relying on a bald appeal to historical facts, the 
Court simply begs the question. Plaintiff’s lawsuit demanded Washington answer the question, 
“Why doesn’t the ban on assisted suicide violate citizens’ basic liberty to control their bodies?” 
Washington cannot answer by saying: “Suicide is and always has been banned.” Other historical 
anti-suicide laws stand or fall on the same basis as Washington’s statute. The issue cannot be 
whether the restrictions are traditional. Of course they are. 
In its haste to constrain judicial discretion, the Court defined the right by a historical 
bean-counting method and ignored the political morality aspect of traditional analysis. The two 
parts of the threshold test should not be separated in this fashion. The appropriate question was 
whether anti-suicide statutes impinge on a liberty interest traditionally regarded as fundamental 
and implicit in the concept of liberty. By divorcing the historical from the moral analysis, the 
 
42 Ibid. at 722. 
43 Only Oregon permitted physicians to prescribe their patients a lethal dose of medication for purposes of ending 
their life. Since then, Washington passed an assisted suicide bill by ballot in 2008 and the Montana Supreme Court 
concluded in 2009 that the Montana constitution prohibited a ban on assisted suicide.  
44 I offer this argument from within the perspective of my theory of legitimacy. I have not tried to show that other 
constitutional theories could not defend Glucksberg by finding a way to identify the “fundamental” aspects of our 
historical traditions in an non-questioning begging fashion. 
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Court obscured the rationale for looking to traditions for guidance in the first place. Law evolves 
in response to social and moral pressures. A sophisticated historical analysis can illuminate how 
certain rights are central to our shared conception of liberty and justice – and help identify when 
our laws departed from these fundamental traditions.  
My objection to Glucksberg’s historical definition of basic rights is not the common, and 
accurate, criticism that this test is easily manipulated to reach outcomes preferred on other 
grounds. Laurence Tribe argues that the historical analysis depends on the level of abstraction at 
which one characterizes the right.45 Once the Court defined the putative right as “a right to 
assistance when committing suicide,” its historical analysis was a foregone conclusion. This 
particularistic definition disconnected the putative right from other rights, undermining any 
chance of finding ways that our tradition supported the newly asserted right. The historical 
analysis of “the right of competent patients to control their medical treatment” would have been 
vastly more complex (or the right “to make momentous personal decisions with significant moral 
and religious ramifications,” as the Philosopher’s Brief insisted).46 While the Court argues that 
the historical test limits judicial discretion and prevents judges from overriding popular will, 
Tribe thinks the Court was fooling itself. The malleability of the historical test belies any claim 
that it constrains justices’ moral beliefs; instead, moral beliefs influenced the right’s definition, 
predetermined the Court’s historical analysis and concealed the opinion’s true basis.  
My objection is that the historical test undermines the ability of judicial review to 
enhance legitimacy, because it relieves the state of any obligation to defend its actions. Judicial 
review provides a forum in which citizens may demand officials articulate the basis for their 
specification of basic rights. If the minimal specification of basic rights is limited by the scope of 
historical laws, then citizens can never demand the state explain why traditional laws respect 
basic rights. The fact that suicide laws are ubiquitous does not support the claim that they are 
consistent with citizens’ rights. Historically, these laws rested on the belief that suicide victims 
face eternal damnation. Such paternalistic religious concern is clearly inconsistent with the 
 
45 Tribe, Laurence H. and Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992): 75.  
46 Glucksberg’s definition of the right looks fair compared to the disingenuous definition used in Bowers v. 
Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Court held that a Georgia statute imposing twenty-year prison 
sentences for “sodomy” (any oral or anal sex) did not violate the liberty rights of two Georgia citizens charged with 
consensual oral sex. By defining the liberty at stake as a “right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy,” the Court 
used the historical test to avoid any engagement with the asserted liberty interest.  
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contemporary understanding of the freedom of conscience.  
The Court’s framework in Glucksberg is mistaken, but its content contains the building 
blocks of an appropriate method. The opinion dwells on the prevalence of assisted suicide bans, 
but in prominent places, it also notes that states are reexamining their laws to accommodate the 
novel end-of-life problems posed by modern medicine. In the final paragraph, it states:  
Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and 
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of 
physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to 
continue, as it should in a democratic society.47  
The Court was referring to the failed ballot initiatives to legalize assisted suicide in Washington 
(1991) and California (1993) and the passage of laws banning it in Iowa (1996) and Rhode Island 
(1997). However, as we saw in Chapter 3-5, ongoing debate is not a justification for deference – 
such disagreement is what calls out for justificatory procedures.  
What matters is whether the laws are a reasonable attempt to specify basic rights and the 
state justifies the laws in reasons citizens appreciate. Accordingly, despite declaring that the 
statute “unquestionably met” the rational basis test, the Court offered six pages analyzing the 
statute’s rationale. It discussed the comprehensive moral and policy analysis performed by the 
New York State’s Task Force on Life and Law and the 1983 President’s Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The majority 
cites the New York Task Force for at least ten propositions about the autonomy of competent 
patients and the well-being of incompetent or pressured patients. The implication is that states 
are honestly considering whether to revise end of life laws in response to the relevant reasons.  
A more nuanced analysis of our legal traditions could further support this conclusion, if 
the court focused not on the mere existence of suicide laws but on their role in our traditions. 
When enacted, suicide laws showed no concern for freedom of conscience, patient suffering or 
patient autonomy. However, modern suicide laws, similar to involuntary commitment laws, 
reflect mental health concerns. The contemporary reconsideration of assisted suicide laws has 
been prompted by new concerns about end of life medical care. Analysis of our traditions can 
inform the substantive question: do suicide laws protect a specification of the right of competent 
patients that balances the relevant concerns of patient autonomy and benevolence? This is a 
 
47 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736. 
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moral judgment, but a judge need not substitute her conclusion about the best specification for 
those chosen by state legislatures. A judge need only ask whether a state has offered a reasonable 
justification that citizens appreciate for the particular law before her – and the answer in 
Glucksberg was a clear yes.48  
7.3.2 Institutional Restraint 
Unlike doctrinal restraints that judges use in their reasoning, institutional restraints give 
other institutions the power to overrule or influence the political efficacy of a judicial decision. 
One might think of doctrinal restraints as self-restraints, while institutional restraints are external 
restraints (judicial reasoning may internalize institutional considerations, a possibility I discuss in 
§ 7.3). Various systems of judicial review can be classified with respect to the relative power 
given courts and legislatures.49 The liberal theory of legitimacy developed here favors what has 
been, in recent years, called “intermediate judicial review.”  
Historically, the debate about judicial review was framed as a choice between the models 
of British parliamentary supremacy and American judicial supremacy. In the United Kingdom, 
Parliament was the final constitutional authority because anything that passed was binding law.50 
By enacting a statute, Parliament implicitly adopted an interpretation of its constitutional 
authority and of the basic rights affected by the statute. Hence, theorists labeled this system 
parliamentary or legislative supremacy.  
On the other hand, if the legislature is not permitted to interpret the scope of its authority, 
then it seemed the only remaining option was to give the judiciary the power to invalidate 
statutes which it concludes conflict with the constitution.51 The United States Supreme Court 
 
48 A state may maintain anti-suicide laws for inappropriate reasons or offer such reasons in public dialogue. Imagine, 
for instance, Washington never reconsiders its traditional laws or it expressly argues it may prohibit suicide to save 
Christian souls. In either case, the state has demonstrated that it is not acting as a public authority by attempting to 
specify a reasonable conception of patient autonomy. The proper judicial response in such situations is to strike the 
law. In addition, it also possible for public officials to develop no meaning justification during litigation, in which 
case the proper judicial response depends on principles of waiver, including fairness to litigants and prejudice to the 
public.  
49 The executive might be given authority to enforce its interpretation of the constitution, but to the best of my 
knowledge, no constitutional democracy has ever rested final interpretive authority in the executive branch. The 
executive’s interpretive power is often marginalized in constitutional theory. However, the Presidency exercises a 
weak, formal, interpretive power through its veto and its role as defendant in constitutional litigation and a strong, 
informal power through his rhetorical power and his power to suggest legislation.  
50 Although the United Kingdom altered it system 1998, Finland and New Zealand retain a classic model. 
51 While an intuitive sense of the regress problem that I described in Chapter 4 was an apparent motivation for 
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asserted this power in Marbury v. Madison.52 A constitutional ruling by the Court ruling can be 
overruled only by a subsequent holding of the Court or by constitutional amendment. The Court 
must rely on the other branches to enforce its decisions and, in this sense, the judiciary is “the 
least powerful branch.” However, the other branches must (constitutionally, not practically) 
accept the judicial interpretation of the constitution and, in this sense, the judiciary is “supreme.” 
This power to invalidate statutes is sometimes called “strong judicial review.”  
Faced with this dichotomy, constitutional theorists vacillated between concerns for 
judicial and legislative overreaching. American theorists, focused on strong judicial review, 
sought to constrain judicial power by urging judges to exercise restraint and defer to legislative 
judgments. In the late nineteenth century, James Thayer claimed judges should defer to the 
legislative interpretations unless they involve a “clear mistake.” In the 1960’s, Alexander Bickel 
urged judges to minimize “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” by using legal doctrines to avoid 
controversial constitutional issues. For the next forty years, the debate raged on in similar 
terms—in John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust in 1980, in the disputes between Bork and 
Dworkin in the 1990s, and in the works of Waldron at the turn of the century.  
Fortunately, constitutional design outpaced constitutional theory. Canada and the United 
Kingdom adopted constitutions that enable a more sophisticated relationship between the 
judiciary and legislature. When Canada adopted its Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1982 
Constitution Act, Canada adopted what some have since called “intermediate judicial review.” 
The Charter enumerates basic individual rights and empowers the judiciary to enforce charter 
rights by modifying or striking statutes.53 However, it limits this power in two ways. First, § 1 
provides that the basic rights are subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Second, § 33 empowers legislatures to 
                                                                                                                                                       
adopting judicial review, the regress cannot actually be avoided. Judicial review simply empowers the judiciary to 
interpret the scope of their own power.  
52 The precise role of Marbury in the development of judicial review is disputed by historians. See Philip 
Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
53 The judiciary is empowered to use “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances,” 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 24.1, which the Court has construed to include a variety of techniques 
from striking a statute, modifying the statute to make it consistent with the constitution, or striking the statute but 
leave it in force for a period of time for the legislature to pass a replacement. Similarly, the Constitutional Court of 
Germany may find legislation null and void; find it incompatible with the basic law and give the legislature a period 
to modify the legislation and suggest revisions of the statute; or warn that it may be unconstitutional and suggest 
conditions for constitutional application. Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Const. Review (July 30, 2008), 
http://constitutionmaking.org/files/constitutional_review.pdf.  
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pass a statute “notwithstanding” conflicts with certain basic rights, including “fundamental 
freedoms” like freedom of religion or speech (§ 2), judicial process rights (§§ 7-14) or equality 
rights (§ 15). Statues reenacted under § 33 are effective for five years, after which the legislature 
must reenact the statute or permit it to expire (§§ 33.3-33.5).  
Accordingly, the Canadian Supreme Court has the power to declare a statute 
unconstitutional, but its decision is not necessarily final. The Charter permits four responses by 
Parliament or provincial legislatures: (1) take no action, (2) revise the statute to conform with the 
opinion, (3) reenact it for a second look or (4) reenact it under the notwithstanding clause. If they 
accept the specification of the right but believe the courts missed the facts that show it is 
reasonable, then they can reenact the statute with more fact-finding to ask the court to take a 
“second look.” If they believe the court interpreted the right or facts incorrectly, then they may 
override the judicial opinion for a five year period under the “notwithstanding” clause in § 33.  
The Charter escapes the deadlock between judicial and legislative supremacy by rejecting 
two assumptions common in constitutional theory: (1) one branch must have final interpretive 
authority and (2) constitutional interpretations must be enduring. The legislature has the last say, 
but it is not clear which branch retains final interpretive authority. If it reenacts the law with 
additional reasoning or fact-finding, the court may retain or alter its specification. If it reenacts 
the law under the notwithstanding clause, then Canada adopts the legislature’s specification—but 
only for now. If the legislature fails to pass the law again in five years, then the judiciary’s 
specification governs. On the other hand, if the legislature does not reenact a law immediately, 
then Canada has adopted the judicial interpretation of the constitution—but, again, only for now. 
The next legislature may reenact the statute. The system adopts settled specifications of basic 
rights, but the settlements remain provisional.  
The outcome of a rights dispute in Canada depends on the power of an identifiable group 
of individuals – either the judges who strike the law or the majority that reenacts it. Nevertheless, 
this outcome should appear less like a bare exertion of power by an identifiable group of 
individuals. If parliament or provincial legislature cannot obtain overcome a judicial ruling, then 
the system could not support its interpretation of the charter right. If a legislature has the political 
will to reenact a law under the not-withstanding clause, then the next legislature must have the 
will to sustain it five years later. Whatever the outcome, the process takes on a collective 
character that should appear to dissenting citizens less like a mere assertion of power by one 
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group of individuals (the bare majority of a handful of judges).  
The United Kingdom has also moved away from full parliamentary sovereignty, adopting 
“weak judicial review” in the 1998 Bill of Rights. The United Kingdom Supreme Court can issue 
a declaration that a law or executive action violates the bill of rights, but these declarations have 
no legal effect.54 The government may ignore a declaration of unconstitutionality and continue 
operating as before. The 1998 Bill of Rights trusts political morality and political expediency to 
encourage Parliament to respect judicial interpretations. British judges must rely on the force of 
their reasoning and their political reputation as neutral arbiters. Parliament and the British public 
have shown significant concern for basic rights (at least of English citizens). After unfavorable 
opinions, the government and ruling party often engage with the merits of the opinion in public 
debates. However, Parliament is not required to act in response and may simply rest on political 
inertia, which reduces the probability that Parliament will react to highly controversial judicial 
decisions under the Bill of Rights.  
The differences between judicial review in United States, United Kingdom and Canada 
illustrate the relationship between doctrinal and institutional restraints. A constitutional decision 
by the United States Supreme Court can be overruled only by later decisions or constitutional 
amendments. Accordingly, the United States relies heavily on political morality and legal 
doctrines to encourage judicial restraint. American judges have incorporated counter-
majoritarian worries into constitutional reasoning, inventing doctrinal restraints like the “political 
question doctrine” and the “rational basis test.” In contrast, British constitutional decisions only 
influence political outcomes by the force of their reasoning and their political reputation as 
neutral arbiters, so it appears that British judges have little need for doctrines to encourage 
deference (except as a strategic political matter to preserve their influence for important cases). 
The Canadian Charter harnesses both doctrinal and institutional restraints. Like American 
courts, Canadian judges may invalidate statutes or executive actions based on their controversial 
specifications of Charter rights. Accordingly, § 1 entrenches a deferential standard of review, and 
the Court has developed additional doctrinal restraints. Deference appears particularly 
appropriate in “second-look” cases when a legislature has revised a previously invalidated statute 
in a good faith effort to accommodate the justices’ prior opinions. However, like the United 
 
54 Human Rights Act of 1998, Article 4(6).  
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Kingdom, the Canadian Charter has institutional restraints permitting a legislative majority to 
overrule judicial decisions. The Canadian Supreme Court must rely on its reputation and the 
persuasive force of its reasoning to convince the population and legislators. Ultimately, the 
Charter relies on political morality and expediency to constrain federal and provincial 
legislatures.  
One might predict that Canadian legislatures are rarely constrained by judicial decisions, 
particularly because the invalidated law must have received a majority vote in the first place. On 
the contrary, Canada’s experience suggests judicial decisions significantly limit legislatures. In 
two comprehensive surveys of Canadian Supreme Court decisions, Hogg, Thornton and Wright 
found that 89 statutes were declared invalid under the Charter between 1982 and 2006.55 The 
legislature responded 72% of the time: repealing the law in 9% of the cases, enacting a revised 
version in 66% of the cases and only twice overruling the judicial decision by reenacting the 
same statute.  
Hogg and Thornton surmise that the best explanation of this pattern is that a Court 
decision shifts the political inertia. Unlike in the United Kingdom, Canadian decisions have 
immediate effect and place the onus on the legislature to respond. A Supreme Court opinion 
creates “a new, judicially created policy status quo” with significant “staying power.”56 The 
majority party or coalition must again overcome the institutional hurdles to pass legislation. Now 
that the judiciary has determined that the statute conflicts with the constitution, the majority 
party must spend additional political capital to reenact the statute. It must be confident that its 
interpretation of the Charter is correct and that citizens will agree.  
Hogg and Thornton call this back and forth process between Canadian legislatures and 
the courts “institutional dialogue.”57 As they recognize, this is a metaphor, because it is not as 
though legislators and judges engage in a conversation. However, their interaction is akin to a 
public debate about the minimal boundaries of basic rights. In Canada, as in the United States, a 
single citizen may initiate a constitutional challenge. The executive must then justify the state’s 
actions publicly, and the judicial opinion evaluates those justifications.  
 
55 Peter Hogg, Allison Bushell Thornton and Wade Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited-or Much Ado about 
Metaphors.” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 45 (2007): 1-65. 
56 Hogg, Thornton and Wright, 41 (quoting Morton and Knopff).  
57 Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, “The Charter dialogue between courts and legislatures,” Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 35:1 (2000): 75-124.  
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Unlike in the United States, however, if the court concludes the proffered reasons are 
insufficient, the legislature has various ways to respond. Canada’s form of judicial review 
empowers dissenting citizens to force legislators to engage in a public discourse about rights. 
First, “second-look” cases enable legislatures to participate directly in the judicial interpretation 
of rights. This additional fact-finding offers the legislature a chance to help explain to judges and 
citizens why the court’s specification is not the only reasonable one. Second, if the ruling party 
reenacts a statute under the notwithstanding clause, the political costs create a significant 
incentive for the majority party to explain publicly why it believes that the statute respects a 
reasonable specification of rights. The five-year limit further ensures that the debate about this 
right remains on the political agenda. Finally, even if the ruling party cannot muster the political 
will to reenact the statute under either option, the possibility of future reenactment gives 
legislators an incentive to engage the court’s reasoning in public.  
As a way of concluding the discussion of institutional restraints, I would like to venture a 
hypothesis about how “institutional dialogue” can enhance liberal legitimacy by developing 
reasons that citizens appreciate. For systems with strong review or weak judicial review, the 
state’s ultimate position is tied to decisions and reasons offered by a particular group of 
individuals: a majority of the court or the legislature. In contrast, the outcome in a system with 
intermediate judicial review is less tied to particular individuals in a single institution. The 
institutional interaction elicits specifications of rights with less concern for their source, although 
an authority remains to pass on their reasonableness. Furthermore, the outcomes remain 
provisional, contingent on the ability of another branch to respond with novel analysis capable of 
convincing either the judges to change their mind or successive legislatures to sustain an 
override. As a result, in a system of intermediate judicial review, basic rights are specified not by 
the preferences of an identifiable group of individuals in a single institution at a particular point 
in time, but by a process among various institutions with individuals entering and departing the 
institutions as the process unfolds. 
* * * * 
Judicial review empowers individual citizens to demand the state, as a collective, provide 
a reasonable justification for actions impacting basic rights. With the right combination of 
doctrinal standards of review and institutional restraints, an intermediate form of judicial review 
can require the state to articulate a reasonable specification of basic rights and public reasons that 
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citizens appreciate, without reducing the state’s specification and public reasons to exercises of 
fiat by the judiciary or the legislature.  
7.4 CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT 
Judicial review can enhance legitimacy further if the legal system follows a principle of 
stare decisis. In this section, I use the institutional conception of legitimacy to sketch a 
normative theory of precedent for basic rights cases.58 After explaining the concept of precedent 
in § 7.4.1, I argue in § 7.4.2 that precedent can enhance legitimacy by developing a stable and 
genuinely collective specification of right and public reasons. In § 7.4.3, I argue that precedent 
for basic rights is best understood on the classical ratio decidendi model instead of rule-based 
models, because judges bound by the holding of prior opinions are more likely to develop an 
impersonal tradition of public reason. Last, in § 7.4.4, I argue that precedent should be entitled to 
presumptive weight, because once an impartial official concludes that a specification and 
justification are reasonable, the fact that she reached this judgment creates a strong content-
independent reason (but not a conclusive one) for subsequent judges to decide similarly despite 
their disagreement with the state’s choices or reasons.59  
7.4.1 The Concept of Precedent 
Precedent is a form of reasoning by authority. The historical fact that someone made a 
decision in the past creates a reason to decide similarly in future situations, one that is somehow 
independent of the soundness of the initial decision. As identified in the present literature, the 
core of any principle of precedent is:  
The mere fact that X was done in situation y at t1 is a reason for doing X when a 
 
58 There are two form of stare decisis. Vertical stare decisis instructs lower courts to regard decisions of higher 
appellate courts as binding. Horizontal stare decisis instructs a court to regard its prior decisions at the same level in 
the same jurisdiction as binding. Intermediate appellate courts give precedential weight to prior opinions by other 
panels, but the U.S Supreme Court is ambivalent about the respect it accords to prior opinions. I focus primarily on 
vertical stare decisis because that is the more controversial form. 
59 The relationship between precedent and constitutional texts is hot topic, with interest largely driven by the 
tensions between existing precedent and the resurgence of originalism. Several originalists have denied that justices 
should respect prior opinions except insofar as they are consistent with the original meaning—in short, precedent 
has no legitimate role in constitutional interpretation or construction. Michael Stokes Paulsen, “How To Interpret the 
Constitution (and How Not To),” Yale Law Journal 115 (2006): 2037-2066, 2065. This chapter does not engage this 
debate. However, I note that the three reasons for following precedent are consistent with originalist methodology 
unless one believes it yields a uniquely correct specification of our rights and application to each case.  
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similar situation y* occurs at t2.60  
Such precedential reasons have three well-recognized features; unfortunately, those features are 
often misunderstood and require some clarification.  
First, precedential reasons are content-independent.61 A reason exists to follow precedent 
that does not rest on the soundness of the precedent’s reasoning.62 This is what distinguishes 
reasoning by precedent from reasoning by analogy. If I follow precedents only insofar as I 
believe they are sound, then precedent is at most a guide to identify the salient reasons. Legal 
theorists use this claim in an ambiguous fashion. Some emphasize that the reasons to follow 
precedent must be independent of the later actor’s beliefs about whether the initial decision was 
correct or whether following it yields the correct outcome in this case. The precedent of doing X 
at t1 creates a reason to do X at t2, regardless whether the subsequent decision-maker believes 
doing X was correct at t1 or is correct at t2. Other theorists omit the epistemic language. They 
write as if the reason exists even if the precedent was in fact incorrect or following it will in fact 
yield an incorrect outcome. The precedent of doing X at t1 creates a reason to do X at t2, 
regardless whether doing X is correct at t1 or t2. This distinction is obscured because precedent is 
often analyzed from the perspective of an actor, usually a judge, deciding whether to follow a 
precedent that she believes was incorrect.  
A second basic question concerns how precedents inform judicial reasoning. Lawyers 
often assume that a precedent “on point” binds judges, preventing them from reevaluating the 
reasons which the prior court considered (or could have) in the precedent case. However, a 
precedent can be authoritative without “binding.” It may create a reason to decide similarly that 
supplements, but does not displace, the underlying reasons. The precedential reason can remain 
content-independent if its strength is a function of the practice of precedent in that context, rather 
than the merits of the underlying reasons. Precedent is “binding” in the stronger sense only if it is 
preemptory—that is, it combines a content-independent first-order reason with fully exclusionary 
second-order reasons.63 Fully exclusionary reasons involve a type of willful blindness that 
 
60 Frederick Schauer, “Precedent,” Stanford Law Review 39 (1987): 571-605, 571. 
61 Frederick Schauer, “Precedent,” in Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (New York: Routledge, 2012): 
123-36, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836384. 
62 As I emphasize below, that does not mean that precedential reasons are exclusionary, so that I may not consider 
content-dependent reasons when deciding whether to follow a precedent.  
63 See, e.g. Grant Lamond, “Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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requires extraordinary justification. Even if a precedent does not create exclusionary reasons, we 
may still have powerful, content-independent first-order reasons to follow precedent. 
Accordingly, we should not assume precedent is exclusionary and keep in mind that whether 
precedent is exclusionary is independent of the strength of precedent as a first-order reason.  
 To illustrate this thoroughly abstract discussion, I offer the following mundane and non-
legal example.64 Employees often expect to be treated similarly, even if doing so is mildly 
wrong. Suppose that, yesterday, a supervisor sent home a cashier for wearing a nose ring because 
she believes it intimidates customers. When a second cashier shows up with a nose ring today, 
yesterday’s decision sets a precedent that gives her an additional reason to send him home too. If 
the decision sets a precedent, this additional reason remains (a) even if the supervisor decided 
last night that nose rings do not frighten customers and (b) maybe even if (though it would be 
odd) nose rings in fact do not intimidate customers. One of these options is what means for the 
precedent to create content-independent reasons. Neither option, however, entails that she should 
conclude that it is best, all things considered, to send the second cashier home. That depends on 
the strength of the underlying reasons and of the reasons supporting the practice of precedent in 
this context. If yesterday’s precedent creates a fully exclusionary second-order reason, then she 
should not even consider acting differently today. If that reasoning sounds bizarre, that it is 
because fully exclusionary reasons are rare, if in fact they exist at all.  
In summary, the core of a concept of precedent is that the mere fact that someone made a 
decision in the past creates a first-order reason to decide similarly in future situations. That 
reason (1) may be independent of the soundness of the initial decision or of the subsequent 
decision maker’s beliefs about its soundness; (2) may vary in strength and need not be decisive; 
and (3) may be accompanied by a second-order reason excluding consideration of the underlying 
reasons. Because the basic definition attracts broad agreement, I will put these refinements aside 
for now, though they play a role in what follows 
A full theory of precedent must ask why act similarly on similar occasions, what makes 
                                                                                                                                                       
(June 20, 2006), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/index.html. Lamond writes that prior 
opinions must be “practical authorities,” by which he means they create preemptory reasons. His assertion seems to 
rest on a undefended conception of rule-following, in which one follows a rule only if one treats all background 
reasons as opaque. This is a controversial assumption about rule-following that should not be built it into the concept 
of precedent, but I consider it as a possibility below. 
64 Discussions of precedent often concentrate on the judicial doctrine of stare decisis but appeals to precedent are 
not limited to legal reasoning. Schauer, “Precedent” (1987). 
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situations similar, and how strong is this reason to act similarly? These three questions isolate 
three aspects of any theory of precedent.65 The rationale justifies the practice of giving special 
weight to prior decisions. The reason must be independent of the reasons underlying particular 
decisions. Instead, it should appeal to contextual features, like characteristics of the activity, the 
decision-makers or the people affected. For instance, a supervisor may want to treat employees 
equally, avoid favoritism and avoid the appearance of favoritism. The rationale for precedent 
will shape a model of its scope and force. The scope of precedent encompasses several issues 
about which future cases are constrained by a precedent, such as whose decisions are 
precedential and which aspects of a decision are precedential. Should stock and floor supervisors 
follow the cashier supervisor’s precedent? Does her precedent apply only to nose rings or also to 
tongue rings, tattoos or any visible bodily modification? Last, the force of precedent concerns the 
weight that precedents carry in future deliberations. They may have minimal, presumptive, 
strongly presumptive or binding weight. The force may vary for different contexts and take into 
account the importance of the precedent, the quality of its reasoning, its age, the number of 
similar cases or subsequent historical changes.  
7.4.2 The Traditional Rationales for Following Precedent about Basic Rights  
The literature identifies two common reasons for the legal doctrine of precedent: (1) 
stability and (2) equality.66 Each provides some reason to follow precedent in basic rights cases.  
The typical justification for legal precedent relies on instrumental concerns about reliance 
and predictability. Variability across cases and decision-makers is reduced if judges follow past 
decisions rather than deciding each case anew. The ability to predict legal outcomes is crucial for 
planning and coordination.67 A complete rejection of precedent would undermine the rule of law, 
particularly for pluralist societies in which sincere judges may reach divergent outcomes.68 
 
65 Alexander offers an alternative analysis of the central features of any theory precedent that combines the rationale 
and scope questions. I think this causes him to obscure important distinctions, such as treating the ratio decidendi 
model as rule-based. Lawrence Alexander, “Precedent,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2010); “Constrained by precedent,” Southern California Law Review 63 (1989); 
Lamond, “Precedent and Analogy.”  
66 Lawrence Alexander and Emily Sherwin, “Judges as Rulemakers,” University of San Diego Legal Studies 
Research Paper (September 2004): 1-36, available online at http://law.bepress.com/sandiegolwps-pllt/art15. 
67 Alexander & Sherwin, 2-3. 
68 Lawrence Solum, “The Supreme Court in bondage: Constitutional stare decisis, legal formalism, and the future of 
unenumerated rights,” Journal of Constitutional Law 9:1 (2006): 155-208. 
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Ideology would become the best way to predict legal outcomes, which would foster cynicism, 
polarize the judiciary and give other officials little reason to respect judicial opinions. Reliance 
can be its own reason to follow precedent. By establishing a practice of precedent, a state 
encourages citizens to rely on judicial opinions and their reliance interests provide a new reason 
to respect precedent. The doctrine of precedent strikes a balance between systemic concerns for 
stability and the likelihood of incorrect individual decisions and entrenching bad decisions.69  
 Predictability and reliance are important interests in cases about basic rights, but they 
must be offset by concern for minimal justice. Most people rarely think about the contours of 
their basic rights, but they live in a realm marked out by rights of conscience, movement, bodily 
integrity, association and welfare rights. While many schemes of rights are reasonable, it would 
disrupt our lives if rights fluctuated in unpredictable ways. Imagine the disorder if a state 
frequently changed its positions about what support rights a spouse is entitled to in divorce or 
about whether citizens have a right to healthcare. Such instability would disrupt citizens’ lives 
and undermine their ability to plan for the future.  
Thus, stability concerns provide a reason to follow precedent about basic rights that is 
independent of whether the decision is fully correct. However, stability concerns must always be 
weighed against the cost of injustice from mistaken opinions. Incremental moves toward better 
outcomes may not implicate stability concerns, depending on the particular context and nature of 
the incremental move. Instrumental arguments for following precedent cannot justify a practice 
of treating constitutional precedent as preemptory.  
Equality provides the second common rationale for a doctrine of precedent. Following 
precedent leads decision-makers to treat like cases alike. This rationale is less frequently cited in 
contemporary literature because it stumbles on a common objection.70 Equality is not a good 
reason to compound one past incorrect decision with another one. A state that oppresses one 
 
69 The instrumental arguments about precedent are a familiar variant of disputes between act and rule utilitarians. 
Law and economics theorists have attempted to formalize the arguments for and against following precedent. 
William Landes and Richard Posner, “Legal Precedent: A theoretical and empirical analysis,” The Journal of Law 
and Economics 19:2 (1976): 264-267. However, more careful theorists note that the importance of predictability and 
reliance vary in ways that make generalization difficult. Schauer, “Precedent” (2011): 17; Schauer, “Precedent” 
(1987): 597-598, 601-602. For example, stable rules are essential for drafting reliable contracts and avoiding malum 
in se crimes, but flexibility is important in economic regulation and predictability is not an issue for malum 
prohibitem crimes.  
70 Alexander, “Constrained,” 9-13; Lamond; Kenneth Winston, “On Treating Like Cases Alike,” California Law 
Review 62 (1974): 1-39. 
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member of an ethnic group has no reason of equality—not even a weak one—to oppress another 
member of that group.71 Two situations are only genuinely equal, as opposed to equal in 
irrelevant respects, only if they are equal with respect to a substantive standard. When we have a 
reason to treat situations equally, these substantive reasons, not equality, do all the work.72 Thus, 
equality cannot supply a content-independent reason to ground the practice of precedent.  
The conclusion of this argument is overstated because it relies on a false dichotomy. As 
Lamond argues,73 and Alexander grudgingly acknowledged,74 equality has independent bite if 
the precedent was neither correct nor incorrect. If a precedent was underdetermined based on the 
relevant reasons, then equal treatment may supply a new reason to follow the past decision in 
subsequent situations.75 Once an “arbitrary” decision was made to treat parties one way in the 
past, then the importance of treating citizens equally may tip the balance in future cases that are 
similarly underdetermined.  
This equality argument is often relevant in decisions about basic rights. In Chapter 3, I 
argued that many basic rights are subject to persistent and reasonable disagreement because they 
are vague or contested. Accordingly, decisions about how to specify these rights are often 
underdetermined, though not “arbitrary” in the sense of without any reason. Once a state chooses 
a specification, then this historical fact generates a reason of equal treatment to decide 
subsequent situations similarly. Again, this reason only applies if the decision was 
underdetermined. Accordingly, equality only justifies a practice of precedent in which decision-
makers ensure that the prior precedents are reasonable before following them—that is, insofar as 
they fall within the vague or contested boundaries of our basic rights.  
7.4.3 The Liberal Legitimacy Rationale for Following Precedent about Basic Rights  
Another rational for precedent, thus far only implicit in the literature, is that it enhances 
liberal legitimacy. Unlike reliability and equality, this legitimacy rationale applies only to 
precedent of a public authority. In a legitimate state, citizens may challenge laws that affect basic 
rights and public officials respond with reasons the citizens appreciate. A doctrine of stare 
 
71 Alexander, “Constrained,” 10. 
72 Schauer, “Precedent” (1987), 595-96. 
73 Lamond, “Precedent and Analogy.” 
74 Alexander and Shirwin, 3-4. 
75 Schauer, “Precedent” (1987): 598. 
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decisis increases the likelihood citizens will appreciate the reasons offered by (1) slowing the 
pace of change and ensuring consistent reasoning across time and (2) developing a genuinely 
impersonal and collective set of public reasons.  
First, a state will diminish its legitimacy by frequently altering its specification of basic 
rights or varying the reasons it uses to specify rights, because such variability (1) suggests the 
state is not attempting to respect rights but simply the agent of the momentarily most powerful 
private agents in society and (2) makes it more difficult for citizens to recognize when the state 
is, in fact, using reasons they appreciate. Suppose the final constitutional authority does not 
consider itself bound by prior decisions. Out of sincere commitment to justice, it reevaluates 
each basic rights challenge anew. Past decisions factor into its decision-making only if changing 
them will disrupt predictability or reliance. Alexander calls this a “result-oriented” conception 
and Solum calls it an instrumentalist conception of precedent.76  
Even if these sincere officials can offer a justification using reasons that citizens 
appreciate, the state’s reasoning and outcomes will vary dramatically depending on which 
official evaluates the case. This volatility diminishes the state’s legitimacy. The fluctuating 
justifications reduce the probability that citizens will recognize when the authority offers reasons 
they appreciate. When a judge is unwilling to defer to her peers’ past judgments, there is less 
chance that citizens will listen to those reasons either, especially when the judge reaches 
outcomes which they do not accept or uses reasons which they do not endorse. Even if the 
reasons conflict only minimally with citizen’s resilient, entrenched or central reasons, citizens 
are unlikely to respond when they must repeatedly engage in the complex reflection necessary to 
appreciate reasons they do not accept. Moreover, volatility can foster cynicism even for citizens 
who realize the authority uses reasons they appreciate. The more outcomes change based on the 
ideological persuasion of the officials who happen to hold office at the moment, the more the 
state appears to favor the preferred specification of powerful individuals. From the perspective of 
a dissenting citizen, deferring to such choices (even if the officials are sincere) is no different 
from deferring to the reasonable choices of another individual in the absence of a state.  
Unless officials defer to reasonable justifications that they do not endorse, acts of public 
justification are less likely to serve their function of demonstrating that public officials are 
 
76 Lawrence Solum, “Supreme Court in Bondage,” 167. It is worth noting that the court exhibits only instrumental 
concern for precedent, but the reasoning of its underlying opinions may not be instrumentalist. 
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neutral arbiter of rights disputes. Stare decisis requires judges to following prior outcomes even 
if they disagree with their reasoning. When officials give more weight to past reasons than they 
believe is otherwise warranted, they demonstrate their commitment to reasonable disagreement. 
Moreover, the stability that stare decisis provides gives citizens time to process any novel 
specifications of rights or novel reasons that emerge. By encouraging stable public reasoning and 
specifications of rights, a doctrine of precedent increases the likelihood that the state’s acts of 
public justifications will convince citizens that it is fulfilling its role as a public authority.  
Second, stare decisis encourages the development of a genuinely collective set of public 
reasons about basic rights and their minimal boundaries. Stare decisis prevents a judge from 
altering the law according to the whims of her practical reasoning. Her decision must engage and 
cohere with a body of law issued over time by many individuals. An individual crafted each 
opinion and issued each judgment, but eventually a body of reasoning emerges that is not limited 
to any particular individual. The state no longer relies only on the sincere reasoning of individual 
officials to establish the publicity of its justifications, but can require individuals to adopt the 
perspective of this impersonal body of reasons. A doctrine of constitutional precedent can 
develop a schema of rights and a body of reason that are attributable, in a real sense, to the public 
authority as a collective. 
This development is particularly germane for precedent about basic rights. Judicial 
minimalism maintains that judges should ask only whether the state has justified its specification 
in reasons that citizens appreciate. When the scope of a judge’s inquiry is thus limited, she has 
even greater reason to respect her colleagues’ past judgment. When a precedential decision only 
determines that the public justification was reasonable, subsequent courts cannot overrule that 
opinion because they believe the reasoning or factual analysis was flawed; they must determine 
that it exceeded the boundaries of minimal reasonableness.  
A system with both stare decisis and judicial minimalism develops a collective tradition 
of public reasoning about the minimal specification of basic rights and the relevant reasons for 
specifying rights. As I described above in Chapter 3, the scope of reasonable disagreement is 
defined by the publicly shared understanding of basic rights and by conclusions reached from 
that shared understanding using recognizable reasons. In essence, judicial review can help define 
the scope of reasonable disagreement.  
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7.4.4 Two Models of the Scope of Constitutional Precedent  
While all three rationales support some doctrine of precedent about basic rights, the 
legitimacy rational is best served by a specific model about the scope and force of precedent. The 
first step in reasoning by precedent is determining whether a past decision qualifies as precedent. 
Should the supervisor’s choice about nose rings apply to nose studs, tongue rings, earrings and 
body tattoos? Should it apply to women? Does it matter that she only told him nose-rings violate 
uniform policy, or does it matter that her real concern was that nose-rings intimidate customers? 
To decide if the new case “falls under” the domain of the precedent, one must identify the salient 
dimensions of similarity between the past and current decisions. If a new case falls in the domain 
of a precedent, then the mere existence of the precedent creates a content-independent reason to 
act similarly. If not, the prior case presents only an analogous situation that can help identify 
persuasive reasons.77 The question of the scope of precedent has aspects: (1) whose past 
decisions have precedential force, (2) what aspects of a past decision have precedential force, 
and (3) what set of future cases does a precedent constrain?  
I begin with the latter two questions, both of which concern the relevant aspects of 
similarity. Jurisprudence recognizes at least two plausible models: the ratio decidendi model and 
the explicit rules model.78 Judges may be constrained in cases with similar facts and reasons or 
only in cases covered by the rule announced in the decision.79  
7.4.4.1 The ratio decidendi model and legitimacy  
The traditional answer in Anglo-American common law is that subsequent courts are 
 
77 The necessity of determining whether the cases are similar when determining if the precedent applies can 
misleading suggest that precedent is a form of reasoning by analogy. Reasoning by analogy, however, cannot supply 
content-independent reasons. Analogizing a new decision to a given past decision only provides a reason to act 
similarly insofar as the analogous decision was correct in the first place; if the given decision was mistaken, it has no 
bearing on what to do in a new case.  
78 ‘Ratio decidendi’ is often treated as synonymous with ‘holding,’ but the latter is misleading because lawyers often 
use it to refer to a court’s explicit statements announced with “We hold that…” In that case, it refers to a legislative 
holding as in the rule model. In addition, theorists sometimes confuse the two models by saying things like the 
holding is “an implicit rule” or “the minimum rule (whether or not expressly articulated) necessary to explain the 
outcome of the case.” Landes and Posner, 249-250. 
79 The justification of a precedent might also be binding if subsequent courts use the principles justifying the 
precedent. This model quickly merges with coherence-based theories of jurisprudence like Dworkin’s Law as 
Integrity. In such a coherence-based theory of precedent, every decision would be precedent for every other, rather 
than only for cases within its scope. Courts are never bound to follow a precedent case but are bound to follow the 
system of principles that best fit and justify a group of cases. The current case is controlled by all cases on similar 
topics, or in this field of law or in the legal system as a whole. The question of the scope of specific precedent case 
reappears as a question about its role in this holistic system: what aspect of an opinion supplies the element of 
constraint we should use to measure the fit of our principles within this set of cases, legal field or legal system?  
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constrained by a precedent’s ratio decidendi.80 The phrase translates as “the reason for the 
decision,” but it refers to some combination of the necessary and sufficient legal reasons and 
salient facts.81 If one imagines a legal ruling as a classical syllogism, subsequent courts are 
limited by its major and minor premise. They should be hesitant, however, to extend the ruling 
beyond its minor premise, even if its explicit major premise is broader. 
On this model, much hangs on how subsequent courts describe a precedent’s relevant 
facts and reasons. The court’s explicit reasoning in the decision provides guidance, but later 
courts exercise discretion when framing the ratio of a precedent. The court cannot announce its 
rule in a single case to control all futures cases. Doctrines emerge gradually as a series of cases 
reach similar results based on similar facts and reasons. Although the supervisor’s may claim 
that he is sending the first employee home because employees cannot wear paraphernalia that 
distracts customers, the store has only adopted this rule once employees are sent home for 
obnoxious hats and extensive body tattoos, but not for discrete tongue rings or tattoos. 
The ratio decidendi approach is commonly touted as a means to increase stability and 
equality. Case-by-case adjudication protects reliance by slowing change, while permitting 
gradual progress. If citizens know that judges alter the law moderately and only in response to 
new facts and new reasons, they can rely on the predictability of the law in all but marginal 
cases. If a case involves novel facts, then citizens can predict outcomes based on the reasoning of 
previous opinions. If the legal principles are underdetermined or are the subject of epistemic 
disagreement, then citizens can rely on similar facts to predict equal outcomes. 
The ratio decidendi model is particularly suited to enhance a state’s legitimacy, for 
several reasons. First, the specification and justifications of rights will be more consistent over 
time if officials must follow prior reasoning and facts, as opposed to merely following rules. 
Even if an official disagrees with the reasoning of a precedent, she should follow the reasons 
recognized by the precedent as appropriate for this type of case. For instance, even officials who 
doubt the “marketplace of truth” theory of free speech should still use it to evaluate laws that 
regulate the internet or campaign speech. Furthermore, if officials follow similar facts, even if 
 
80 See Arthur Goodhart, “Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” Yale Law Journal 40 (1930): 161-83. 
81 Alexander, confusingly, insists that the ratio decidendi model is a version of the rule-based model with a different 
method for abstracting the general rule. The ratio decidendi model, however, differs precisely because the court’s 
own formulation of the rule is not what binds subsequent courts. The text of an opinion provides a guide, but it is 
only a guide to identify the relevant combination of legal reasons and facts.  
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the justification for the right or its application to these facts is controversial, then a right should 
develop consistently around its vague or contested contours. For example, officials should 
expand the right to bear arms by careful consideration of the similarities and differences among 
classes of weapons and types of restrictions.82 
Second, the ratio decidendi model helps the state develop a tradition of reasoning about 
rights that is not reducible to the beliefs of any individual. Instead of engaging directly with the 
moral disputes that sustain disagreement about the right, officials analyze the right through a 
tradition of thought. By analyzing the facts and reasoning of past cases, an official demonstrates 
that she is committed to expounding the state’s scheme of basic rights. She is not simply 
enacting her preferred version of the disputed right. By following a precedent’s ratio decidendi, 
officials develop an impersonal tradition of reasoning and increase the probability that dissenting 
citizens will appreciate any novel reasons that emerge and recognize the state’s specification as 
reasonable. 
The ratio decidendi model further enhances the legitimacy of institutions exercising the 
minimal form of judicial review I described in § 7.3. The judiciary acts as a gatekeeper for basic 
rights, demanding the state justify any actions that impinge on basic rights, but upholding the 
state’s actions if it articulates reasons that citizens appreciate. Thus, a court should uphold a state 
action if it finds that the state’s proffered reasons fall within the bounds of minimal 
reasonableness. Consequently, a subsequent court cannot overrule the precedent merely by 
disagreeing with the described specification—the ratio decidendi is consistent with various 
reasonable specifications. The overruling court must conclude that the prior court wrongly 
pronounced these reasons as within the bounds of minimal reasonableness.  
When a precedent about basic rights adopts this deferential reasoning, a court that wants 
to overrule it must conclude that the precedent rested on something other than judgments about 
the law’s reasonableness: bias, moral blindness or perhaps sincere but over-zealous pursuit of the 
best specification. It must conclude that the prior court abandoned its obligation to exercise 
public judgment. Thus, a court that frequently overrules precedent does more than foster the 
cynical impression that its decisions are not principled judgments—it endorses this cynical 
 
82 This paragraph explains why, contrary to Alexander, a reason-based account of precedent does not collapse into 
doing what the balance of reasons requires. Stare decisis requires judges to follow justifications they regard as 
ultimately wrong and, thus, reach outcomes they would have regarded as incorrect absent the existing precedent.  
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conclusion. In summary, the ratio decidendi model of precedent’s scope facilitates equal results, 
promotes stability and is particularly well suited to enhance the state’s legitimacy.  
7.4.4.2 Underdeterminacy and the rule model  
The ratio decidendi model has a well-known problem. The range of salient facts and 
legal principles permit a holding to be extracted at various levels of generality, leading 
interpreters to disagree about a precedent’s precise scope. Judges and lawyers can manipulate the 
description of a precedent to rationalize outcomes they prefer for self-interested or ideological 
reasons. Jaded by this process, critical theorists argue that it is naïve to belief judges can identify 
holdings objectively. Underdeterminacy troubles even formalists. Schauer writes: 
[N]o description of … the material facts and the holding … can 
uniquely determine the extension of the precise and narrowest 
holding of the potential precedent case. And if this is so, then 
except in the trivial and uninteresting ways…, the very idea of 
constraint by precedent appears to be illusory, and arguments from 
precedent turn out to be forms of persuasion used by competing 
advocates who are free to construct the alleged precedential 
constraints in largely unconstrained ways.83 
This worry may be that precedent cannot in principle constrain or is unlikely to do so in practice. 
Either way, underdeterminacy may cause judges to reach different outcomes in similar cases, 
thereby hindering the ability of precedent to promote equality, predictability and legitimacy.  
Fortunately, the conceptual and empirical underdeterminacy concerns are overblown. 
Precedent can constrain in principle. Even if every precedent has a range of ratio, rather than a 
“uniquely” correct ratio, this vague constraint still constrains. The real dispute concerns the 
extent of underdeterminacy. This dispute cannot be resolved at a level of generality covering all 
basic rights, much less for all legal disputes, but must require analysis of a specific case or line of 
cases. Of course, in practice, the ratio decidendi may be so malleable that judges are likely to 
manipulate them to serve their political ideology or implicit biases. However, such empirical 
assertions require sociological and psychological evidence about judicial behavior that is, so far, 
not forthcoming. In the meantime, all the players, including clients, lawyers, judges and 
academics act as if judges can and should constrain themselves by precedent. It is also almost 
universally assumed that lower courts are constrained by higher court precedent, even when the 
 
83 Schauer, “Precedent” (2011), 13 (citing Levi 1949; Stone 1968: 241–57). 
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likelihood of reversal is small.  
Nevertheless, the rule model for the scope of precedent is often pitched as a solution to 
the underdeterminacy of the ratio decidendi model. Rule-based models starkly distinguish the 
explicit holding from the reasoning of an opinion.84 Future opinions are constrained only by the 
canonical legal rule explicitly announced in prior judicial opinions.85 This model embraces the 
metaphor of judicial legislation. Judicial opinions promulgate rules to implement the general, 
abstract or vague statutory or constitutional rules. Judges proclaim these new rules with language 
like “We hold that . . . ,” or announce the crucial facts using language like “facts x, y . . . are 
dispositive.” Solum appropriately labels these “legislative holdings.”86  
The rule-based model has several advantages. First, there is no special difficulty about 
how judges determine a precedent’s scope or how precedents constrain judges. They follow the 
rules written in prior opinions just as they follow the rules written in constitutional or statutory 
texts. Interpreting judicial holdings is no different than interpreting the provisions of a 
constitution or statute. The analogy between holdings and statutes “spreads the pain” of 
skepticism, because the arguments against precedential constraint now appear to undermine all 
legal constraints. Second, the rule model serves the stability-based rationales of predictability 
and reliance. If an opinion formulates its rules and dispositive facts clearly, then these rules make 
it easier to predict legal outcomes and identify reasonable reliance. Last, Schauer argues that the 
rule model improves outcomes by framing decisions correctly. If judges are aware that their 
holding controls future cases, then they are more likely to focus on long-run considerations, 
rather than being misled by the idiosyncratic facts of a single case to create a rule with bad 
overall results.  
Despite its advantages, the rule model struggles to explain a core feature of the traditional 
doctrine of precedent: “distinguishing” precedents. A court may avoid an apparently applicable 
precedent by reaching a narrower holding that identifies pertinent facts or reasons in the current 
case that were not present in the precedent. The distinguished precedent retains its legal force but 
 
84 Ibid. 14. 
85 Schauer, “Precedent” (1987), 579 (the “articulated and authoritative characterization of the decision and its 
underlying facts…, not unlike an articulated and specifically formulated rule, constrains the use of subsequent and 
inconsistent characterizations”); Alexander and Sherwin, 6 (“a rule-oriented understanding of precedent gives prior 
courts authority to settle future disputes by announcing rules, [which] … implies that the resolution intended by the 
first court is the resolution to be adopted, without further input from later appliers of the rule”). 
86 Solum, “Supreme Court in Bondage,” 188. 
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with a diminished scope. In contrast, for a court to reach a different result on admittedly similar 
facts and reasons, it must “overrule” the precedent, depriving it of any precedential force. A 
supervisor who asks employees to remove their obnoxiously large earrings may later dismiss an 
employee with ear-stretchers. She can distinguish the cases because even if he removes the ear-
stretchers, distractingly large holes will remain. However, if she wants to retain an employee 
with a facial tattoo, she must then decide to discard the ear-stretcher decision.  
In its basic form, the rule model cannot sustain the distinction between distinguishing and 
over-ruling a precedent. If only the explicit rules are binding, then distinguishing a precedent is 
actually discarding the old rule for a more refined rule. However, the precedent was intended to 
govern cases with distinct facts. Presumably, the past decision-maker considered the refined rule 
and chose not to adopt it. Advocates of the rule-based approach have attempted to diminish this 
tension by modifying the approach so that (1) a holding’s scope is limited to cases with similar 
“material facts”87 or (2) asking what the prior court would have done if presented with the new 
facts.88 However, these modifications diminish the rule model’s relative stability advantages by 
reintroducing elements of the ratio decidendi model. Judges and citizens must go beyond the 
precedent’s explicit statement to predict which facts are material or how the prior court would 
have reacted to different facts. What is worse, they must do this without recourse to the 
reasoning of the opinion. In conclusion, the rule model must either drop the traditional practice 
of distinguishing precedents or lose its relative stability advantages.  
Second, by disregarding the role of public justification in the common law, the rule 
model diminishes the ability of precedent to enhance a state’s legitimacy. Future courts are 
bound only by a precedent’s explicit rules, not its reasoning. If a new case does not fit within the 
explicit formulation of the rule in the prior case, that case is not authoritative and an official may 
declare a new rule based on her evaluation of all the relevant reasons – even if the prior court’s 
reasoning supports a clear outcome in the new case. For example, if the supervisor declared 
yesterday that “Obtrusive facial modifications will not be tolerated,” she must send home a 
cashier for wearing large eyebrow rings but she may permit a cashier to work with extensive 
forearm tattoos. In a state, inconsistency of this kind inhibits citizens’ ability to recognize that 
the state protects a reciprocal specification of rights. When novel rights-based challenges arise, 
 
87 Schauer, “Precedent” (1987), 469-71 
88 Lamond, “Precedent and Analogy” (citing Raz 1979, 187-88). 
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officials applying the rule-based model may reconsider the challenge anew, even if it implicates 
the same substantive concerns as other rights already decided. Depending on which official hears 
the challenge, the state will reach discordant results based on inconsistent reasoning.  
Moreover, the rule model inhibits courts from building an impersonal tradition of 
reasoning about rights. If a rights-based challenge falls under the explicit statements in a prior 
decision, then the similarity of its reasons or facts are irrelevant. If not, a judge should proclaim a 
new rule to govern future cases, relying on her all-things-considered judgment about all the 
relevant facts and reasons. She need not develop a limited ruling by expounding past cases with 
similar facts or reasons. Her chosen specification becomes the state’s position, and her reasoning 
becomes its public justification, because future officials will follow her specification and will not 
reconsider her reasoning. Consequently, the rule-based model increases the impression that the 
state adopts the judgment of powerful officials and reduces the likelihood it will develop an 
impersonal system of justification.  
7.4.5 Give basic rights precedents presumptive force 
The force of precedent concerns the weight that precedents carry in future deliberations. 
They may have minimal, presumptive, strongly presumptive or binding weight.89 The force may 
vary for different contexts and take into account the importance of the precedent, the quality of 
its reasoning, its age, the number of similar cases or subsequent historical changes. 
Precedents applying judicial deference should be entitled to presumptive weight. Once an 
impartial official concludes that a specification and justification are reasonable, the fact that she 
reached this judgment creates a strong content-independent reason (but not a conclusive one) for 
subsequent judges to decide similarly despite their disagreement with the state’s choices or 
reasons. To overrule the prior decision that a public justification was reasonable, the later judges 
must do more than find that its reasoning or factual analysis was incorrect; she must find that it 
was improper.  
* * * * 
A moderate form of judicial review is well situated to enhance the legitimacy of the state 
 
89 The idea that courts are bound to follow precedent is much newer than typically assumed, only receiving general 
acceptance in the early nineteenth century. T. R. Lee, “Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective,” Vanderbilt Law 
Review 52 (1999): 647–83.  
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in conditions of reasonable disagreement. The doctrine of judicial review empowers individual 
citizens to demand the public authority provide a reasonable justification for actions that impact 
basic rights. When this power is limited by doctrinal and institutional restraints, such as 
standards of review and legislative overrides, a deferential judicial review can force the public 
authority to articulate a specification of rights justified by reasons that citizens appreciate, while 
preventing outcomes from reducing to the simple fiat of judicial or legislative power. If such 
judicial deference is further combined with a doctrine of precedent based on the ratio decidendi 
model, then judicial review can produce an impersonal specification of rights and tradition of 
public reason that defines the boundaries of reasonable disagreement.  
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CHAPTER 8: 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the common political rhetoric, persistent and reasonable disagreement about 
basic rights does not threaten the legitimacy of judicial review. It does not justify abandoning 
rights to legislative or popular control. On the contrary, legitimacy in conditions of reasonable 
disagreement requires justificatory institutions: institutions that can respond to citizens’ 
challenges and demonstrate that political coercion is used only according to a reasonable 
specification of their rights.  
As long as we have freedom of thought, we will reasonably disagree about basic rights, 
because those rights – liberty, economic and political – are vague and contested. Yet, to respect 
my own or others’ rights, I must follow a determinate specification. Unfortunately, as private 
individuals, we cannot settle on a specification without violating one another’s rights. Only a 
third-party authority can enact positive law to provide determinate specifications to bind us 
reciprocally. We are obligated to adopt such a practical authority. That authority is justified 
because it enables rightful relations among private individuals.  
A particular public authority is legitimate when (a) it adopts and respects a reasonable 
specification of vague or contested basic rights and (b) its procedures publicly demonstrate, 
using reasons citizens appreciate, that its respects reasonable specifications. If a state fulfills its 
minimal function by respecting a reasonable specification of rights, then its citizens are obligated 
not to oppose its decisions with force based on their own judgment. If a state also follows 
justificatory procedures that respond to dissenters with reasons that they appreciate, then citizens 
may accept the state’s decisions despite their disagreement. In that case, they are not abdicating 
their judgment but exercising it to recognize that the state protects a reasonable specification. A 
specific state is legitimate to the extent that it responds to citizens’ challenges with reasons that 
they appreciate.  
Why is it possible for a large portion of citizens to appreciate the state’s reasons, if they 
reasonably disagree about matters of justice? Because citizens need not endorse the state’s 
reasons or decision. Legitimacy and public reason do not require consensus on outcomes or 
principles. Citizens can recognize an outcome they reject is nonetheless reasonable, because we 
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appreciate reasons that we do not and will not endorse. Intuitively, citizens appreciate reasons 
that are in the ballpark. Formally, a citizen can appreciate a reason if there is some possible 
world in which her counterpart accepts the reason and this world is sufficiently similar to the 
actual world. For this purpose, similarity across possible worlds may be judged by differences in 
facts about the world, differences in the person’s fundamental, resilient or central beliefs and the 
type of arguments that might occasion belief change. Appreciation is a practical judgment about 
the quality of a reason. A politically reasonable citizen is one who can maintain sufficient 
distance from her otherwise wholehearted judgments about basic rights in order to make this 
counterfactual judgment.  
The final task for a philosophical theory of legitimacy is to identify institutions that will 
permit citizens to challenge state actions and that will articulate reasons that they appreciate. An 
intermediate form of judicial review is well suited to this task. Unlike other forms of political 
accountability, notably elections, judicial review empowers individual citizens to demand the 
state as a collective justify it chosen specification. If the judiciary adopts a stance of judicial 
deference, then judicial review can force the state to develop reasonable justifications without 
permitting judicial or legislative fiat to select the state’s specification. When deference is 
combined with precedent, the process of judicial review can develop an impersonal tradition of 
public reason that sets the boundaries of reasonable disagreement about rights.  
We will inevitably disagree with one another about the correct specification of our basic 
rights. We will inevitably disagree with the public officials who must select which specification 
of basic rights will govern our lives. Fortunately, legitimacy does not require that we agree with 
one another or with the state. Unfortunately, legitimacy requires something much more 
demanding. It requires us to accept outcomes we believe are unjust. It requires us to step back 
from our own position and recognize when a contrary position is reasonable. That is possible; it 
is just difficult. The state lays the groundwork for its own legitimacy by accepting an obligation 
to respond to citizens with reasonable justifications. Despite its polarizing history in the United 
States, judicial review can facilitate this process.  
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